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"If you knew your history, then you would know 
where you're comin' from." 
Bob Marley and the Wallers 
"Buffalo Soldier," 1983 
To my father, David Wallace, and in memory of 
my mother, Evelyn Schmitt Wallace, 
who helped me learn where I was coming from, 
and to my husband. Bill Effland, and 
our children, Daniel, Jacob, and Kathleen, 
who keep me sure of where I'm going to. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reform is more frequently a problem of power 
than of knowledge. The unpleasant and even shocking 
facts of disease and malnutrition, the brutalizing 
effects of poverty, are well enough known to lie 
heavily on the conscience of the American public. 
One of the curious characteristics of this problem 
is that the facts are rediscovered every few years. 
It is testimony to the drama and eloquence of the 
facts that we have not yet become altogether 
accustomed to them and they still have power to 
awaken conscience and even guilt. 
But conscience can only put the issues; it is 
political power that resolves them. Therefore a 
hiatus has existed, a persistent hiatus between 
intent and accomplishment.^ 
These words, written by farm labor market analyst 
Lloyd Fisher in his 1953 study The Harvest Labor Market 
in California, describe with perceptive insight the 
circumstances from which federal assistance programs for 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers emerged in post-World 
War II America. This study traces the political 
developments that ended the "persistent hiatus between 
intent and accomplishment" from the years immediately 
following World War II to the end of the Johnson war on 
poverty in 1968. During that period, the intersection of 
an awakening public conscience and the increasing power 
of reformers in government began to counter the political 
forces of commercial agriculture and in the process 
^Lloyd H. Fisher, The Harvest Labor Market in 
California (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard Univ. Press, 1953), 
p. 140. 
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defined the character of the programs that finally 
evolved as part of the broader antipoverty effort. 
Historians and other social scientists have 
repeatedly investigated and analyzed the experiences of 
migrant agricultural labor in recent American history. 
Economists have tried to count these workers and 
determine the reasons for their persistence in the 
American agricultural system. Sociologists have examined 
their living and working conditions and tried to discover 
what forces accounted for their position in American 
society. Political scientists have been interested in 
the ways in which the interactions of different group 
interests have affected government attention to the 
problems of farmworkers. Historians have recounted the 
experiences of agricultural workers as far back as the 
nineteenth century, providing context and perspective to 
questions about the situation of farmworkers in our own 
time.2 
^The work of economists is well represented in the 
large number of publications produced by the departments 
of Agriculture and Labor during the twentieth century. A 
recent study by economist Philip L. Martin, Harvest of 
Confusion: Migrant Workers in U.S. Agriculture (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), attempts to make sense of 
the varied interpretations presented in the last fifty 
years of such publications. The sociological approach 
may be seen in William H. Friedland and Dorothy Nelkin, 
Migrant Agricultural Workers in America's Northeast (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971). Examples of the 
political science perspective may be seen in Richard B. 
3 
Particular attention has been paid by recent 
scholars to the development of unions among California 
farmworkers, perhaps inspired by the successes of the 
United Farm Workers in the 1970s.' The accomplishments 
of organized labor tell only part of the story of 
successful action on behalf of migrant agricultural 
labor, however. The federally funded assistance programs 
that provided migrants with health, education, housing, 
and employment services affected migrants in far more 
areas than ever were touched by the efforts of union 
organizers. Yet few studies have examined these programs 
in trying to understand the recent experiences of migrant 
agricultural labor in the United States.* The analysis 
Craig, The Bracero Program; Interest Groups and Foreign 
Policv (Austin; Univ. of Texas Press, 1971) and J. Craig 
Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgencv: The Farmworker 
Movement in the 1960s (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 
1985). Historical studies include Cletus Daniel, Bitter 
Harvest; A History of California Farmworkers. 1870-1941 
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981) and Linda C. Majka 
and Theo J. Majka, Farm Workers. Agribusiness, and the 
State (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1982). 
'see Daniel, Bitter Harvest; Majka and Majka, Farm 
Workers. Agribusiness, and the State; Jenkins, The 
Politics of Insurgencv; The Farmworker Movement of the 
1960s; and Ernesto Galarza, Farm Workers and Agri­
business in California. 1947-1960 (Notre Dame, Ind.; 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). 
'^In fact, most of these studies emanate from either 
the programs themselves or from groups and individuals 
formerly associated with them. See, for example, Helen 
L. Johnston, Health for the Nation's Harvesters; A 
History of the Migrant Health Program in its Economic and 
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offered here helps to fill that gap by describing how the 
migrant assistance programs developed during the post-war 
period to become part of the federal antipoverty effort 
of the 1960s. 
This study also offers a new perspective on the 
development and implementation of federal reform programs 
during the 1960s. Analyses of the movement for reform 
during the 1960s have just begun to appear in the 1980s. 
They concentrate primarily on the broad picture, 
particularly the fate of liberalism, student unrest and 
the New Left, and the dramatic civil rights movement.^ 
Examination of the process by which programs such as 
those to assist migrants entered the national antipoverty 
Social Setting (Farmington Hills, Mich.: National Migrant 
Worker Council, Inc., 1985); National Farmworker Policy 
Project, CETA Farmworker Programs; A Legislative History 
(Sacramento, Calif.: National Farmworker Policy Project, 
1981); and Ronald L. Goldfarb, Migrant Farm Workers: A 
Caste of Despair (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1981). 
®See, for example, Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling 
of America; A Historv of Liberalism in the 1960s (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1984) ; Alonzo L. Hatnby, Liberalism 
and Its Challengers: F.D.R. to Reagan (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1984); Milton Viorst, Fire in the Streets; 
America in the 1960s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1979); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties; Years of Hope. Davs of 
Rage (New York; Bantam Books, 1988); James Miller, 
"Democracv Is in the Streets"; From Port Huron to the 
Siege of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); 
Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality. 1954-
1980. ed. by Eric Foner (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981); 
and David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther 
King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(New York: W. Morrow, 1986). 
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agenda provides a view of the fate of less spectacular 
movements. Furthermore, the investigation of how state 
and local agencies in Iowa used the available federal 
funds to operate assistance programs offers some evidence 
of how governments and private agencies translated 
legislation into operable programs. Such information 
affords a basis for understanding the effectiveness of 
federal programs for the communities and migrants they 
were designed to help. 
The terms migrant agricultural labor, migrant 
farmworkers, migrant workers, farmworkers, migrant labor, 
migrant farm labor, seasonal farmworkers, seasonal 
agricultural labor, and other combinations of these words 
are used interchangeably in this study. They may in some 
cases carry significant differences of meaning, but for 
the uses of this analysis those differences seemed 
unimportant. Farmworkers who worked as seasonal labor on 
large-scale farms were nearly always migratory to some 
extent, at least from job to job, if not from state to 
state. Although migrant labor received the largest 
measure of national attention, much federal legislation 
for migratory labor applied to seasonal farmworkers as 
well. 
The dissertation begins its investigation of migrant 
assistance programs in 1945. Migrant agricultural labor, 
6 
however, has been used in the United States since the 
consolidation of agriculture on a large scale began in 
the post-Civil War period. Historians have most commonly 
investigated migrant labor in California, where the size 
of farms became large enough by 1870 to require the 
hiring of large numbers of laborers during planting, 
cultivating, and harvest periods. The earliest groups of 
migrants included Chinese and Japanese immigrants. 
Restriction of Chinese immigration beginning in 1882, 
however, reduced the opportunity to hire Chinese labor. 
At the same time, the Japanese tendency to organize and 
insist on improved working conditions, as well as to save 
money and attempt to become farm tenants and owners 
themselves, convinced California farmers to look 
elsewhere for workers.* 
Large-scale growers turned to other isolated 
minority groups like the Filipinos and Mexicans for 
agricultural labor by the turn of the twentieth century. 
The alienation of these minority groups from the larger 
society allowed the growers to treat them in ways that 
would have been unacceptable to white labor. Another, 
perhaps more important, reason for their popularity as 
workers was the likelihood that these racial groups would 
^ajka and Majka, pp. 20-50; Daniel, pp. 46-67. 
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have few other options for employment and would be unable 
to discover any rights they might hold as Americans 
because of educational and language barriers. Those who 
were not citizens were under the constant fear of 
deportation/ 
Whatever the reasons for these minority groups' 
employment as laborers by large farms in California, 
there seems to have been little public interest or 
concern for the conditions under which the migrants 
worked. Not until union organizers for the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW) made the first attempt to 
improve conditions for farm workers in California in the 
years just before the First World War did the public take 
notice. The strikes and bloody confrontations between 
labor and growers that resulted from this organizing led 
to national interest in the situation. As a consequence, 
the first of many commissions and committees on 
agricultural labor assembled to investigate conditions in 
the fields of large-scale farms in California.® 
^Majka and Majka, pp. 61-68; Daniel, pp. 67-68. 
®The commission was a California state Commission on 
Immigration and Housing that began investigations in 1914 
as a means of ending the appeal of IWW organizers among 
farm labor. There was also a federal Commission on 
Industrial Relations that made investigations in 1915. 
Majka and Majka, pp. 51-61; Daniel, pp. 81-87; Carey 
McWilliams, 111 Fares the Land (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1942), p. 11. 
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World War I anti-socialist repression ended the 
ability of the IWW to affect the agricultural labor 
issue. The few reforms in California law forced by IWW 
pressure were rescinded and conditions returned to those 
that had existed before 1910. World War I also created 
pressure to allow large numbers of Mexicans to enter the 
United States as seasonal laborers to take the place of 
Americans serving as soldiers or in war industries. 
Throughout the 1920s government support of immigration 
for seasonal labor allowed further concentration of 
agriculture in California based on cheap, tractable, and 
plentiful labor.' 
As the economy entered the Depression in the 1930s, 
however, the need for Mexican labor declined. American 
workers from other regions and from California cities 
entered the seasonal agricultural work force. By the 
mid-1930s, the return of American workers to the fields 
of California had become a mass migration of displaced 
'u.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Employment Service, 
Report of the Farm Labor Bureau of the U.S. Employment 
Service. 1923 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1924); U.S. 
Department of Labor, U.S. Employment Service, Report of 
the Farm Labor Division. U.S. Employment Service. 1924. 
1925 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1925, 1926); U.S. Department 
of Labor, U.S. Employment Service, Summary of Activities 
of the Farm Labor Division. U.S. Employment Service. 
1926. 1927. 1928. 1929. 1930 (Washington, D.C.; GPO, 
1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931); Majka and Majka, pp. 62-
65; Daniel, p. 67. 
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farm families. The publicity their working and living 
conditions received helped support the development of the 
first federal assistance programs for migrant and 
seasonal farmworkers. Those programs, part of Franklin 
Roosevelt's New Deal, in turn formed the basis for the 
later efforts documented in this study. 
^°Majka and Majka, pp. 65-73; Daniel, pp. 67-68. 
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. CHAPTER 1 
FARM POWERS ASCENDANT; THE TRIUMPH OF P.L. 78 
At the end of World War II, migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers faced an uncertain future as American society 
and government began to readjust to peace and search for 
a new order following a decade and a half of domestic and 
foreign turmoil. The New Deal and the war offered two 
conflicting patterns that post-war farm labor policy 
might follow. On the one hand, the New Deal had produced 
the federal migrant labor camp system offering housing, 
sanitary facilities, health care, and a measure of self-
determination to impoverished farmworkers. Similarly, 
the emergency wartime agricultural labor program, 
continued through December 31, 1947, hired and provided 
maintenance, health care, and transportation for 
farmworkers needed by private employers/" 
'Accounts of the New Deal programs for farm labor 
may be found in Theodore Saloutos, The American Farmer 
and the New Deal (Iowa State Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 150-
178; Richard S. Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm 
Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia; Univ. of 
Missouri Press, 1966; reprint ed., Iowa State Univ. 
Press, 1982), pp. 106-132; Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and 
Politics; The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security 
Administration (Chapel Hill; The Univ. of North Carolina 
Press, 1968); Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian 
Democracy (Berkeley; Univ. of California Press, 1953), 
pp. 84-96; Walter J. Stein, California and the Dust Bowl 
Migration (Westport, Conn.; Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 
140-189; Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka, Farm Workers. 
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On the other hand, Congress, under pressure from 
organized farm employers, had denied farmworkers 
inclusion in the major labor legislation of the New Deal. 
Moreover, these same organizations had succeeded in 
wresting control of the federal farm camp program from 
the Farm Security Administration, sympathetic to workers, 
and placing it under the control of the Extension 
Service, sympathetic to employers. The critical question 
for farmworkers as they entered the post-war period was 
whether the farmworker advocates or the farm employers 
would establish control of farm labor issues after the 
war.2 
Agribusiness, and the State (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. 
Press, 1982), pp. 108-112; and Wayne D. Rasmussen, A 
Historv of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program. 1943-
47, Agriculture Monograph No. 13, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, September 
1951, pp. 10-11. Rasmussen's Historv of the Emergency 
Farm Labor Supply Program is also the most complete and 
detailed source of information on Department of 
Agriculture involvement with the agricultural labor 
supply program during World War II. 
^On the decision to exempt agricultural labor from 
protective labor legislation during the New Deal see 
Cletus Daniel, Bitter Harvest; A Historv of California 
Farmworkers. 1870-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 
1981), pp. 258-272; Ronald L. Goldfarb, Migrant Farm 
Workers: A Caste of Despair (Ames: Iowa State Univ. 
Press, 1981), pp. 147-148, 152-154, 162-163, 168-175; and 
Stein, California and the Dust Bowl Migration, pp. 140-
144. Details of the transfer of federal farm labor 
programs are described in Baldwin, Poverty and Politics, 
and McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy. 
12 
A group of officials in the Department of Labor's 
Bureau of Labor Standards had assembled as early as March 
1945 to plan action to assert the power of farmworker 
advocates within government at the end of the war 
emergency. They were led by the division's associate 
director Clara Beyer, an appointee of Frances Perkins and 
associate director of the division since its founding in 
1934. Beyer had a lifelong commitment to improving the 
condition of labor, as evidenced by the long list of 
labor-related positions she held before joining the labor 
standards office. Just out of college, she had served 
from 1917 to 1919 with the World War I Labor Policies 
Board and from 1919 to 1921 with the District of Columbia 
Minimum Wage Board. During the years 1922-1927, while 
she raised her three sons, she held several part-time and 
volunteer positions with the Women',s Joint Committee for 
the Minimum Wage and Hour Legislation, the American 
Federation of Labor, and the New York Consumers' League. 
This last activity led to her acquaintance with Frances 
Perkins. In fact, after joining the Labor Department in 
1928 as an economist with the Children's Bureau, she 
helped persuade Roosevelt to appoint Perkins to his 
13 
cabinet. Perkins in turn appointed Beyer to her position 
in the Bureau of Labor Standards.' 
Beyer's labor department committee had hoped to 
persuade Senator LaFollette to introduce a resolution 
calling for investigation of the potential solutions to 
anticipated post-war labor migration. State government 
officials also expressed concern about a potential 
return to the migrancy problems of the Depression. In 
December 1945, delegates to the Secretary of Labor's 
Twelfth National Conference on Labor Legislation, a 
gathering of government and private labor officials from 
throughout the United States, urged the formation of 
state and federal committees to study and coordinate 
government services for migrants. The group also 
recommended coverage of agricultural workers under all 
state and federal labor legislation, as well as special 
legislation regulating labor contractors and 
transportation and providing medical care.* 
'Bart Barnes, "Labor Expert Clara Beyer Dies at 98," 
Washington Post. 27 October 1990, p. D7; "Beyer, Clara 
Mortenson," Who's Who of American Women. Vol. 1: 1958-
1959. 1st ed. (Chicago; Marquis, 1958), p. 120. 
^Memorandum, Miss McConnell, 30 March 1945, 
"Migratory Labor—General," Box 94, Records of the 
President's Committee on Migratory Labor, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; "Secretary Reports 
on Federal Labor Consolidation; Outlines Legislation 
Problems," Labor Information Bulletin 13(1)(1946):2-3. 
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Federal action eventually came as part of the 
Department of Labor's efforts to smooth the reorientation 
of workers to a peacetime economy. Major General G. B. 
Erskine, administrator of the Retraining and Reemployment 
Administration, established the Federal Interagency 
Committee on Migrant Labor in May 1946 to investigate and 
recommend action on post-war labor migrancy. 
Erskine chaired the committee, with Shans McCarthy and 
John P. Sanderson of the Reemployment Branch of the 
Retraining and Reemployment Administration serving as 
deputy chairman and secretary, respectively. The 
committee operated through work groups composed of staff 
from the departments of Agriculture and Labor, the 
Federal Security Agency, the National Housing Agency, and 
the Railroad Retirement Board. Although the committee 
considered migrancy among workers in industry and 
transportation as well as agriculture, their report, 
issued in 1947, concentrated primarily on the needs of 
agricultural migrants.® 
The committee report recommended action by 
employers, communities, all levels of government, and 
migrants themselves. Calls for inclusion of agricultural 
^Federal Interagency Committee on Migrant Labor, 
Migrant Labor ... a human problem (Washington, D.C.; 
U.S. Department of Labor, Retraining and Reemployment 
Administration, 1947), pp. v-vi, 1-5. 
15 
workers under state and federal labor protection 
legislation echoed those made by the National Conference 
on Labor Legislation two years earlier. In the area of 
social services for migrants, the report urged re.^oval of 
state residence requirements for health, education, i 
welfare assistance and federal grants-in-aid to help 
states in providing those services to migrants. Less 
specific recommendations discussed the need for increased 
public awareness of migrant problems to support necessary 
legislation, and education of employers, communities, and 
migrants to promote more efficient recruitment and 
smoother integration of migrants into the areas where 
they worked.* 
Among the most creative of the solutions to migrant 
problems advanced by the committee were those aimed at 
ending the need for migrancy altogether. They recalled 
some of the direct intervention programs attempted during 
the New Deal to stabilize the rural poor. By 1947, 
however, solutions requiring federal direction of social 
and economic innovations had fallen into disfavor. The 
committee suggested instead that areas with seasonal 
labor needs take local action to diversify their 
industries and assist in establishing permanent 
^Federal Interagency Committee on Migrant Labor, pp. 
6-58. 
16 
subsistence homesteads for migrants to assure the 
availability of seasonal labor without forcing migrancy 
upon their workers/ 
Agricultural employers, however, did not show much 
interest in improving the living and working conditions 
of their seasonal workers in the immediate post-war 
period. Discussions of the need for importation of 
Mexican and other foreign labor to meet harvest labor 
demands after the war provide ample evidence of this 
attitude and its influence on Congress and the Employment 
Service. The emergency farm labor recruitment program 
had provided both a domestic labor supply program and 
foreign contract labor agreement.® When that program 
came to an end on December 31, 1947, farm employer 
organizations abandoned efforts to secure continuation of 
the domestic program, but they persisted in seeking 
foreign farmworkers from Mexico in the years after 1947. 
From 1948 to 1950, provisions of the 1917 
immigration law supported annual agreements with Mexico 
allowing recruitment of labor both from within Mexico and 
^Federal Interagency Committee on Migrant Labor, p. 
9. 
*The wartime foreign labor importation agreements 
are discussed in Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of the 
Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 1942," Agricultural 
History 34(3)(1960): 140-149. 
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from among illegal Mexican "wetbacks" already in the 
United States. Loss of the wartime program resulted in a 
new program in many ways more amenable to employers; the 
federal government played no role except for Employment 
Service certification of a grower's need for foreign 
workers. The U.S. government no longer supervised 
contracts guaranteeing minimum living and working 
conditions or wage levels. Moreover, because farmworkers 
had no recognized organizations of their own, they had no 
representatives available to balance farm employer 
influence on the Employment Service advisory boards that 
determined when to certify a grower's foreign labor 
needs. Therefore, the Employment Service rarely denied 
an employer's contention that domestic labor was 
unavailable. The Mexican labor importation program of 
the late 194 0s appeared to offer American farm employers 
the control of their labor force they had long desired.' 
'Majka and Majka, pp. 142-146; Ellis Hawley, "The 
Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950-1965," 
Agricultural History 40(3)(1966); 158-159; Peter N. 
Kirstein, Analo over Bracero; A History of the Mexican 
Workers in the United States from Roosevelt to Nixon (San 
Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1977), pp. 64-82; 
Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program; Interest Groups 
and Foreign Policy (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1971), 
pp. 52-64; President's Commission on Migratory Labor, 
Migratory Labor in American Agriculture (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1951), pp. 52-54, 61-64. 
18 
This evidence of the political power of farm 
employers and their consequent power over agricultural 
workers angered labor unions, particularly the National 
Farm Labor Union, and such liberal organizations as the 
National Council for Agricultural Life and Labor, the 
National Consumers League, and the Catholic Rural Life 
Conference, who worked to improve conditions for domestic 
migrant farmworkers. The resistance of American growers 
to adopting even minimal standards for foreign workers 
and their regular use of imported labor instead of 
domestic farmworkers outraged these migrant advocates. 
That outrage became an insistent demand by 1949 that the 
President appoint a commission to thoroughly investigate 
the situation of migratory labor, both foreign and 
domestic. 
Finally, in June 1950, President Truman created such 
a commission by Executive Order. The commission included 
five members, all professionals with some experience in 
areas germane to the study of migrant labor. Maurice T. 
Van Hecke was a law professor at the University of North 
Carolina and a former member of the National War Labor 
Board. Archbishop Robert E. Lucey served as Chairman of 
the Bishops' Committee for the Spanish Speaking People of 
i^Kirstein, pp. 74-75; Craig, pp. 54. 
19 
the Southwest. William M. Leiserson, a labor arbitrator, 
had recently been president of the Industrial Relations 
Research Association and had formerly held the position 
of chairman of the National Mediation Board. His 
experience also included membership on the National Labor 
Relations Board. Peter H. Odegard chaired the Department 
of Political Science at the University of California and 
was president of the American Political Science 
Association. The fifth member; Paul Miller, worked as 
chief of the Extension Service at University of 
Minnesota. Miller resigned shortly after his 
appointment. Noble Clark, associate director of the 
University of Wisconsin Experiment Station and former 
deputy director general of the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, replaced him. Finally, Varden 
Fuller, an agricultural economist with the Agriculture 
Experiment Station at the University of California, 
served as executive secretary. Fuller investigated labor 
relations in California agriculture for his doctoral work 
in agricultural economics in 1939 and had become a 
recognized expert in the field of agricultural labor. 
^Kirstein, pp. 85-86; Peter Kirstein, "Agribusiness, 
Labor, and the Wetbacks; Truman's Commission on Migratory 
Labor," Historian 40(1978);652, 656; "Brief Biographies 
of Participants, National Conference to Stabilize Migrant 
Labor, November 21-22, 1959," p. 2, "National Conference 
to Stabilize Migrant Labor, Chicago," Box 84, Records of 
20 
Officials of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People criticized Truman for 
neglecting to appoint minority and labor leaders to the 
Commission, but he also did not appoint representatives 
of farm employer organizations. The President's choices 
appeared to be a sincere attempt to produce an objective 
assessment of the migratory labor situation based on open 
public testimony from all interested parties. By 
choosing academic and religious professionals, Truman 
could expect the Commission to be free of vested interest 
on either side of the controversy.^^ 
' Yet why the Truman administration accepted the need 
for investigation of this question only three years after 
its own earlier committee had completed a nearly 
identical study is not clear. The President's Commission 
report never mentioned the work of the earlier Federal 
Interagency Committee, despite the striking similarity of 
their purposes, research, and recommendations. Among 
agencies and organizations who testified before the 
the U.S. President's Committee on Migratory Labor, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Varden Fuller, 
"The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the 
Evolution of Farm Organization in California" (Ph.D. 
diss., Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1939). 
^Kirstein, Analo over Bracero. pp. 84-87. 
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Commission, only two, the Federal Security Agency and the 
Alliance for Guidance of Rural Youth, referred to the 
earlier investigation. Both indicated that the Truman 
administration had ignored the results of that study. 
Presumably the President intended the new Commission to 
serve the administration as a lightening rod for 
criticism of the foreign farm labor program and the 
neglect of domestic farmworkers. 
The Executive Order creating the President's 
Commission on Migratory Labor directed the Commission to 
investigate the twin issues of the inadequate living and 
working conditions of domestic migratory labor and the 
implications of the foreign farm labor importation 
program for efforts to improve those conditions. To 
carry out this responsibility, the Commission held public 
hearings during the summer and fall of 1950. These 
hearings offered interested groups and individuals the 
opportunity to present their grievances, recommendations, 
and professional experiences to the Commission. 
Presentations followed what had become a familiar 
pattern of positions. Farmers and their representatives 
testified that, in the words of LaMonte Graw, migrant 
labor "could earn $20.00 a day but they didn't want to 
^The President's Commission on Migratory Labor, pp. 
vii-viii. 
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work hard enough to earn more than $20.00 a week." Graw 
was manager of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Growers 
Association, chairman of the Florida Farm Labor Advisory 
Committee, and a member of the U.S. Employment Service 
Advisory Committee. He insisted "that migrants who 
wanted to work could make more money than people in other 
industries."14 Keith Mets, president of the Imperial 
Valley Farmers' Association, representing 500 of the 
wealthiest California farmers, opposed any labor 
involvement in determining need for foreign contract 
workers and recommended an open border for acquiring 
Mexican farm labor, controlled by a simple card system 
allowing border crossing for farm work. C. B. Ray, a 
Texas grower representing the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, repeated Graw's claim that the shortage of 
farm labor was a shortage of domestic migrants who were 
"willing and able." He also echoed Mets' recommendation 
of a simplified contract labor system that would make 
legal entries out of illegal ones.^® 
i^Memorandum, Louise Q. Blodgett to Miss McConnell, 
18 July 1950, "President's Commission on Migratory Labor-
-Hearings of National Organizations," Box 13, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
Incited in Kirstein, Analo over Bracero. p. 88; 
Memorandum, Blodgett to McConnell, 18 July 1950, p. 7, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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Labor organizations opposed importation of foreign 
workers on principle, especially without labor 
involvement in the process of certifying a domestic 
shortage. Labor representatives countered the grower 
argument that domestic farmworkers would not take farm 
labor jobs by pointing out the role of low wages and poor 
working and living conditions in creating the supposed 
shortage of domestic workers. H. L. Mitchell of the 
National Farm Labor Union suggested that Congress might 
justify providing minimum standards for farmworkers, 
since farm parity legislation calculated farm labor costs 
into the guaranteed price index. He also claimed that 
the requirement of county extension agent approval for 
transport of domestic workers to areas of labor shortage 
outside their home county had hampered the establishment 
of an effective domestic farm labor placement program. 
Testimony from voluntary religious, education, and 
social welfare organizations echoed the concerns 
expressed by organized labor, although these groups 
concentrated particularly on such issues as education, 
child labor, housing, health care, and racism. They 
repeatedly challenged the Commission by asking questions 
'^Kirstein, Analo over Bracero. pp. 87-88; 
Memorandum, Blodgett to McConnell, 18 July 1950, p. 4, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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about the federal government's neglect of migrant 
farmworkers. Why did established labor standards 
legislation exclude agricultural labor from its 
provisions? Why had the authority to fund farm labor 
housing under the Housing Act of 1950 not been used? Why 
did the U.S. Employment Service work so often in the 
interests of farm employers to the disadvantage of farm 
labor?^ 
Federal agency representatives transmitted the 
administration's position on migratory labor issues to 
the Commission through written reports detailing their 
agencies' experiences with migrant labor and 
recommendations for further action. Each department 
emphasized those aspects of the migratory labor problem 
with which it was most familiar and approached the 
problem from the context of its special responsibilities. 
The Department of Labor recommendations focused 
particularly on extension of labor standards laws to 
migrant farmworkers, including protection of the right of 
agricultural employees to organize and bargain 
collectively. Labor also offered model regulations for 
migrant housing and transportation. The Federal Security 
Agency, precursor to the Department of Health, Education, 
^Memorandum, Blodgett to McConnell, 18 July 1950, 
pp. 1-5, 7, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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and Welfare, addressed the issues of health care, 
education, and social security protections for migrants 
and their children. Although they clearly recognized a 
need, they expressed frustration over the agency's lack 
of authority to cope with that need from the federal 
level, or even to assist state and local governments and 
voluntary organizations looking for guidance and 
financial aid J® 
The Department of Agriculture agreed on the general 
outline of improvements needed for migrant farmworkers, 
but approached the issue from a different context. Their 
solutions took the form of improving the living and 
working conditions for migrant farm labor in order to 
retain that labor for the farm, rather than to benefit 
the migrant farmworkers themselves as an isolated group. 
In particular, the Department of Agriculture 
recommendations addressed the problems of "the basic 
economic and population problems that, from the supply 
Suggested Recommendations of the U.S. Department 
of Labor to the President's Commission on Migratory 
Labor," "Statement to President's Commission on Migratory 
Labor, Federal Security Agency," October 1950, 
"President's Commission on Migratory Labor—Federal 
Agencies," Box 13, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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side, generate migratoriness.The Department 
considered improved employment and educational 
opportunities, vocational guidance, and aid in relocating 
the necessary long-term solutions to the problems that 
"pushed" workers into the migrant farm labor stream. The 
Department of Agriculture also identified conditions that 
"pulled" migrants into a system of short-term, seasonal 
employment leading to chronic underemployment. To 
improve this system, Agriculture recommended accelerated 
mechanization to reduce the need for hand labor at 
seasonal peaks, experimentation with combinations of 
crops and livestock within an area or on single farms 
that would spread labor needs more evenly over the ye ir, 
and efforts to engage growers in cooperative planning 
that would provide better distribution of labor needs 
across regions and over seasons. 
After gathering thid wide range of views on the 
problems of migrant agricultural labor in the United 
States, the President's Commission on Migratory Labor 
issued its report on March 26, 1951. Reflecting the 
^'"Recommendations of the United States Department of 
Agriculture to the President's Commission on Migratory 
Labor," October 1950, pp. 5-6, "President's Commission on 
Migratory Labor—Federal Agencies," Box 13, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
^°Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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seriousness with which they accepted their charge to 
recommend an appropriate policy response, the members of 
the Commission distilled their findings into a 
challenging question: 
The issue we face as a matter of national 
policy is this: Shall we continue indefinitely to 
have low work standards and conditions of employment 
in agriculture, thus depending on the 
underprivileged and the unfortunate at home and 
abroad to supply and replenish our seasonal and 
migratory work force? Or shall we do in agriculture 
what we have already done in other sectors of our 
economy—create honest-to-goodness jobs which will 
offer a decent living so that domestic workers, 
without being forced by dire necessity, will be 
willing to stay in agriculture and become a 
dependable labor supply?^ 
The Commission members concluded that federal policy 
had failed to provide leadership on the question. They 
believed, in fact, "we have done worse than that. We 
have used the institutions of government to procure alien 
labor willing to work under obsolete and backward 
conditions and thus to perpetuate those very 
conditions."^! The Commission members, however, did not 
believe that the federal government itself could be held 
fully accountable nor be expected to improve conditions 
on its own. They recommended a federal role as 
coordinator of efforts by all involved groups and 
^The President's Commission on Migratory Labor, pp. 
22-23. 
22lbid., p. 23. 
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individuals: employers, workers, private agencies and 
voluntary organizations, and government at all levels. 
That role, the Commission suggested, could.best be played 
through the establishment of a Federal Committee on 
Migratory Labor composed of three public members and 
representatives from each of the federal agencies with an 
interest in migrant labor policy—the departments of 
Agriculture, Labor, and State, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and the Federal Security 
Agency. 
Except for the addition of the foreign farm labor 
issue, the recommendations in the Commission report 
essentially repeated those made by the Federal 
Interagency Committee on Migrant Labor in 1947. 
Unfortunately, they experienced an identical fate. The 
reasons for that very likely lie in the problems Truman 
experienced with agricultural interests throughout his 
presidency. According to historian Allen Matusow's 
analysis of farm policy and politics during the Truman 
administration, the President had continual difficulty in 
securing the support of farm organizations;^^ perhaps 
^"The President's Commission on Migratory Labor, p. 
24. 
^^Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the 
Truman Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1967). 
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risking their further alienation on the relatively 
obscure issue of farm labor seemed unwise. By appointing 
the Commission, Truman had temporarily satisfied the 
demands of labor and liberal migrant advocacy 
associations. By ignoring its recommendations, he could 
avoid antagonizing the powerful commercial farm groups. 
Those farm groups, in fact, were demonstrating their 
political power on farm labor questions at the very 
moment the Commission report became public. Despite the 
Commission's assertions of the detrimental effects of 
imported foreign labor on conditions for domestic 
farmworkers, members of the House and Senate agriculture 
committees introduced legislation early in 1951 to 
institutionalize the annual agreements with Mexico for 
supplying farm labor to American growers. Senator Allen 
J. Ellender of Louisiana presented S. 984 in late 
February and Representative W. R. Poage of Texas offered 
a House version in March 1951. The legislation provided 
the Secretary of Labor authority to operate a foreign 
farm labor recruitment and transportation program similar 
to the World War II emergency program. The bill 
authorized the Secretary to recruit Mexicans for farm 
labor in the United States; operate reception centers and 
provide food, transportation, and health care to those 
workers during transit to American employers; assist in 
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negotiating work contracts; and guarantee employer 
compliance with contracts. To protect domestic workers, 
foreign workers could not be contracted unless the 
Secretary of Labor certified that domestic workers were 
unavailable despite sincere efforts to recruit them with 
wages and working conditions equivalent to those offered 
the Mexican workers. 
The importation program recommended in this 
legislation differed little from the annual agreements 
already in operation except that the U.S. government 
replaced individual growers as contracting agents. The 
federal government thereby accepted most of the cost of 
operating the program and guaranteed to the Mexican 
government that American employers would honor their 
contracts and that Mexican workers would return to Mexico 
at the end of the season. The new program relieved 
growers of the expense and risks of recruiting their own 
Mexican workers. It also reassured the Mexican 
government, thereby increasing the likelihood that the 
^^Studies of the Mexican farm labor importation 
program (commonly known as the bracero program) are 
abundant. Among the most instructive are Kirstein, Angle 
over Bracero; Hawley, "The Politics of the Mexican Labor 
Issue,"; Craig, The Bracero Program; Majka and Majka, 
Farm Workers. Agribusiness, and the State, pp. 136-166; 
and Ernesto Galarza, Farm Workers and Aari-business in 
California. 1947-1960 (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press, 1977), pp. 203-276. 
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program could continue on a relatively permanent basis. 
In exchange for the security of a more permanent and 
predictable program, growers accepted additional federal 
involvement in their operations. Most farm employers, 
however, expected the Secretary of Labor to defer to the 
state Farm Placement Service offices for certification 
decisions and contract supervision. Because grower 
influence with the state Farm Placement Services remained 
strong, federal interference did not seem much of a 
threat in 1951. 
Advocates for protection of domestic migrant 
farmworkers objected strongly to the reinstitution of a 
government-sponsored labor importation program. The 
President's Commission on Migratory Labor had just 
recommended ending foreign farm labor importation 
altogether in the interests of improving conditions for 
underemployed domestic farmworkers. To create an 
elaborate and apparently permanent importation system 
amounted to rejection of the entire thrust of the 
Commission's findings. Senators Hubert Humphrey of 
Minnesota, Wayne Morse of Oregon, and Dennis Chavez of 
New Mexico made persistent efforts in discussions of the 
Senate bill to add amendments to safeguard American 
^'See Kirstein, Analo over Bracero; Hawley; Craig; 
Majka and Majka, pp. 136-166; and Galarza, pp. 203-276. 
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farmworkers by insisting on comparable protections and 
benefits for domestic farmworkers before the Secretary of 
Labor could certify the need for imported labor. All 
three repeatedly noted the assertions of the President's 
Commission that domestic farm labor could fill almost all 
farm labor needs in the United States if recruitment and 
labor standards could be improved. Representatives James 
G. Polk of Ohio and Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota 
attempted similar amendments in the House. 
Supporters of the labor importation bills 
counteracted the effectiveness of this appeal to protect 
American workers through reassurances and their own 
appeals to other related issues. Perhaps most effective, 
Senator Ellender and Senator Spessard Holland of Florida, 
another Agriculture Committee member, continually 
reminded their fellow senators that the Ellender bill 
included protection for domestic farmworkers. One 
section required the Secretary of Labor to consider 
adverse effects of imported labor on American farmworkers 
before certifying a grower's need for Mexican labor. 
Representative Poage and Representative Harold D. Cooley 
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 30 April, 1, 7 May 1951, 
Congressional Record 97:4505-4520, 4546-4547, 4583-4603, 
4959-4980; U.S., Congress, House, 26, 30 June 1951, 
Congressional Record 97:7153-7154, 7161-7165, 7167-7169, 
7171-7175, 7538-7542. 
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of North Carolina, also of the House Agriculture 
Committee, repeated this assertion in the House. At 
suggestions by Senator Chavez that the Department of 
Labor had not acted effectively in the past to protect 
migrant farmworkers, Senator Ellender accused Chavez and 
those who might agree with him of disrespect for well-
intentioned government officials. Ellender thereby 
helped to turn the sympathies of other senators away from 
the idealistic appeals for protection of the powerless 
being made by Chavez and his colleagues. 
Supporters of imported farm labor found a second 
effective issue in concerns about the "wetback invasion." 
Since the end of the wartime Mexican labor importation 
program, the numbers of Mexican workers entering the 
United States illegally had increased dramatically. 
Senator Ellender and Representatives Poage and Cooley 
insisted repeatedly that a formal arrangement for 
recruiting Mexican farmworkers would end this situation 
by providing alternative, legal means for Mexicans to 
find employment on American farms. Although the 
importation bill did not specifically include provisions 
to enforce immigration laws against illegal Mexicans, it 
^°U.S., Congress, Senate, 30 April, 1 May 1951, 
Congressional Record 97;4581-4603. 4512-4517; U.S., 
Congress, House, 30 June 1951, Congressional Record 
97:7538-7542. 
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did require the Secretary of Labor to refuse to certify 
growers found to be employing wetbacks. 
Finally, as had been the case during the early 
1940s, the food production pressures of war entered the 
discussion of labor importation arrangements with Mexico. 
North Korea had invaded the South in June 1950 and by 
summer of 1951 the American military draft began to 
affect the availability of domestic farm labor in some 
areas. Fears of labor and food shortages made it easier 
for farm state congressmen to persuade their urban 
colleagues of the real need for foreign contract labor. 
Representative E. C. Gathings of Arkansas, representing a 
state with several large users of Mexican farm labor, 
quickly dismissed the recommendations of the President's 
Commission on Migratory Labor by pointing out that the 
Commission had been appointed before the outbreak of war 
and therefore addressed a situation different from the 
current emergency.^" 
The majority of members of both the House and Senate 
accepted the arguments advanced by supporters of the 
^'u.S., Congress, House, 26, 27, 30 June 1951, 
Congressional Record 97:7151-7153, 7156-7171, 7173-7175, 
7254-7258, 7538-7542. 
^°U.S., Congres^, Senate, 1 May 1951, Congressional 
Record 97:4583-4584; U.S., Congress, House, 26, 27 June 
1951, Congressional Record 97:7147-7148, 7161, 7258-7259. 
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Mexican labor importation bill. The final version of 
Ellender's bill passed the Senate on a voice vote May 7 
and the House by a roll call of 240 to 139 on June 27. 
The question clearly included an element of party 
division. Democrats had split nearly evenly on the bill 
while Republicans had voted heavily in favor of it. Of 
the 240 supporters, 132 were Republicans and 108 
Democrats. Among those opposing were 90 Democrats and 
only 49 Republicans.'^ 
Region, however, also played an important role in 
determining support for the farm labor importation 
program. Democrats elected from states that regularly 
used imported farm labor (Arizona, New Mexico, 
California, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida) 
voted 41 to 7 in favor of the bill. Democrats from other 
states split 83 to 67 against it. Republicans in the 
farm labor states voted 12 to 1 to support the program. 
Those representing the rest of the nation favored it only 
^'u.S., Congress, Senate, 7 May 1951, Congressional 
Record 97:4979-4980; U.S., Congress, House, 27 June 1951, 
Congressional Record 97:7261. Analysis of this vote was 
performed using the SPSSX statistical package. The 
database of Congressional roll call votes was provided by 
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research, University of Michigan. Neither the original 
collectors of the data nor the consortium bear any 
responsibility for the analysis or interpretation. I 
wish to thank Dr. Don F. Hadwiger and Dr. James M. 
McCormick of the Iowa State University Political Science 
Department for their assistance with this analysis. 
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120 to 49, still overwhelming, but by a smaller 
percentage.^ 
Grower organizations and their representatives in 
Congress, a small minority, required the support of these 
other state delegations to maintain their labor 
importation program. Their influence had won the day 
handily in 1951, but only for a two-year program. Those 
favoring Mexican labor importation would have to lobby to 
maintain that influence each time Congress reconsidered 
the law. 
The bill passed the conference committee on June 30 
and President Truman signed it on July 13, against the 
advice of his own Department of Labor, whose officials 
supported the findings of the President's Commission that 
domestic workers could fill the nation's farm labor 
needs. The Ellender bill became Public Law 78, creating 
what amounted to a permanent program for the 
supplementation of American farm labor through 
importation of contract labor from Mexico. Congressional 
support for this program completely disregarded evidence 
from federal study committees that such labor importation 
'^U.S., Congress, Senate, 7 May 1951, Congressional 
Record 97:4979-4980; U.S., Congress, House, 27 June 1951, 
Congressional Record 97:7261. Analysis of this vote was 
performed using SPSSX and the lUCPSR database. See 
footnote 31 for full citation. 
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depressed the wages and living conditions available to 
domestic workers, accepting instead the assurances of 
grower representatives that farmers needed the additional 
help to provide the nation with an adequate food 
supply." 
President Truman did not entirely ignore the advice 
of his own staff regarding the limitations of the bill. 
In his message to Congress on signing the bill he 
indicated strong reservations about the limited way in 
which the legislation addressed the problems of migratory 
labor in the United States. He expressed the hope that 
this foreign labor importation program would be only the 
first in a series of measures in Congress designed to 
alleviate the other serious shortcomings of American 
policy that affected migrant agricultural workers. He at 
least acknowledged the recommendations of his Commission 
when he reminded Congress of the need of domestic 
migrants for improved housing, health care, education, 
and social security protection, and noted his intentions 
to submit, periodically, recommendations for specific 
legislation in those areas.Politically, however, 
Truman could ill afford to take a stand against growers 
"craig, pp. 76-77; U.S., Congress, House, 13 July 
1951, Congressional Record 97:8144-8146. 
'^Ibid. 
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on an issue on which they had such obvious strength. As 
Roosevelt had acceded to the transfer of the farm labor 
program from the Farm Security Administration to the 
Extension Service during a war emergency in 1942, Truman 
also acceded to grower demands for a farm labor supply 
program that conformed to their needs. 
Less than a year after passage of P.L. 78, in 
February 1952, Senator Humphrey, chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations, 
called several days of hearings to investigate the 
problems of domestic migratory labor. Although these 
hearings were part of a general series on manpower 
problems, they addressed directly the legislative 
recommendations of the President's Commission on 
Migratory Labor. Witnesses included the same mix of 
government, labor, grower, church, and social welfare 
organization representatives who had presented testimony 
to the President's Commission two years earlier. The 
subcommittee also heard testimony from most of the former 
members of the President's Commission. As a result, 
little new information surfaced, but the hearings did 
reinforce the effort of the Commission to draw attention 
to the problems of domestic migrant agricultural workers 
and their families and to try to address those problems 
legislatively. Of even greater significance to the 
39 
future of migrant labor legislation in Congress, these 
hearings challenged the jurisdiction of the congressional 
agricultural committees on farm labor issues. Although 
the challenge was not repeated until 1959, the hearings 
became a symbol, along with the President's Commission 
report, of a new direction for migrant legislation in the 
United States.'® 
The political interplay between organized 
agriculture and liberal advocates of federal assistance 
for migrant labor from the end of World War II to the 
passage of Public Law 78 reveals a tension that 
characterized federal involvement with migrants beginning 
with the New Deal. A contest of power and sympathy 
between the reality of farmworker poverty and the 
political influence of agricultural employers developed 
over those years and affected the content of policies and 
legislation produced throughout the period. 
During the New Deal wide public sympathy with the 
problems of poverty had supported the rural poverty 
initiatives that assisted displaced farmers and tenants 
forced to migrate in search of work. The intervention of 
''U.S., Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Hearings on Migratory Labor before the 
Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 82d Cong., 2d 
sess., 1952. 
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war dissipated that support and forced a change in 
government priorities that derailed the rural poverty 
initiatives. The war and immediate post-war years 
witnessed the growing strength of farm organizations at 
the expense of efforts to address farmworker poverty. 
Yet advocates of federal assistance to migrants managed 
to keep the issue alive with study committees and 
hearings that made public reports of conditions and 
recommendations for their improvement. Although the 
Truman administration never implemented any of these 
recommendations, the committee reports and hearings, 
particularly that of the President's Commission on 
Migratory Labor, laid a solid foundation for future 
initiatives. As the political balance changed over the 
next two decades, migrant advocates would return to their 
recommendations repeatedly for ideas about appropriate 
action on migrant issues. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE 1950S: 
"DARK AGES" OR LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR FUTURE SUCCESS? 
Historian Charles C. Alexander has described the 
Eisenhower administration as a period of "holding the 
line," suggesting that resistance to change characterized 
the years 1952 to 1960. Other analysts, however, have 
pointed to a slow move away from the conservative 
consensus of the early years under Eisenhower toward a 
growing interest in reform by the end of the decade. 
Political scientist James Sundquist, writing in 1968, 
identified the Eisenhower period as the conservative half 
of a pendulum-swing toward liberalism that culminated in 
the flood of reform legislation of 1964 and 1965. 
According to this metaphor, the swing toward liberalism 
was half-completed by 1960.^ 
The issue of farm labor in the 1950s follows both 
patterns of the political character of that decade. On 
the one hand, the Mexican farm labor importation program, 
commonly called the bracero program, continued to color 
'Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The 
Eisenhower Era. 1952-1961 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. 
Press, 1975), pp. xv-xvii; James L. Sundquist, Politics 
and Policy: The Eisenhower. Kennedy, and Johnson Years 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 
506-512. 
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discussion of the migrant labor problem in the United 
States during the 1950s. Opponents persisted in their 
efforts to end the program, but without success. Termed 
the "Dark Ages" for anti-braceroists by one student of 
the period,2 agricultural interests held firm and 
encountered almost no Congressional opposition to 
extensions of the program throughout the decade. 
Yet, on the other hand, debate of the Mexican 
contract labor bills and the report of the President's 
Commission on Migratory Labor set in motion a continuing 
public discussion of the need for improved conditions for 
domestic migrant labor. Participants in that discussion 
included union activists in California, members of 
voluntary religious and social welfare organizations. 
Congressional advocates of assistance to domestic 
migrants, and officials within the Eisenhower 
administration whose work brought them in contact with 
migratory labor issues. By the end of the decade, their 
arguments gained increasing government and public 
support, and although the bracero program continued to 
appear secure, advocates of reform were poised for action 
^Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest 
Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin; Univ. of Texas Press, 
1971), p. 138. 
43 
in the new political environment developing on the 
horizon. 
The political struggle over the bracero program took 
place primarily in Congress, where agricultural interests 
maintained a powerful presence during the 1950s. In 
part, their influence arose from the traditional 
association of farmers with democratic virtue, which 
served to insulate farm politics from intense scrutiny by 
an increasingly urban public with nostalgic views of 
rural life. But their real strength depended on 
organization and the close personal ties between farm 
organization leaders and rural representatives in 
Congress. If farm state congressmen were not themselves 
farmers or members of agricultural organizations, they 
recognized the influence of those groups among their 
constituents and listened carefully to their advice. 
Additionally, these rural representatives held most of 
the seats on congressional agriculture committees, 
assuring that agricultural interests would control 
agricultural legislation/* 
^Analyses of the influence of farm organizations on 
agricultural policies in general may be found in Charles 
M. Hardin, "The Politics of Agriculture in the United 
States," Journal of Farm Economics 32(November 1950);571-
583; Ernest A. Engelbert, "The Political Strategy of 
Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics 36(August 
1954):375-386; Gordon E. Baker, Rural Versus Urban 
Political Power (New York; Random House, 1955); Wesley 
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Because the agriculture committees remained the 
basis of farm organization political power, continuing 
jurisdiction over farm labor issues played an essential 
role in assuring success. Although the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 placed farm labor issues 
within the purview of the labor committees, the 
agriculture committees continued to insist on originating 
farm labor legislation. Chairmen of the agriculture 
committees tended to be long-time rural representatives 
with years of seniority, giving them powerful positions 
within congressional party organizations.^ As a result, 
the agriculture committees ignored labor committee 
reminders of the proper jurisdiction on farm labor 
McCune, Who's Behind Our Farm Policv (New York; Praeger, 
1956); Louis B. Schmidt, "The Role and Techniques of 
Agrarian Pressure Groups," Agricultural History 30(April 
1956);49-58; and Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian 
Democracv (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1953). 
For an analysis of such influence on the farm labor 
question particularly see Ellis W. Hawley, "The Politics 
of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950-1965," Agricultural 
Hlstorv 40(3)(1966): 162-164 and Robert D. Tomasek, "The 
Migrant Problem and Pressure Group Politics," The Journal 
of Politics 23(May 1961);295-319. 
^Chairmen of the House and Senate agriculture 
committees during the Eisenhower period included 
Representative Clifford R. Hope of Kansas and Senator 
George D. Aiken of Vermont, both Republicans, in 1953 and 
1954, and Representative Harold D. Cooley of North 
Carolina and Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana,' both 
Democrats, from 1955 to 1960. Representatives Hope and 
Cooley entered Congress in 1927 and 1935, respectively. 
Senator Ellender won election in 1936, while Senator 
Aiken began his tenure in 1941. 
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legislation with little fear of repercussions. 
Consequently, when the agriculture committees 
reconsidered P.L. 78 in 1953, 1955, 1958, and 1960, the 
interests opposed to extension of farm labor importation 
had little hope of altering, let alone ending, the 
program during committee hearings. The political 
connections between rural representatives and 
conservative urban Republicans assured that discussions 
of the issue on the floor of the House or Senate would be 
equally ineffective.* 
Opponents of P.L. 78 nevertheless launched a 
concerted attack on the program in an attempt to convince 
legislators that the use of Mexican contract labor 
undermined the economic position of domestic agricultural 
workers. Representatives of anti-bracero interest groups 
and individual congressmen who opposed the farm labor 
program brought witnesses, letters, testimonies, 
statistical reports, and journalistic exposes to hearings 
and the floor of Congress to support their case. These 
forces employed a wide array of arguments to make their 
^Hawley, p. 164; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, Migratory Labor. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management 
Relations of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 
82d Cong., 2d sees., 1952, pp. 350-351; Robert D. 
Tomasek, "The Migrant Problem and Pressure Group 
Politics," The Journal of Politics 23(May 1961);309-311. 
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point against importing farm labor. They claimed the 
labor shortage which the program existed to alleviate was 
a false shortage created by farm employers' refusal to 
pay decent wages and provide adequate living and working 
conditions. They offered documentation of the extent to 
which the importation of Mexican laborers depressed the 
farm labor wage scales. They suggested that public 
underwriting of the labor costs of a small percentage of 
corporate farmers undermined the ability of the small 
family farmers of other regions to compete, essentially 
valuing their family labor on the same scale as that of 
exploited braceros. Some even asserted that the foreign 
farm labor importation system allowed communist agitators 
to enter the country as farmworkers, thereby opening the 
U.S. border to uncontrolled assault by enemy agents.* 
Agricultural interests in favor of bracero labor, 
however, effectively challenged these objections, 
responding confidently to each charge with their own 
version of the evidence and arguments. They asserted 
that a labor shortage clearly did exist, since the 
Department of Labor's own Farm Placement Service 
*Hawley, pp. 166-171; Craig, pp. 144-147; U.S., 
Congress, House, 15 April 1953, Congressional Record 
99:3144-3157; U.S., Congress, House, 2, 11 March 1954, 
Congressional Record 100:2492-2511, 3122-3127; U.S., 
Congress, House, 14 August 1958, Congressional Record 
104:17652-17662. 
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certified the need each season. Unemployed urban workers 
could not perform farm work adequately and would not 
consider such work anyway, since they had access to 
unemployment insurance and other welfare services. 
Because P.L. 78 required that no foreign workers be paid 
at less than the prevailing wage, bracero program 
supporters claimed that foreign workers could not 
possibly be depressing wages. They pointed to the high 
wages in California agriculture, one of the largest users 
of Mexican contract workers, as further evidence that 
guarantees for foreign labor in fact kept wages up for 
domestic migrants who wanted to work. Against the anti-
bracero argument that underpaid foreign contract labor 
devalued the labor of family farmers, supporters of P.L 
78 suggested that legal contracting for foreign labor 
helped keep the value of labor higher than it would 
become if bracero users had to turn to illegal "wetback" 
labor for harvest help. The same argument sufficed in 
response to the charge of communist infiltration through 
bracero laborers. Without such a legal system, it was 
argued, illegal entry of Mexican workers would pose an 
even greater threat to American security.^ 
^Hawley, pp. 166-171; Craig, pp. 144-147; U.S., 
Congress, House, 15 April 1953, Congressional Record 
99:3144-3157; U.S., Congress, House, 2, 11 March 1954, 
Congressional Record 100:2492-2511, 3122-3127; U.S., 
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The forces in favor of continuing the bracero 
program in the 1950s drew their strength from larger 
numbers and well-developed organizations. Chief among 
these were the two largest general farm organizations, 
the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National 
Grange. Both groups, along with the equally powerful 
National Cotton Council, had mastered the politics of 
farm labor issues during the attacks on the Farm Security 
Administration in the early 1940s. Joining these three 
during the 1950s were the National Canners Association, 
the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, the Western 
Growers Association, the National Farm Labor Users 
Committee, and a long list of state and local growers and 
processors associations and corporations.® 
Congress, House, 14 August 1958, Congressional Record 
104:17652-17662. 
®U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 
Hearings on Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program. 83d 
Cong., 1st sess., 1953; U.S., Congress, House, Committee 
on Agriculture, Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor. 83d 
Cong., 2d sess., 1954; U.S., Congress, House, Committee 
on Agriculture, Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor Program 
before the Subcommittee on Eguipment. Supplies, and 
Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. 84th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1955; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor Program 
before the Subcommittee on Eguipment. Supplies, and 
Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. 85th Cong., 2d 
sess., 1958; Craig, pp. 138-142; Hawley, pp. 162-163; 
Tomasek, pp. 301-303. 
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Also, in addition to their connections with rural 
congressional representatives and the congressional 
agriculture committees noted above, the general farm and 
commodity organizations had links to the Department of 
Agriculture and the Department of Labor's Farm Placement 
Service. Their connections within the Department of 
Agriculture rested on the same basis as that supporting 
farm organization alliances with rural congressmen: 
Department of Agriculture staff and officials generally 
shared the farming or at least rural background of farm 
organization representatives and provided services to the 
same constituency of commercial farmers. The association 
with the Farm Placement Service resulted from its years 
as a part of the Department of Agriculture's Extension 
Service during the World War II farm labor program. 
Officials and employees of that system continued to 
consider their responsibility to be supplying farm labor 
to employers, rather than helping farm laborers find 
employment. Their citizen advisory board, the Special 
Farm Labor Committee, included only representatives of 
commercial farmers and their organizations. The 
placement service also functioned within a decentralized 
federal-state cooperative system. Local representatives, 
as members of small rural communities, felt social 
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pressure from local employers to conform to their views 
of the farm labor situation.' 
Through these well-placed government relationships, 
the growers' organization? virtually controlled the 
design and implementation of the bracero program. 
Although they objected to the demands of the Mexican 
government for guarantees of adequate working and living 
conditions, even those could be influenced in extreme 
situations. When the Mexican government attempted to 
insist on additional safeguards for their workers in 
1954, Congress, at the urging of Department of Labor 
officials, amended P.L. 78 to allow for unilateral 
contracting of Mexican workers "after every practical 
effort has been made to negotiate and reach agreement on 
such arrangements."1° With the support of a state 
department that proved willing to protect the interests 
of American business throughout the world, the Eisenhower 
'Hawley, p. 165; Tomasek, pp. 306-309. 
^°Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka, Farm Workers. 
Agribusiness, and the State (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. 
Press, 1982), pp. 154-155; Craig, pp. 102-118; U.S., 
Congress, House, 2 March 1954, Congressional Record 
100:2486-2511. 
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administration presented a united front to Mexico that 
reflected the desires of American farm employers 
Anti-bracero forces worked from a much more limited 
power base. Among farm organizations only the National 
Farmers Union opposed importation of Mexican labor. (It 
contended that such exploited labor cheapened the labor 
of small family farmers.) organized industrial labor 
also sided against foreign farm labor, but only insofar 
as it affected domestic labor. During the 1950s, labor 
union representatives at congressional hearings accepted 
the possibility that in some cases braceros might be 
necessary where "real" shortages of farm labor existed. 
The National Agricultural Workers Union, heir to the 
Southern Tenant Farmers Union of the 1930s, devoted all 
of its energies in the 1950s to fighting P.L. 78. Their 
only paid organizer, Ernesto Galarza, described the 
union's approach as "a major risk," since it meant 
organizing and recruitment of new members would come to a 
standstill. Such neglect might mean the end of the 
struggling union's efforts to gain stability and 
bargaining strength. But Galarza believed it was a 
'^Craig, pp. 123-125. See Charles C. Alexander's 
description of the Guatemala intervention in Holding the 
Line, pp. 74-77, for a discussion of the willingness of 
the Eisenhower administration to intervene 
internationally for the benefit of American business. 
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necessary risk in order "to throw light on corporate 
agriculture's infiltration and domination of government 
as an instrument to its ends; and to clear the way for 
future unionists."12 
Minority rights organizations also assisted the 
efforts of the farm and labor groups in opposition to the 
bracero program. Among these groups were the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
several representatives of American Indian interests, and 
the American GI Forum of Texas, a relatively weak 
Mexican-American veteran's organization that supported 
causes to strengthen the position of Mexican-Americans in 
the United States. They opposed the importation of 
Mexican farm labor on the grounds it damaged the position 
of minority American citizens who tried to earn their 
livings as farmworkers.^^ 
Further support emanated from an assortment of 
voluntary religious and social welfare organizations who 
added their voices to the opposition. They represented 
what Galarza called "the liberal conscience"^* and 
^^Ernesto Galarza, Farm Workers and Aari-business in 
California. 1947-1960 (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre 
Dame Press, 1977), p. 205. 
"craig, p. 143; Tomasek, pp. 305-306. 
^Galarza, p. 315. 
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although their protests against the bracero program in 
the 1950s proved ineffective, their influence would grow 
by the end of the decade and exert significant force on 
behalf of domestic migrants in the social reform era of 
the 1960s. Among the most vocal were the National 
Sharecroppers Fund, the National Consumers League for 
Fair Labor Standards, the National Catholic Rural Life 
Conference, the American Friends Service Committee, and 
the National Council of Churches of Christ's Migrant 
Ministry J® 
These anti-bracero forces also maintained 
connections within government. They found allies in the 
Department of Labor, especially the secretaries, and on 
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, but 
their associations produced fewer results than those of 
the grower interests. The Senate committee insisted on 
its jurisdiction over farm labor issues in Congress only 
^^Craig, pp. 142-143; Tomasek, pp. 303-306; U.S., 
Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on 
Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program. 83d Cong., 1st 
sess., 1953; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor. 83d Cong., 
2d sess., 1954; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor Program 
before the Subcommittee on Equipment. Supplies, and 
Manpower of the Committee on Agriculture. 84th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1955; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on Mexican Farm Labor Program 
before Subcommittee on Equipment. Supplies, and Manpower 
of the Committee on Agriculture. 85th Cong., 2d sess., 
1958. 
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once before 1959, when it finally created a special 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor. President Truman's 
Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin did appoint a Labor 
Advisory Committee on Farm Labor in 1952 with the 
intention of counterbalancing the influence of the 
grower-controlled Special Farm Labor Advisory Committee, 
and it continued under the Eisenhower administration. 
But the advisory committee never succeeded in affecting 
the Farm Placement Service's implementation of the 
bracero program because grower organizations retained 
such a powerful hold on the operations of the service at 
the state and local levels. Secretary of Labor James P. 
Mitchell used his regulatory powers under P.L. 78 to 
guarantee adequate employment standards for imported 
Mexican labor as early as 1956, but because his efforts 
produced results, the outrage of the farm organizations 
forced a compromise that curtailed Mitchell's activity in 
opposition to the bracero program until late in 
Eisenhower's term.^* 
Despite the seeming impermeability of agricultural 
interests' control of Congress on the farm labor issue, 
continuing public discussion of the question strengthened 
the position of anti-braceroists as the decade passed. 
^Tomasek, pp. 307, 311, 316-318; Hawley, p. 161. 
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Although Congress had ignored the recommendations of the 
President's Commission on Migratory Labor in 1951 when it 
passed the initial version of P.L 78, the report served 
as a rallying point for reform interests throughout the 
1950s. 
A number of the agencies had already begun the 
process of focusing staff on the specific problems of 
migrant agricultural labor. For example, the Public 
Health Service had an Interbureau Committee on Migrants 
that researched the public health requirements of 
migrants and made recommendations to the Bureau for new 
services. The Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officers supported the work of the Public Health 
Service by adopting resolutions in 1953 favoring an 
increased focus on health needs of migrant workers, 
particularly on continuity of health care among states 
within a migrant stream. At their annual meeting in 
1954, the Association followed up on that resolution by 
making specific recommendations through a Special 
Committee on Migrant Labor. Among these recommendations 
were such suggestions as a traveling health record card 
system and federal appropriations to control communicable 
diseases among migrants, both of which would become 
important in the next decade as part of the Kennedy 
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administration's focus on public health, leading 
ultimately to a successful Migrant Health Act in 1962. 
The Bureau of Employment Security of the Department 
of Labor also began a program on improving life for 
migrant agricultural labor by 1954. In a circular letter 
to State Employment Security Agencies, Robert C. Goodwin, 
Director of the Bureau of Employment Security, outlined 
the role local employment offices could play in 
encouraging community support for migrant workers. 
Suggestions for local office activity included providing 
information to communities about incoming migrants, 
assisting in evaluating facilities and services available 
for migrants in the community, sharing information about 
successful programs in other communities around the 
nation, and cooperating with community programs where 
possible. The letter provided examples of various 
community programs offered successfully in previous 
^^Lucile Petry Leone and Helen L. Johnston, 
"Agricultural Migrants and Public Health," U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public 
Health Service, reprinted from Public Health Reports. 
Vol. 69, No. 1, January 1954, p. 1, "Health," Box 28, 
Records of the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, 
RG42, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington, D.C.; "Excerpts from Recommendations of the 
Fifty-Third Annual Conference of State and Territorial 
Health Officers," 20 December 1954, "Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Committee on Migrancy," 
Box 7, Records of the President's Committee on Migratory 
Labor, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 
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years. While emphasizing cultural, educational, and 
health services, the programs also included emergency 
relief and even legal assistance.'® 
Advocates of assistance to domestic migrant 
farmworkers approved such efforts among federal and 
private agencies, but as they operated separately from 
one another, their activities remained uncoordinated and 
essentially invisible. Since the issuance of the report 
on migrant labor by the Interagency Committee on Migrant 
Labor in 1947, study committees and commissions, 
government officials, professional associations, and 
voluntary service organizations had been urging the 
creation of some kind of ongoing federal committee to 
coordinate programs and focus public attention on the 
problems of migrant agricultural workers and their 
families. Bills to establish such a committee began to 
appear regularly following the migratory labor hearings 
of 1952. The first Secretary of Labor under the 
Eisenhower administration, Martin P. Durkin, favored this 
legislation, claiming that "past experience has clearly 
demonstrated the inability of Federal agencies, acting 
without the assistance of non-governmental groups, to 
'^Robert C. Goodwin to State Employment Security 
Agencies, Letter No. 572, Appendix F, 17 August 1954, pp. 
1-3, "Department of Labor," Box 11, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library. 
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achieve positive action or formulate comprehensive 
programs to deal with these problems."^' A year later, 
however, at the urging of the new Secretary of Labor, 
James P. Mitchell, and following the failure of Congress 
to act on the issue. President Eisenhower appointed an 
Interdepartmental Committee on Migratory Labor. Its 
members included the secretaries of Interior, 
Agriculture, Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare, and 
the administrator of the Housing and Home Finance 
Agency. 
James P. Mitchell emerged during the Eisenhower 
administration as a key figure in support of federal 
assistance for migrant and seasonal farmworkers. The son 
of working class parents, Mitchell had experienced both 
the labor and management sides of business and industry. 
After a few years of success as the owner of two retail 
dairy stores, followed by a recession-induced bankruptcy, 
Mitchell eventually entered the field of personnel 
administration in 1929 with the Western Electric Company. 
The immediate onslaught of the Great Depression provided 
^'The Secretary of Labor to The Honorable Bernard M. 
Shanley, Special Counsel to the President, 21 July 1953, 
"124-C Migratory Labor (1)," Box 634, White House Central 
Files, Official File, Eisenhower Library. 
^°Dwight Eisenhower to James P. Mitchell, Secretary 
of Labor, 2 6 August 1954, "Bradley Patterson, The White 
House," Box 12, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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Mitchell the opportunity to prove his talent for dealing 
with difficult labor relations. Both labor leaders and 
management praised his ability during that crisis to 
satisfy both sides in a conflict.^ 
Mitchell's management skill soon led him into 
government service, to which he would return periodically 
until his appointment as Secretary of Labor by 
Eisenhower. With the beginning of the New Deal, Mitchell 
joined the federal Emergency Relief Administration in New 
Jersey, remaining in that position from 1932 to 1936. 
After two years back at Western Electric as supervisor of 
training, the New York City Works Progress Administration 
appointed him director of industrial relations in 1938. 
He followed his area director in New York, Brehon 
Somervell, to the Construction Division of the Army 
Quartermaster Corps for the duration of World War II, 
where he continued to work with labor relations problems. 
When the war ended, Mitchell joined the staff of the R. 
H. Macy department store in New York as chief industrial 
relations officer. In 1947 he moved to Bloomingdales 
where he served as vice-president of labor relations 
^Dictionarv of American Biography, s.v. "Mitchell, 
James Paul," by Henry P. Guzda, pp. 542-543; Henry P. 
Guzda, untitled draft of biographical study of James P. 
Mitchell, available from the author. Department of Labor, 
1990, p. 3. 
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until reentering government service in 1953. His 
relations with unionized employees defied the generally 
volatile labor situation in the retail industry during 
the post-war period, even earning him a membership in the 
union's "no-executives" fishing club.2% 
Mitchell's first position in the Eisenhower 
administration as assistant secretary of the Army lasted 
only a few months. On October 8, 1953, Mitchell replaced 
Martin Durkin, former president of the plumbers and 
steamfitters union, as Secretary of Labor. Although 
organized labor feared Mitchell's connections with 
management, quick action on behalf of labor against 
Commerce department attempts to preempt labor issues in 
the Eisenhower administration gained their confidence. 
In addition to more traditional labor issues, Mitchell, 
almost alone within the Eisenhower administration, also 
supported the causes of civil rights and equal employment 
opportunity.^ 
Given this orientation toward labor and the 
disadvantaged, Mitchell's championing the rights of 
migrant agricultural labor to adequate employment and 
^^DAB. "Mitchell," p. 543; Guzda, unpublished study, 
pp. 4-5. 
2'dab, "Mitchell," p. 543; Guzda, unpublished study, 
pp. 5-8. 
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living conditions was a natural position for him, 
although it surprised many at the time. Despite 
Mitchell's career as an industrial relations specialist 
with management, his interest lay as much with fairness 
to labor as with improving efficiency and profits for 
employers. Mitchell did not become a Republican until 
after Eisenhower's election, and with his government 
service roots in Roosevelt's New Deal, he brought a 
greater social conscience to the Republican 
administration than his fellow cabinet officers. Finding 
as he entered office that migrant agricultural workers 
were among the most exploited labor group in the nation, 
he requested the formation of the President's Committee 
on Migratory Labor within a year of his appointment. He 
continued to use the Committee as his channel for 
advocating reform for agricultural workers throughout his 
tenure. 
The new Committee held its first meeting on October 
14, 1954. Having identified some 500 studies over the 
preceding fifty years, the members concluded "that there 
was no need for further study on the total migratory 
labor problem, but that an action program should be 
instituted at once." The myriad reports together 
^^DAB. "Mitchell," pp. 543-544; Guzda, unpublished 
study, pp. 11-15. 
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reflected a clear consensus for action in the areas of 
education, health, increased income, housing, and 
transportation.^ At subsequent meetings in 1955 and 
1958, this interdepartmental cabinet committee considered 
a variety of recommendations from its working 
subcommittees, but its mandate to "aid the various 
Federal agencies in mobilizing and stimulating more 
effective programs and services for migrants"^' limited 
its capacity to act except through the already 
established programs of individual cabinet departments. 
Consequently, by 1960 the Committee could only claim to 
its credit the publication of model codes for safe 
transportation of migrant farmworkers and farm labor camp 
housing standards, an unsuccessful attempt at legislation 
to allow federal establishment of highway rest stop 
facilities for the use of migratory labor, the successful 
establishment of state migratory labor committees in 28 
states through Committee encouragement, and a new set of 
studies and surveys to provide more information on 
Federal Interdepartmental Committee on Migratory 
Labor," 10 November 1954, "First Meeting - ICML, Cabinet 
Members," Box 12, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library; "The President's Committee on Migratory Labor, A 
Report - January 1956," 24 January 1956, "Arthur Larson, 
Under Secretary of Labor, 1955-56," Box 11, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
^^Eisenhower to Mitchell, 26 August 1954, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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migrants and their needs. Executive branch action had to 
come from another source." 
Among the committee's departments, Secretary 
Mitchell's Department of Labor took the lead. The 
Department worked particularly through the programs of 
the Bureau of Employment Services, since those operations 
were the Department's only direct responsibility for 
migrant farm labor. As its earliest program under 
Mitchell, except for the community involvement program 
mentioned above, the Bureau adopted the Annual Worker 
Plan in 1954. Very simply, the Plan involved Farm 
Placement Service personnel working closely with migrants 
at their home base to map out a series of seasonal 
industrial and agricultural jobs throughout the year, 
hoping to decrease periods of unemployment and travel in 
search of work. The New Jersey Farm Labor Service had 
developed a prototype of this plan at the end of World 
War II, which the Farm Placement Service then expanded to 
^Agenda for Meeting of the President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor, 17 October 1955, "Secretary Mitchell's 
Cabinet Meeting, October 20, 1955," Box 13, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Agenda for Meeting of the 
President's Committee on Migratory Labor, 22 May 1958, 
"Summary of October 14, 1954, meeting of Cabinet 
Committee," Box 12, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library; The President's Committee on Migratory Labor, 
Progress Report. September 1956 (Washington, D.C.; GPO, 
1956); The President's Committee on Migratory Labor, 
Report to the President on Domestic Mlaratorv Farm Labor 
(Washington, D.C.; GPO, 1960). 
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cover the entire East Coast migrant stream in 1948. The 
Employment Service then adapted the Eastern Seaboard Plan 
for national use.^® 
The state offices of the Farm Placement Service 
provided information stations, also termed rest camps, by 
the mid-1950s. These stations offered employment and 
travel information for migrants seeking work, and 
toilets, shelter, and water for overnight highway stops. 
The department had requested funding for a federally 
supported system of migrant rest camps in 1951, but the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry did not 
report the bill. Opponents at hearings considered the 
provision of such accommodations outside the legitimate 
authority of the federal government. Although such 
authority had been found to support the federal farm 
labor camps of the New Deal and World War II period, 
attitudes about federal intervention had changed by the 
1950s. The information station/rest stops thus offered a 
^®Ronald L. Goldfarb, Migrant Farm Workers: A Caste 
of Despair (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1981), p. 271; 
"Minutes and Recommendations of the Special Farm Labor 
Committee," 9-10 February 1955, p. 5, "Advisory Committee 
on Farm Labor, BES," Box 40, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library; Don Larin, "Annual Work Plans for 
Agricultural Migrants," Employment Securitv Review 
22(March 1955):3-4. 
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similar service within the established authority of the 
state employment offices.^' 
Both the Department of Labor and the President's 
Committee worked again for legislation to authorize rest 
camps following promulgation of new Interstate Commerce 
Commission regulations in 1957 that required periodic 
rest stops for private carriers of migrant farmworkers. 
The Department of Labor had first attempted to establish 
an expanded rest camp system based on its authority to 
maintain information stations for interstate labor 
recruitment, but the department's own solicitor 
questioned the legal basis for that authority. The 
legislative proposal lacked key support, however, from 
Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, a member of 
the President' Committee. He believed federal 
establishment of a travel camp system would compete 
unfairly with private business, and, furthermore, would 
suggest federal support for a system of long distance 
migration for employment. Without Department of 
^'Charles W. Kenyon, "Farm Labor Information station 
and Rest Camp," Emplovment Security Review 22(March 
1955):6-7; Millard Cass, Chairman, Intradepartment 
Committee on Migratory Labor, to The Under Secretary, 24 
March 1959, p; 3, "Rest Stops," Box 102, Records of the 
PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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Agriculture support Congress again showed little 
interest.M 
Department of Labor officials frequently appeared as 
witnesses at hearings and submitted statements directly 
to congressional offices on legislation affecting migrant 
labor throughout the decade. The Department 
unsuccessfully supported amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act that would have extended protections to 
farmworkers in 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1958. Labor also 
strongly encouraged the inclusion of seasonal farmworkers 
under amendments to the Social Security Act in 1955 and 
vigorously, although unsuccessfully, opposed alteration 
of those same amendments to the detriment of seasonal 
agricultural workers the following year. The Department 
urged the legislation in 1956 that authorized the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate interstate 
transportation of farm labor. Other bills supported by 
the Department included those to provide loans and other 
financial support for provision of improved housing for 
migrant workers, which failed in both 1958 and 1959, and 
legislation in 1959 to require federal registration of 
farm labor crew leaders, which also did not become law. 
^°Cass to Under Secretary, 24 March 1959, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Ezra to Hon. James P. 
Mitchell, 3 March 1960, "Rest Camps for Migrants," Box 
48, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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One of the chief reasons for failure of both the housing 
legislation and the crew leader registration bills was 
the lack of enthusiasm for both ideas from the Department 
of Agriculture. The primary rural lending agency, the 
Farmers Home Administration, showed no interest in 
broadening its lending programs to include farmworker 
housing, and Secretary of Agriculture Benson personally 
opposed federal registration of crew leaders, asserting 
that states bore that responsibility.^ 
Lack of enthusiasm, and even outright hostility, 
from the Department of Agriculture, plagued the 
^%.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Transportation of Migrant Farm Workers. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Transportation and 
Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce. 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956, p. 9; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare. 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 
Part 1, pp. 38, 64, Part 3, pp. 1494, 1503, 1511, 1536-
1537; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and 
Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the Committee on 
Education and Labor. 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, Part 1, 
p. 2; U.S., Congress, Senate, 23 April 1959, 
Congressional Record 105:6505; "Statement of the 
Department of Labor on Sections 201(f)(1) and 201(f)(2) 
H.R. 7225, The Social Security Amendments of 1956," "H.R. 
7225 - Social Security with Secretary Mitchell's 
Statement, 1956," Box 14, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library; "Farm Labor Housing Legislation," 11 July 1958, 
"Council of State Governments (Housing)," Box 7, Records 
of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; "Tangible 
Accomplishments in the Field of Farm Labor," "Farm Labor-
-Tangible Accomplishments," Box 43, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library. 
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Department of Labor and the President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor throughout the Eisenhower period. The 
Department of Agriculture, among all the other members o-f 
the President's Committee on Migratory Labor, retained 
strong reservations about the directions taken by 
Secretary of Labor Mitchell towards migrant farm labor. 
In an analysis of the work of the Committee for Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, Russell W. Oberlin, 
of the Commodity Stabilization Service and a member of 
the President's Committee's Working Group, described 
these reservations candidly. Oberlin observed "there is 
a tendency on the part of some agencies and groups to 
emphasize the social and welfare problems of migrants out 
of proportion with what we believe to be the basic 
economic situation."'^ He reassured Butz, however, that 
there was little likelihood of these agencies actually 
accomplishing changes in the social conditions for 
migrant farmworkers, "since funds are usually not 
available to expand programs and, therefore, 
reorientation is about all that can be expected. 
W. Oberlin to Earl L. Butz, Assistant Secretary, 
27 April 1955, p. 3, "USDA Migrant Work Committee," Box 
10, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
^Oberlin to Butz, 27 April 1955, p. 3, "USDA Migrant 
Work Committee," Box 10, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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Of greater concern to Oberlln was the leadership of 
the President's Committee. In a thinly veiled reference 
to Secretary of Labor James Mitchell, Oberlin suggested 
"while we do not wish to imply criticism of any 
Department, we believe that the problems of migratory 
farm workers involve both employers and workers." He 
continued: 
It would, therefore, appear that to get full 
cooperation and effective action the chairmanship 
should not be placed in any one of the Departments 
which are primarily concerned. The chairman should 
be a person who would have an equal interest in the 
welfare of management, labor and the public. This 
arrangement would also make it possible to place the 
Secretariat under the direct supervision of the 
chairman instead of in a Bureau of a particular 
Department as located at the present time.^^ 
Yet Oberlin summed up his analysis with an even more 
fundamental indictment of the Committee, suggesting that 
the Interdepartmental Committee as set up by the 
President mistakenly singled out migrant farmworkers for 
attention. This orientation ignored the needs of other 
seasonal farmworkers and provided "an opportunity for 
some agencies to give migrant farm worker problems undue 
publicity which in turn brings undeserved criticism to 
certain employers and communities." Oberlin advised that 
"by broadening the scope of interest of this Committee, 
^Oberlin to Butz, 27 April 1955, p.—37 Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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there will be greater inducement to consider practical 
problems of labor recruitment, training and productivity 
along with the more strictly social problems."'® 
Clearly the departments of Agriculture and Labor 
approached the issue of migrant farm labor from opposite 
poles. That antagonism increased through the 1950s as 
Secretary Mitchell escalated his pressure for federal 
intervention to protect migrant farmworkers from 
oppressive labor conditions. After repeated refusals by 
Congress to extend minimum wage and other labor standards 
protection to agricultural workers, Secretary Mitchell 
looked in 1958 to his position as administrator of the 
Employment Service and of the Mexican labor importation 
program. Congress had given the Secretary of Labor 
authority under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 creating 
the U.S. Employment Service to make rules governing the 
operation of an interstate employment referral system. 
Under P.L. 78 governing the Mexican farm labor program, 
the Secretary bore responsibility for assuring that the 
use of Mexican contract laborers did not "adversely 
affect" the wages and working conditions of domestic 
farmworkers. Mitchell planned to use the provisions of 
-^Oberlin to Butz, 27 April 1955, p. 4, "USDA Migrant 
Work Committee," Box 10, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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those two laws to set prevailing wages and require 
adequate housing and transportation arrangements before 
allowing use of the interstate farm labor recruitment 
system by employers. Employers who could not use the 
farm placement service also could not be certified to 
receive Mexican braceros, so exclusion from that system 
could have severe consequences for large farm 
employers.^ 
The Secretary found support for his new regulations 
among members of Congress often frustrated in their 
attempts to pass legislation to accomplish similar ends. 
In June 1959, thirty-four representatives and senators 
submitted a signed statement to the Congress recommending 
support for the regulations requiring stricter wage, 
housing, and transportation standards by users of the 
Farm Placement Service. Senator Eugene McCarthy of 
Minnesota, among the signers of that statement, further 
urged Congress, although without success, to extend those 
minimal protections through legislation in an attempt to 
'^Newell Brown to The Secretary, 20 May 1958, "1958-
President's Committee on Migratory Labor (Jan-May)," Box 
131, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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use the momentum created by Secretary Mitchell to force 
action in Congress. 
Secretary Mitchell's proposal, however, evoked 
outraged reactions from farm interests. Mitchell met 
with Republican congressional leaders in April 1959 to 
answer objections to the regulations and found from 
Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois that the Farm Bureau 
Federation had raised the loudest voice in opposition to 
the changes. Mitchell wrote to Benson regarding the Farm 
Bureau response, pointing out to him that the 
organization's uncompromising stance against any changes 
in regulations jeopardized the possibility of 
constructing regulations in the best interests of all 
parties. Rather than recommend improvements in the 
interests of farm employers, the Farm Bureau had directed 
its members to oppose the changes entirely. Mitchell 
assured Benson that new regulations would be issued 
despite Farm Bureau pressure and advised that farmers 
would be better served by helping the Department of Labor 
'^U.S., Congress, Senate, 15 July 1959, Congressional 
Record. 105:13473-13474; U.S., Congress, House, 9 June 
1959, Congressional Record 105:10350-10351. 
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create regulations that considered the employers' needs 
as much as possible. 
The National Farm Labor Users Committee joined the 
Farm Bureau in opposing the new regulations. This 
organization served most employers of imported farm labor 
and so had an obvious interest in avoiding stricter 
standards for importing braceros. A confidential 
Department of Labor analysis of opposition to the new 
farm labor regulations, however, noted an important 
difference between the interests of the foreign labor 
users group and those of the Farm Bureau. The latter 
intended to regain leadership of a united farm bloc 
through a very public opposition to the new farm labor 
recruitment regulations; the Farm Labor Users Committee 
feared any public discussion of farm labor that might 
increase sympathy for even greater federal protections 
for farm labor and perhaps for an end to the importation 
program altogether. The analysis suggested a Labor 
Department strategy of "divide and conquer." The report 
counseled key personnel to let leaders of the foreign 
^®"Notes on Congressional Leaders Meeting, Tuesday -
April 14, 1959," "Legislative Meetings 1959 (3) [March-
April]," Box 3, Legislative Meeting Series, Ann Whitman 
File, Eisenhower Library; Jim, Secretary of Labor, to 
Ezra Taft Benson, .14 April 1959, "Employment 1-1 
Agricultural Jan. 1-May 31, 1960," Box 3437, Series 17, 
Correspondence of the Secretary of Agriculture, RG 16, 
National Archives. 
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labor users group know that the Department planned public 
hearings in response to the public opposition of farm 
leaders. They hoped the foreign users would rein in the 
Farm Bureau to protect their own interests. Since 
opposition to the new regulations did not appear to 
slacken throughout the year before they became permanent, 
the strategy apparently failed.'' 
The Department of Labor used its own Special Farm 
Labor Advisory Committee to suggest changes in the 
recruitment regulations that might help to ease farmer 
objections. A Domestic Labor Subcommittee composed of 
farm employer representatives from the eleven Employment 
Service regions prepared recommended revisions to the 
regulations in early 1959, but refused to approve even 
the revised regulations. The group charged that such 
regulations made the Department of Labor standards for 
wages, housing, and transportation mandatory controls, 
since most farm employers depended on Employment Service 
recruitment to supply their seasonal labor. Although 
they believed that the Secretary of Labor might have 
legal authority for this action, they opposed "using 
obscure sections of a statute designed to provide a 
3*D. E. Christian to R. Kennedy, Confidential, 27 
April 1959, "Interstate Recruitment Regulations," Box 83, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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service to farmers as the basis to accomplish what 
Congress . . . refused to authorize in specific terms. 
Despite Secretary Mitchell's request to Secretary 
Benson that he use his influence to moderate farm 
employer responses to the new regulations, Benson 
continued to support the Farm Bureau position opposing 
any regulation of farm labor conditions. He claimed more 
research was needed about farm labor conditions and the 
economic impact of increasing wages and other labor 
standards before regulations should be imposed. 
According to Department of Agriculture data, the wages of 
farm labor had actually increased twice as much as the 
prices farmers paid for other services and materials. 
The Secretary also pointed out the variable character of 
agriculture among regions and crops that made federal 
labor standards difficult to apply equally, suggesting 
that state and local controls were more appropriate. 
Most emphatically, however, he reiterated his fundamental 
objection that "the proposed regulations . . . retain the 
concept of Federal intervention and administrative 
control and regimentation that is contrary to the 
^"introduction to revisions by the Domestic Labor 
Subcommittee to "Proposed Standards for Job Orders Placed 
in Interarea Recruitment," and "Subcommittee on Domestic 
Labor," February 1959, "Special Farm Labor Committee," 
Box 86, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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principles of this Administration and that is so 
repugnant to agriculture."^ 
Secretary Benson had first publicly opposed federal 
intervention in agriculture, including protections for 
agricultural workers, in 1940 as an official of the 
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives. He continued 
that opposition throughout his tenure with the Council 
and so his position as Secretary of Agriculture on the 
Secretary of Labor's farm labor regulations came as no 
surprise. In contrast. Secretary of Labor Mitchell 
accepted the responsibility of government to protect the 
interests of American wage workers, including 
farmworkers. Although he publicly subscribed to the 
Eisenhower administration preference for private 
solutions to labor relations problems, he noted 
frequently that agricultural employers had indicated no 
interest in solving their labor problems privately. He 
further asserted that they could not be expected to do so 
^^Ezra to Hon. James P. Mitchell, 8 September 1959, 
"Interstate Recruitment Regulations," Box 83, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. See also Benson to 
Mitchell, 23 April 1960, "Employment 1-1 Agricultural 
Jan. 1-May 31, 1960," Box 3437, Series 17, RG16, National 
Archives. 
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as long as the federal government provided them with a 
cheap alternative foreign labor force 
Benson and Mitchell's disagreements continued 
through the end of the Eisenhower administration. In May 
1960, the latter presented the results of a Department of 
Labor study of the feasibility of a minimum wage in 
agriculture to Congress without clearing the report with 
the Department of Agriculture. Benson complained to 
Mitchell and warned the White House that he would speak 
openly in opposition to the report if asked about it by 
the press. The White House, through Deputy Assistant to 
the President Gerald D. Morgan, showed little concern 
about the possibility of a public confrontation on this 
issue and Mitchell seemed surprised by Benson's 
irritation, noting the cooperation he had received from 
Department of Agriculture staff in preparing the report. 
He also suggested not having advance notice could be 
useful to Benson, since it allowed him to deny Department 
^^"Ezra Taft Benson," Current Bioaraphv 1953 (New 
York: H. W. Wilson, 1954), pp. 63-65; "James P(aul) 
Mitchell," Current Bioaraphv 1954 (New York: H. W. 
Wilson, 1954), pp. 462-464; Paul Jacobs, "An Interview 
with Secretary Mitchell," The Reporter. 22 January 1959, 
p. 20; Speech text, "Migrant Labor, the National 
Responsibility," 23 November 1959, "James P. Mitchell, 
Chairman, PCML 1959," Box 1, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library. 
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of Agriculture knowledge of the report and thereby retain 
the support of angered farm groups/' 
In the next couple of months, Benson again wrote to-
Mitchell to complain about another example of the 
Department of Labor's "misunderstanding" of labor 
problems in agriculture. Mitchell had issued regulations 
refusing use of the interstate recruitment system of the 
Farm Placement Service during agricultural labor 
disputes. Benson emphasized to Mitchell "that the labor 
problem for farmers and ranchers is entirely different 
from that of industry. . . because of the possibility of 
substantial crop loss at harvest time which can result 
from inadequate or uncertain labor supplies." Benson 
continued, "it should be an accepted principle that the 
interests of farm operators are protected equally with 
those of hired workers.Mitchell's reply merely noted 
that he had already scheduled meetings with agricultural 
interests and Department of Agriculture officials to 
^'Ezra Taft Benson to James P. Mitchell, 10 May 1960, 
Miller F. Shurtleff, Executive Assistant to the 
Secretary, to Gerald D. Morgan, Deputy Assistant to the 
President, 11 May 1960, and James P. Mitchell to Ezra 
Taft Benson, 17 May 1960, "Employment 1-1 Agricultural 
Jan.l-May 31, 1960," Box 3437, Series 17, RG16, National 
Archives. 
^^Ezra, Secretary of Agriculture, to James P. 
Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, 15 July 1960, p. 2, "1960— 
Migratory Farm Workers (May-June) (2)," Box 104, James P. 
Mitchell Papers, Eisenhower Library. 
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discuss details of the regulations. He offered no 
indication that he intended to rescind the regulations at 
Benson's request/® 
Representatives of agricultural interests in 
Congress vigorously opposed Mitchell's use of regulatory 
powers to intervene on behalf of domestic farmworkers. 
Because the Attorney General had found the making of such 
regulations to be within the Secretary's legal authority, 
these opponents, led by Florida Senator Spessard Holland 
of the Agriculture Committee, sought legislative changes 
to remove that authority through an amendment to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1960. The amendment failed, 
however, by a vote of 56 to 42. 
Divisions on this vote substantially paralleled 
those that had appeared in the vote to create the Mexican 
farm labor program in 1951, but at the same time 
" Ij r 
indicated a growing opposition among Democrats outside 
the region employing Mexican contract labor. In fact, 
the House Agriculture Committee had originally proposed 
T. Benson to the Secretary of Labor, 30 June 
1960, "Labor Department," Box 3385, Series 17, RG16, 
National Archives; Ezra to Mitchell, 15 July 1960, p. 2, 
Mitchell Papers, Eisenhower Library; Jim, Secretary of 
Labor, to Ezra Taft Benson, Secretary of Agriculture, 18 
July 1960, "1960—Migratory Farm Workers (May-June) (2)," 
Mitchell Papers, Eisenhower Library. 
S., Congress, Senate, 16 August 1960, 
Congressional Record 106:16500-16521. 
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the amendment as part of the 1960 extension of that 
program. When supporters feared losing the whole program 
over disagreements on the question of controlling 
Mitchell's regulatory power, the committee removed that 
section of the bill and reintroduced it during discussion 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act/' 
The fears of those congressmen were well-placed. 
Although the party preferences established in 1951 
remained in 1960—Republicans supported restricting the 
Secretary of Labor's authority 22 to 11 while Democrats 
opposed that plan 45 to 20—the regional voting pattern 
indicated a polarization among Democrats. Those from 
states using the Mexican labor program (Arizona, New 
Mexico, California, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and 
Florida) voted 7 to 5 in favor of the amendment; 
Democrats from other states opposed the amendment 40 to 
1. With a growing number of reform-minded Democrats 
entering Congress in the 1960s, this new voting bloc 
boded ill for the influence of farm employers in the 
coming years.*® 
^Congress and the Nation. 1945-1964 (Washington, 
D.C.; Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 757. 
*®Ibid.; U.S., Congress, Senate, 16 August 1960, 
Congressional Record 106:16520-16521; Congressional 
Directory. 86th cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1960), pp. 185-195. 
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The vote followed a lengthy debate in which 
supporters of federal protection for migrant farmworkers, 
including Senators Hubert Humphrey, Wayne Morse, and 
Harrison Williams of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, pressed the opponents to propose the amendments 
at public hearings on migrant labor being held by the 
Senate Committee on Labor. They apparently believed that 
the attempt by agricultural interests to attach these 
amendments to an unrelated bill indicated they had begun 
to fear their voices could no longer prevail under public 
scrutiny. Supporters of federal assistance and 
protection for migrant farmworkers had, in fact, achieved 
some success in the Senate by 1960, at least in 
recognition of the importance of their issue. The 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare created a 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor on August 5, 1959, to 
study the problems of migrant farmworkers. Senator 
Harrison A. Williams, Jr., of New Jersey, assumed the 
chairmanship of the new subcommittee. By 1959, Williams 
had established a reputation as a liberal Senator through 
his support of such issues as civil rights, repeal of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, and health insurance for the elderly. 
As a Senator from New Jersey, a state whose growers 
employed considerable numbers of seasonal farmworkers, he 
also possessed first-hand knowledge of the labor 
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situation in agriculture. The Subcommittee held public 
hearings for two months in 1959, sponsored extensive 
staff studies, then prepared a lengthy report repeating 
the familiar list of recommendations for federal 
assistance in the areas of labor standards, housing, 
transportation, health, sanitation, and child and adult 
education. 
The Subcommittee began with four referred bills to 
establish a minimum wage and end child labor in 
agriculture and to require federal registration of 
migrant labor crew leaders. Subcommittee members 
introduced additional bills to allow federal assistance 
for migrant housing and education in 1960. All of the 
bills died in committee, but the existence of the Senate 
Subcommittee provided a focus of support for federal 
legislation on behalf of migrant farmworkers. Its 
members, particularly Senator Williams, worked 
continuously to increase public awareness of migrant 
problems and to raise the issue at every possible 
.S., Congress, Senate, 16 August 1960, 
Congressional Record 106:16500-16521; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Study of Migratory Labor. S. Rept. 1088, 86th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1960, pp. 2-4; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Study of Migratory Labor. S. Rept. 66, 87th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1961, pp. 2-3; U.S., Congress, Senate, The 
Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United States. S. 
Rept. 1098, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961; "Williams, 
Harrison A., Jr." Current Biography 1960 (New York: H. W. 
Wilson, 1960), pp. 463-465. 
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opportunity on the floor of Congress. In the next four 
years, the Subcommittee would generate a constant stream 
of bills to authorize federal assistance or protection 
for migrant farm labor, forcing opponents to defend 
repeatedly the farmers' need to employ labor at wages and 
under conditions considerably inferior to that of workers 
in other industries. One of the reasons behind the 
congressional success of farm employers, a small minority 
even among American farmers, had been the lack of 
interest in agricultural issues shown by the nonfarm 
constituents of the majority of congressmen. Publicity 
on the issue forced these same congressmen to take stands 
on the question in. response to a growing concern for the 
problems of migrant labor among their urban supporters. 
The Senate Subcommittee worked closely with the 
growing group of private voluntary organizations that 
advocated federal responsibility for assistance to 
migrant farmworkers. Subcommittee members credited the 
work of these groups for most of the improvements that 
had been made in the migrant condition by the end of the 
1950s. Some organizations had been active for years as 
advocates of government assistance for farm labor; others 
^°U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1088, 1960, p. 2; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 66, 1961, p. 3; 
"Position paper in 6 parts," "II-A.5 Subcommittee 
Position Paper," Box 16, RG42, National Archives. 
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appeared in the 1950s as the migrant labor issue gained 
visibility. The Migrant Ministry of the National Council 
of Churches, among the most vocal of these groups, had 
been created in 1920. During their first decade, the 
Migrant Ministry offered child care and health services 
on the East and West Coasts. In the 1930s they added 
education for school-age children and cooperated with the 
Farm Security Administration in providing programs at 
federal farm labor camps. By the 1950s, the Migrant 
Ministry's experience in providing programs at the state 
and local level had attracted the attention of officials 
in the newly emerging federal programs to study migrant 
farmworkers/" 
The President's Committee on Migratory Labor worked 
closely with the Migrant Ministry through its Director of 
Home Missions, Edith Lowry. Lowry had begun working with 
the National Council of Churches on migrant programs in 
1926 and by 1950 directed those activities at the 
national level. The staff of the President's Committee 
first met with Lowry in November 1954, only three months 
after the Committee was created. At that meeting Lowry 
informed the members of the Committee about state 
5i"Four Decades of the Migrant Ministry," 19 June 
1961, "531. Migrant Ministry," Box 21, RG42, National 
Archives. 
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government programs and recommended strategies for 
encouraging additional action at that level. The Migrant 
Ministry local and state committees offered themselves as 
a convenient distribution system for information on 
federal programs. For example, Migrant Ministry program 
staff served as the local interpreters of new regulations 
for Social Security coverage of farmworkers in 1955 and 
1956. Along the same lines, church leaders and federal 
government officials met for consultations sponsored by 
the National Council of Churches and the Department of 
Labor in 1957 and 1960 at which the participating 
government representatives presented information on 
programs available for use by private organizations 
assisting migrant farmworkers and their families. 
Shortly after the end of World War II, the Migrant 
Ministry had joined with the National Child Labor 
Committee, the National Consumers League, and the 
""Four Decades of the Migrant Ministry," 19 June 
1961, p. 7, RG42, National Archives; "Edith Lowry, 72, 
Farm Labor Aide," 14 March 1970, The New York Times 
Biographical Edition (New York; The New York Times Co., 
1970), p. 611; R. A. Dungan to Files, 12 November 1954, 
"National Council of Churches, Dec. 1954-Oct. 1955," Box 
9, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, 
Proceedings of Consultation on Migratory Farm Labor 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), pp. 1-2; "Working Group 
Meeting with Migrant Ministry," 12 January 1960, "Jan. 
22, 1960 PCML Working Group Meeting with National Council 
of Churches," Box 38, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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National Sharecropper Committee to form a coordinating 
organization, the National Council on Agricultural Life 
and Labor. Other groups joined over the next fifteen 
years until by 1962, when Edith Lowry had become its 
executive director, thirty-five different groups 
maintained connections with the Council. The group 
maintained an office in Washington, D.C., and shared 
research and news on developments in the field of 
migratory labor. As the orientation of these 
organizations became increasingly political by the end of 
the 1950s, the Council expanded its efforts to include 
study of legislation affecting farm labor. The Council 
issued its first report on that subject in January 1960, 
identifying the political opposition to such legislation 
at the state level. That opposition closely resembled 
the national political opposition identified at the same 
time by the Department of Labor staff in response to 
attacks on the regulatory changes announced in 1959, but 
the Council recognized the power of the opposition in 
state politics and urged its member organizations to 
enter the battle on all governmental levels. 
53iiFour Decades of the Migrant Ministry," 19 June 
1961, p. 5, RG 42, National Archives; "Guests Attending 
PCML Working Group Meeting - April 27, 1956," 
"Subcommittee on Cooperation with Voluntary Agencies, 
Bever," Box 18, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; 
"Edith Lowry," The New York Times Biographical Edition. 
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In keeping with the accelerating pace of activity 
on behalf of migrant farmworkers in the late 1950s, the 
National Sharecroppers Fund, an original member of the 
National Council on Agricultural Life and Labor, had 
created a new organization, the National Advisory 
Committee on Farm Labor, in October 1958. The Fund's 
interest in migrant labor arose from its work with low-
income farmers in the South, many of whom either 
supplemented their insufficient incomes with seasonal 
farm work or turned to seasonal farm work when they lost 
their farms or sharecropping arrangements. By 1955 the 
Sharecroppers Fund had become interested enough in the 
question to issue a pamphlet exposing the miserable 
condition of farm workers and their difficulties in 
organizing into trade unions. At a conference focused 
specifically on migratory labor in 1957, the members of 
the National Sharecroppers Fund concluded that the 
gravity of tha migrants' situation justified a new 
committee dedicated exclusively to furthering the 
interests of migrant farm labor. That committee 
materialized as the National Advisory Committee on Farm 
Labor. Well-known representatives of liberal and labor 
p. 611; "Memorandum to the Board of Directors," 30 
January 1960, "#9 National Council on Agricultural Life 
and Labor, 1959," Box 77, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower 
Library. 
88 
organizations and institutions made up the membership, 
including A. Philip Randolph, president of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and active in the 
civil rights arena; Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of the former 
President and a social activist in her own right; Norman 
Thomas, leader of the American Socialist Party; Dr. Clark 
Kerr, president of the University of California; and Dr. 
Peter Odegard, Dr. Maurice van Hecke, and Archbishop 
Robert Lucey, former members of President Truman's 
Commission on Migratory Labor. The Committee served to 
provide a strong public profile for migratory labor 
issues and tied them to other prominent social causes of 
the day.®^ 
The National Advisory Committee immediately 
sponsored two days of hearings in Washington, ostensibly 
to gather information on migratory labor for their use in 
developing a strategy for advocating reform. More likely 
the committee members intended to force public and 
federal government attention to migrant labor issues, 
since the committee members had already taken positions 
^^League for Industrial Democracy and National 
Sharecroppers Fund, Down on the Farm: The Plight of 
Agricultural Labor (N.p.: League for Industrial 
Democracy, 1955); "National Committee on Farm Labor 
Established," 20 October 1958, "National Advisory 
Committee on Farm Labor, 1958-59 (5)," Box 8, Records of 
the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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as members of other organizations on most of the problems 
and solutions discussed at the hearings. To some extent 
the hearings achieved that goal. Both Senator Wayne 
Morse and Representative James Roosevelt referred on the 
floor of Congress to having attended the hearings with 
other legislators. Secretary of Labor Mitchell and 
Senator Eugene McCarthy spoke together at the hearings on 
the need for minimum labor standards protection for farm 
labor. Paul Jacobs, a journalist writing for the 
nationally circulated liberal magazine The Reporter, 
publicized the hearings in advance, hoping that they 
would play a part in "a revival of the Instincts for 
social compassion and indignation—qualities recently 
absent from our society. 
The National Sharecroppers Fund and National 
Advisory Committee on Farm Labor maintained closer 
contact and sympathy with the labor union approach to 
migrant farmworker problems than did most other voluntary 
advocacy groups. The National Sharecroppers Fund had 
originally formed to support the work of labor organizer 
'®Paul Jacobs, "The Forgotten People," The Reporter. 
22 January 1959, p. 20; U.S., Congress, Senate, 16 
February 1959, Congressional Record 105:2361; U.S., 
Congress, House, 25 February 1959, Congressional Record 
105:2950; "Report on National Advisory Committee on Farm 
Labor," 5-6 February 1959, "National Advisory Committee 
on Farm Labor, 1958-59 (5)," Box 8, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library. 
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H. L. Mitchell with the Southern Tenant Farmers Union 
(STFU) in the South during and after the Depression of 
the 1930s. H. L. Mitchell continued the farm labor 
organizing work of the STFU as a leader of the National 
Farm Labor Union (NFLU) chartered by the AFL in 1947. 
The NFLU later became the National Agricultural Workers 
Union (NAWU) under the AFL-CIO in 1955. The National 
Sharecroppers Fund followed these changes with continuing 
support of the NFLU and NAWU. Mitchell had adopted the 
strategy of securing liberal urban support, with its 
access to the national media and high-level politics, in 
an effort to improve conditions for agricultural workers 
through legislation and law enforcement when traditional 
organizing methods seemed to be failing. Those tactics 
continued under NFLU and NAWU, although never with the 
whole-hearted acquiescence of Mitchell's fellow union 
members, who preferred traditional union organizing and 
collective bargaining as solutions to labor problems. 
. The approach of labor organizers differed 
fundamentally from that of most other farmworker advocacy 
organizations. The labor organizers emphasized 
®^Galarza, pp. 317-320; H. L. Mitchell, Mean Things 
Happening in This Land (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, 
Osmun, 1979), pp. 237-278; "Mitchell, Harry Leland," 
Biographical Dictionarv of American Labor Leaders, edited 
by Gary M. Fink (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), 
p. 247. 
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government labor standards protection as the key to 
solving the problems of farm labor. At a seminar on 
services for migrant children sponsored by the federal 
Interdepartmental Committee on Children and Youth in 
1952, H. L. Mitchell had represented the position of the 
National Agricultural Workers Union (NAWU) on federal 
assistance for farmworkers. He asserted in his comments 
following presentations by leaders of such social welfare 
organizations as the National Child Labor Committee and 
the National Consumers League that "the development of 
programs for health, recreation and education of adults 
and children of migratory workers is most desirable but 
the Union points out that the basis of the plight of the 
migratory worker is economic, and until this problem is 
solved, anything else is in the nature of a 
palliative."^ 
One of Mitchell's NAWU organizers, Ernesto Galarza, 
also a professional economist who wrote a number of books 
on labor relations in California agriculture, recognized 
as Mitchell did that these organizations idealized the 
plight of migrant workers. He warned against allowing 
them to control the direction of farm labor solutions. 
^^U.S. Interdepartmental Committee on Children and 
Youth, "Report of Seminar on Services for Children of 
Migratory Agricultural Workers, October 28 and 29, 1952," 
Washington, B.C., January 1953, p. 51. 
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Galarza argued that these groups focused their energies 
on migrant farmworkers, often placing most emphasis on 
helping them find a new life outside the migrant stream. 
Their approach ignored the labor protection needs of 
seasonal farmworkers who did not migrate and often did 
not wish to leave farm work. Moreover, their tendency to 
dramatize the misery and poverty of families and 
characterize the farmworkers as helpless victims led away 
from empowerment and towards bureaucratic assistance.^" 
Rather than work toward political and institutional 
changes that would allow the farmworkers to protect their 
own interests, the liberal groups, according to Galarza, 
stopped short of altering "the structure of power . . . 
in Agri-businessland" and secured "neither economic power 
nor political efficacy for farm workers beyond what the 
existing establishments were willing to permit." As a 
result, when "the crises waned, the moral pressure was 
turned off, and the destruction of the domestic 
harvester's unions continued."®' 
Galarza credited voluntary organizations with one 
important accomplishment, however. Their investigations 
"Galarza, Ernesto," Biographical Dictionary of 
American Labor Leaders, pp. 116-117; Galarza, pp. 315-
320. 
^'Galarza, p. 318. 
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exposed the poverty and substandard working conditions of 
migrant farmworkers and forced at least a temporary end 
to grower violence against farmworkers in California. 
Ultimately, according to Galarza, the publicity produced 
by their persistent efforts "created . . . the climate of 
opinion in which Public Law 78 was at last rejected. 
That rejection did not come during the Eisenhower 
administration, but the battle for extension of the law 
in 1960 foreshadowed the power of the opposing forces 
that would bring a final end to the program in 1964. 
A critical change had occurred in late 1958 and 
throughout 1959 that moved the voluntary organizations in 
the direction of agitating for an end to the bracero 
program as the first step in helping domestic migrant 
farmworkers. Secretary Mitchell's justification for the 
Labor Department's regulatory restrictions on the program 
as a way of protecting domestic migrant farmworkers 
publicly connected the bracero program abuses with the 
poverty of domestic migrants. This recognition served to 
focus advocacy groups on the role of federal labor policy 
in prolonging the poor conditions for domestic 
farmworkers and brought the full weight of an awakening 
urban social conscience about agricultural workers to 
(^Galarza, p. 317. 
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bear against the traditional political power of the farm 
bloc.^ 
Secretary of Labor James Mitchell initiated a review 
of the Mexican farm labor program by a group of non­
government consultants in 1959 in preparation for the 
anticipated Congressional discussion about renewing the 
program in 1960. Those consultants brought direct 
experience and differing viewpoints on the question of 
imported farm labor to their study. Edward J. Thye was a 
former Senator from Minnesota who had served on the 
Agriculture Committee that considered the original 
bracero legislation in 1951. The Very Rev. Msgr. George 
G. Higgins directed the Social Action Department of the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference. Glenn E. Garrett 
held positions as executive director of the Good Neighbor 
Commission and chairman of the Texas Council on Migrant 
Labor. Dr. Rufus B. von Kleinsmid was chancellor of the 
University of Southern California. After study of the 
issues, these consultants recommended temporary 
extension, but only with significant changes in the 
powers of the Secretary of Labor to enforce the 
provisions to protect domestic farmworkers. Among these 
Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, "Insurgency of 
the Powerless; Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)," 
American Sociological Review 42(April 1977);260-262. 
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powers the consultants suggested giving the Secretary of 
Labor specific power to refuse Mexican workers unless 
farmers made adequate attempts to recruit domestic 
workers by offering the same wages and working conditions 
to domestic labor that were offered to braceros. The 
consultants found that decentralized administration 
allowed local interests to control the program, 
encouraging abuses and distortions of the law. They 
believed that clearly assigning authority for setting 
standards for use of the program to the Secretary of 
Labor could best solve those problems. 
Combined with previous Department of Labor "attacks" 
on P.L. 78 through regulatory restrictions, the 
consultants report brought angry reactions from bracero 
program supporters in Congress. Those supporters offered 
a bill in the House Agriculture Committee to extend P.L. 
78 that included provisions to remove what authority the 
Secretary of Labor already claimed under the Wagner-
Peyser Act to protect domestic farmworkers and to divide 
control of the foreign farm labor program between the 
"u.S. Department of Labor, Mexican Farm Labor 
Program Consultants Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959), 
pp. 13-17; "Mexican Farm Labor Program, Digest of 
Consultants Report," 23 October 1959, "Consultants 
Report, Mexican National Program," Box 80, Records of the 
PCML, Eisenhower Library; U.S., Congress, House, 28 June 
1960, Congressional Record 106:14805. 
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Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Neither amendment succeeded through the full Agriculture 
Committee, however. As noted above, a majority of 
representatives of farm employer interests did not wish 
to jeopardize renewal of the labor importation program 
over the question of restricting the Secretary of Labor's 
role in regulating farm labor. Such attempts to restrict 
the power of the Secretary of Labor to protect a group of 
American workers from exploitation drew a backlash 
reaction even from supporters of the bracero program. 
An anti-bracero bill encompassing most of the 
recommendations of the Department of Labor consultants 
report appeared in March 1960, soon after the grower 
representatives proposed their restrictive amendments to 
curtail the authority of the Secretary of Labor. George 
McGovern, congressman from the farm state of South 
Dakota, took the unusual step as a member of the House 
Agriculture Committee of offering a bill to extend P.L. 
78 that included strong protections for domestic migrant 
farmworkers and phased the entire program out over a 
five-year period. McGovern's bill, and similar 
^Congress and the Nation. 1945-1964. p. 765; Craig, 
pp. 151-155, 160-161; Tomasek, pp. 316-318; Miller to 
Secretary of Agriculture, 17 March 1960, "Employment 1-1 
Agricultural Jan. 1-May 31, 1960," Box 3437, Series 17, 
RG16, National Archives. 
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amendments proposed later by Senator Eugene McCarthy and 
Representatives John Fogarty of Rhode Island and Alfred 
Santangelo of New York, achieved no more success than the 
bill proposed .by opponents of the consultants report, but 
they served as rallying points for bracero program 
opponents who forced serious congressional debate of the 
foreign farm labor program for the first time since its 
initiation in 1951.^ 
An important reason for the failure of amendments 
from both camps could be found in the refusal of 
Eisenhower administration officials to endorse either 
approach. Behind that refusal was the culmination of the 
long-standing dispute between Secretary of Agriculture 
Benson and Secretary of Labor Mitchell over the bracero 
program. That conflict had been building since Mitchell 
began his pressure on the Mexican labor importation 
program using the Wagner-Peyser Act in 1959. Their 
disagreements, noted above, increased when the 
consultants report appeared and Mitchell took a public 
stand in opposition to extension of P.L. 78. Such a 
public division within the Cabinet created political 
^Craig, pp. 155-157, 160-161; Tomasek, pp. 316-318; 
U.S. Congress, House, 21, 24, 28 March, 11 April, 28 June 
1960, Congressional Record 106:6172, 6517-6518, 6720-
6721, 7914-7915, 14801-14812; U.S., Congress, Senate, 13 
June 1960, Congressional Record 106:12377-12380. 
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embarrassment for the Eisenhower administration and White 
House officials forced a compromise in March 1960 between 
Mitchell and Benson guaranteeing that neither would 
support any changes to P.L 78 in 1960. The compromise 
led by default to an administration endorsement of 
extension without change, seriously weakening the chances 
for success of amendments on either side of the 
question/® 
In the end, the House passed the two-year extension 
of P.L. 78 without amendment. The Senate, however, 
proved more difficult for the grower interests to secure. 
The House bill failed to gain enough support in the 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to reach the floor. 
Only a six-month extension survived, and that largely 
through the efforts of Chairman Allen J. Ellender, 
sponsor of the original bracero bill in 1951. Senator 
Ellender revealed the nature of the opposition to any 
bracero bill in the Senate Agriculture Committee as he 
defended the six-month extension to the full Senate in 
late August. Not all committee members who opposed the 
House extension necessarily opposed P.L. 78. Some simply 
believed discussion should be held over to the next 
session of Congress, when the issues could be 
^'craig, pp. 156-157, 159; U.S., Congress, House, 16 
June 1960, Congressional Record 106:12947. 
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reconsidered without the pressure of an upcoming recess. 
The secretaries of Labor and Agriculture had suggested 
such an approach in letters to the committee, pointing 
out that the program would not expire until June 30, 
1961, leaving plenty of time for more careful study and 
debate in the new Congress. The Labor Department hoped 
to gain further support in the new Congress to end or 
alter the farm labor program as recommeoded by the 
consultants report. The Agriculture Department hoped 
instead that a delay would give them time to persuade 
Congress of the need for a full two-year extension.^ 
Ellender defended the six-month extension with the 
explanation that postponing consideration of the labor 
program until after the planting season would eliminate 
any chance for growers to plan for changes in the 
availability of Mexican farmworkers. If Congress voted 
to end or substantially alter the program after June 30, 
1961, its legislated termination date, farm employers 
could be left without harvest labor in 1961 and with no 
time to make other arrangements. The extension to 
December 31, 1961, would protect the harvest season in 
^Craig, pp. 158-160; Marvin L. McClain, Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture, to Phillip S. Hughes, Assistant 
Director for Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget, 
12 August 1960, "Employment 1-1 Agricultural June 1-Sept. 
13, 1960," Box 3437, Series 17, RG16, National Archives. 
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1961 and provide farmers a year's advance for" making 
adjustments. His arguments persuaded a majority of 
senators to vote with him for the short extension and the 
House concurred that same afternoon, rescuing the bracero 
program for another year.^^ The short-term extension, 
however, also guaranteed renewed struggle in the next 
Congress over the same issues. Indicative of what that 
struggle would be like. Democratic Representative 
Cleveland M. Bailey of West Virginia, who had opposed 
bracero legislation since 1951, withdrew his objection to 
the six-month extension at the last minute, warning "you 
are not going to be back here at the expiration of your 6 
months extension demanding to make this type of lousy 
legislation a permanent proposition ... it is lousy 
legislation which cannot be justified, in view of the 
situation of these farm people out there. 
The final consideration of the farm labor question 
under the Eisenhower administration had thus ended on a 
note suggestive of imminent change in the new decade. 
Paralleling Charles C. Alexander's characterizations of 
the Eisenhower administration described at the beginning 
^^Craig, pp. 159-160; U.S., Congress, House, 31 
August 1960, Congressional Record 106:18904. 
^U.S., Congress, House, 31 August 1960, 
Congressional Record 106:18904. 
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of this chapter, the farm employer interests and rural 
Congressmen had indeed "held the line" against 
substantial alteration of the federal role in farm labor 
programs. Yet the pendulum swing suggested by James L. 
Sundguist had also clearly begun. Secretary Mitchell's 
policy changes within the Department of Labor had 
increased the momentum of liberal support for federal 
intervention on behalf of migrant farmworkers and had 
identified federal administration of the Mexican labor 
importation program as the primary support for continued 
grower control of the farm labor market. Congressional 
debate of the bracero program in 1960 revealed a growing 
interest in the farm labor question as a social reform or 
poverty issue. As the liberal critique of American 
politics and government intensified at the turn of the 
decade, the problems of migrant labor became attached to 
a widening social reform agenda. That agenda would 
mature in the next few years amidst some encouraging 
political successes in the areas of health, nutrition, 
and job-training, and American migrant farmworkers would 
share in that experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TURNING POINT; MIGRANTS ENTER THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE 
On the day after Thanksgiving, 1960, Americans were 
shocked by the stark scenes of poverty and deprivation 
among the nation's migrant agricultural laborers captured 
in the CBS documentary Harvest of Shame. The film 
ushered in an era of renewed sympathy for these 
farmworkers and their families. It undermined the 
political influence of farm employers by publicly 
exposing the living and working conditions of migrants 
and their families and spurred new support for federal 
assistance to migrant farmworkers. Part of the social 
reform mood of the incoming Kennedy administration and 
promoted by increased publicity through the activism of 
liberal advocacy organizations, this new public interest 
encouraged the work of the administration and the Senate 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, as well as some state 
legislative activity. As a result, the early years of 
the 1960s witnessed the first successful federal 
legislation directed specifically to migrant farmworkers 
and prepared the way for the end of the bracero era and 
the inclusion of migrant assistance programs in the 
Johnson administration's war on poverty. 
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Historian Allen Matusow has suggested that the 
election of 1960 "initiated the resurgence of American 
liberalism, which had not commanded the political 
landscape since the first term of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.For migrant farmworkers that prospect 
offered renewed hope, since the first term of Roosevelt' 
administration had launched the original efforts by the 
federal government to assist them in escaping their 
poverty. The rising tide of that new liberalism had 
begun in the last few years of the preceding decade, 
punctuated by the publication of John Kenneth Galbraith' 
The Affluent Society in 1958. Galbraith's book pointed 
out the material affluence of American society and 
suggested that the nation could afford to invest more of 
its wealth in public spending, including programs to 
assist the poor who continued to exist within the 
affluence. Among his purposes in writing the work, 
Galbraith wished to oppose the Keynesian obsession with 
economic growth as the cure-all for social problems. He 
asserted that increasing economic growth simply shifted 
the level of income by which poverty was measured. He 
insisted that societies must consider the ways in which 
^Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A 
History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1984), p. 3. 
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they spent their wealth, because only through government 
taxation for public spending could the necessary 
investments in social problems bring relief of economic 
imbalances.2 
Matusow has pointed out, however, that, more than 
Galbraith's work itself, the critical responses to 
Galbraith's book affected the social reform focus of 
politics. He notes that Leon Keyserling, a former 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under the 
Truman administration, countered Galbraith's dismissal of 
economic growth in solving social problems. Keyserling 
claimed nearly a quarter of the American population lived 
in poverty. American society could not afford public 
spending on the level necessary to alleviate poverty 
among such a large group. Only continued economic growth 
could accomplish the feat, by raising the standard of 
living of many of those poor and by increasing tax 
revenues as incomes rose, thereby providing sufficient 
income for government programs to assist those not 
reached by the economic growth. Keyserling's viewpoint 
would affect the Kennedy poverty initiatives by 
suggesting a combination of tax reduction to spur 
Zjohn Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Societv 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958; 2d ed., revised, 1969), 
pp. xxiv-xxvii. 
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economic growth with increased direct public spending on 
antipoverty programs.^ 
The reaction of another critic, socialist Michael 
Harrington, held more direct significance for the future 
of federal assistance to migrant farmworkers. 
Harrington's book The Other America; Poverty in the 
United States, published in 1962, praised Galbraith for 
recognizing the new form of poverty existing in mid-
twentieth century America. Much like Galbraith, 
Harrington emphasized the isolated, minority character of 
modern poverty and the seeming paradox of its existence 
amid an increasingly affluent society.* Further, he 
credited Galbraith with an important political insight 
about poverty, one he obviously shared: "[Galbraith] was 
one of the first to understand that there are enough poor 
people in the United States to constitute a subculture of 
misery, but not enough of them to challenge the 
conscience and the imagination of the nation."® His only 
criticism of Galbraith concerned Galbraith's 
^Matusow, pp. 9-10; James L. Sundguist, Politics and 
Policy: The Eisenhower. Kennedv. and Johnson Years 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 
112-113. 
^Michael Harrington, The other America; Poverty in 
the United States (New York; Macmillan, 1962), p. 1-18. 
'Harrington, p. 12. 
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underestimate of the prevalence and causes of American 
poverty.* 
Harrington devoted most of the pages of The Other 
America to describing the varieties of this poverty, 
within which he included workers who lost their jobs 
through technological progress in industry, the elderly, 
blacks and other minorities, and poor farmers and 
farmworkers. His book achieved wide popular circulation 
and became the source of much public opinion on the 
federal role in addressing poverty. Americans had been 
made aware of the poverty of migrant farmworkers by 
Harvest of Shame in 1960; The Other America made explicit 
the connection between the migrant situation and the more 
widespread condition of poverty throughout the United 
States. Migrant farmworkers thereby gained a place in 
the public conscience as members of the poverty class to 
which federal legislation should be directed.' 
A succession of books and magazine articles joined 
Harvest of Shame and The Other America in exposing the 
conditions of migrant agricultural workers in the early 
years of the 1960s. The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People published No Harvest for 
^Harrington, p. 11. 
^Harrington, pp. 19-174; Matusow, p. 119. 
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the Reaper: The Storv of the Migratory Agricultural 
Worker in the United States by Herbert Hill in 1960. 
Louisa Rossiter Shotwell of the National Council of 
Churches' Migrant Ministry wrote The Harvesters; The 
storv of the Migrant People to explain the life of 
migrants to children in 1961. Liberal magazines like The 
Reporter and Commonweal ran numerous articles on the 
problems of migrants throughout the period, beginning as 
early as 1959. Such social-action oriented religious 
journals as Christian Century and Christianity and Crisis 
carried similar stories, including one by Senator 
Harrison A. Williams, Jr., chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Migratory Labor, in 1961. More significant for 
influencing the general reading public, however, a 
sprinkling of articles appeared in such general 
circulation magazines as Newsweek. Time, and the New York 
Times Magazine in 1960 and 1961.® 
^Herbert Hill, No Harvest for the Reaper: The story 
of the Migratory Agricultural Worker in the United States 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1960); Louisa Rossiter 
Shotwell, The Harvesters: The Storv of the Migrant People 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961); Paul Jacobs, 
"Forgotten People; with an Interview with Secretary 
Mitchell," Reporter. 5 February 1959, p. 8; E. P. Morgan, 
"Forgotten People," Reporter. 5 March 1959, p. 4; 
"Possible Turning Point," Commonweal. 17 April 1959, pp. 
68-69; "California Farm Labor," Commonweal. 18 September 
1959, p. 508; P. Burnham, "Million Migrants," Commonweal. 
19 February 1960, p. 572; "Men on the Land," Commonweal. 
8 April 1960, p. 30; L. T. King, "America's Poor," 
Commonweal. 22 July 1960, pp. 366-369; S. Keisker, 
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Some publications in the first half of the decade 
originated in the state activities stimulated by the work 
of Eisenhower's President's Committee on Migratory Labor. 
% 
Reports on farm labor conditions and programs appeared 
from Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Oregon, between 1959 and 1963. 
Although reports do not necessarily equal action on 
identified problems, these state publications added to 
the attention gathering around the migrant labor issue 
and usually supported federal involvement in solutions 
because of the interstate character of migrancy. When 
the states themselves requested federal assistance, the 
case for federal legislation and funding gained 
considerable strength.* 
"Harvest of Shame," Commonweal. 19 May 1961, pp. 202-205; 
L. T. King, "Blight in Our Fields," Commonweal. 24 
November 1961, pp. 227-230; "Latter-Day Serfs," 
Commonweal. 8 February 1963, p. 504; Paul Jacobs, "Task 
for a Peace Corps," Christian Century. 20 February 1963, 
pp. 237-238; "American Outcasts," Christian Century. 3 
May 1961, p. 548; H. E. Fey, "Out of Work in Ten Years: 
National Council of Churches-Sponsored Migrant Ministry 
Program," Christian Century. 9 October 1963, pp. 1230-
1231; Harrison A. Williams, Jr., "The Migratory Farm 
Worker Problem in the United States," Christianity and 
Crisis. 27 November 1961, pp. 207-210; A. H. Raskin, "For 
500,000, Still Tobacco Road," New York Times Magazine. 24 
April 1960, p. 14; "Excluded Americans," Time. 5 December 
1960, p. 50; "Drudgery and Despair," Newsweek. 23 October 
1961, p. 68. 
^Colorado General Assembly, Committee on Migratory 
Labor, Migratory Labor in Colorado; a Progress Report to 
the Colorado General Assembly. Denver, 1960; Colorado 
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In fact, by 1960 the issue of migrant farmworker 
assistance had achieved sufficient public support to 
warrant campaign platform statements from both parties. 
The Republicans pledged "action on . . . improvement of 
job opportunities and working conditions of migratory 
farm workers.The Democratic platform, more dramatic 
and activist than the Republican, promised "to bring the 
two million men, women, and children who work for wages 
on the farms of the United States under the protection of 
General Assembly, Legislative Council, Migratory Labor in 
Colorado; Report. Research publication no. 72, Denver, 
December 1962; Florida Legislative Council, Migrant Farm 
Labor in Florida (Tallahassee; State Legislative Council 
and Legislative Reference Bureau, 1963); Indiana 
Governor's Committee on Migratory Labor, Progress Report. 
1960-1963. Indianapolis, 1964; Louisiana 
Interdepartmental Committee on Health, Education and 
Services, Report on the Louisiana Migrant Labor Problem. 
Baton Rouge, 1960; Maryland Governor's Committee for the 
Regulation and Study of Migratory Labor, Annual Report 
(College Park: Univ. of Maryland, 1960, 1961, 1962); 
Maryland Governor's Committee on Migratory Labor, 
Progress in Meeting Problems of Migratory Labor in 
Maryland. 1959-1962. 4th Annual Report, Annapolis, 31 
January 1963; Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, The Migrant 
Labor Problem in Wisconsin (Madison: Governor's 
Commission on Human Rights, 1962); Ohio Legislative 
Service Commission, Migrant Workers in Ohio; Report. 
Research report no. 49, Columbus, 1961; Ohio Governor's 
Committee on Migrant Labor, Migratory Labor in Ohio 
Agriculture; a Report. Columbus, 1962; Oregon Bureau of 
Labor, . . . and Migrant Problems Demand Attention: the 
Final Report of the 1958-59 Migrant Farm Labor studies in 
Oregon. Salem, 1959. 
^As quoted by Harrison A. Williams, Jr., in Harrison 
A. Williams, Jr., "Proposed Legislation for Migratory 
Workers," Labor Law Journal 12(7)(1961);631. 
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existing labor and social legislation; and to assure 
migrant labor, perhaps the most underprivileged of all, 
of a comprehensive program to bring them not only decent 
wages but also an adequate standard of health, housing, 
social security protection, education and welfare 
services. 
According to political scientist James L. Sundquist, 
the voters endorsed that traditional Democratic activism 
on domestic social issues in the 1960 election by 
choosing John F. Kennedy as President supporters of 
the Kennedy presidency who had worked for some time to 
secure federal assistance to migrant labor expected much 
from the new administration. William L. Batt, Jr., 
Secretary of Labor and Industry for Pennsylvania and a 
supporter of government intervention on behalf of 
farmworkers throughout the 1950s, claimed in an article 
published by the National Council of Churches that 
i^Ibid., pp. 630-631. 
^^sundquist, p. 470. Sundquist based his 
interpretation of the voter mandate to Kennedy on 
domestic reform on a series of public opinion polls 
conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion on 
leading election issues from 1956 to 1960. According to 
these polls, voter support for Democrats arose primarily 
from concerns about such issues as unemployment, 
inflation, and education. Strength on these domestic 
issues barely outweighed Republican strength on foreign 
policy questions and anti-Catholic votes against Kennedy. 
Thus, Sundquist asserts, a very close election can still 
be read as a mandate for domestic reform. 
Ill 
because "we have just elected a President who pledged in 
his campaign to move America forward in a war on poverty 
... we may be able to accomplish more in the next six 
months than we have in the last generation."" 
These high expectations for success arose in part 
from the earlier indications of increasing voter support 
for government activism evident in the 1958 congressional 
elections. Those elections brought an activist 
Democratic majority to Congress in 1959 whose effect on 
migrant labor issues included increasing opposition to 
the Mexican labor importation program and the creation by 
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of a 
subcommittee dedicated to studying and recommending 
legislation to assist migrant farmworkers. The chairman 
of the new Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, Harrison A. 
Williams, Jr., of New Jersey, had himself been among the 
liberal activist senators elected in the 1958 
elections.^ 
"William L. Batt, Jr., "How the New President and 
Congress Can Best Help Solve the Nation's Migratory Labor 
Problem" The Fifth Decade (memorial publication by the 
National Council of Churches), p. 33, "National Council 
of Churches, Jan. I960-," Box 9, Records of the 
President's Committee on Migratory Labor, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 
'^Sundquist, pp. 456-470; "Williams, Harrison, 
A(rlington), Jr.," Current Biography i960 (New York; H. 
W. Wilson, 1960), p. 463. 
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Senator Williams believed that such public backing 
for government activism specifically supported the 
subcommittee's work on behalf of migrant agricultural 
labor. His comments at the opening of hearings in 1959 
reflected a well-developed liberal critique of the 
migrant condition reminiscent of Galbraith's general 
comments on the need for American commitment to 
government spending for the public welfare. They also 
presaged Harrington's popular application of that idea to 
the particular problems of diverse poverty groups. 
Williams characterized the public concern for migrant 
farmworkers as "based upon three fundamental 
propositions: 
(1) A democratic and affluent society such as 
ours will not tolerate pockets of poverty and human 
degradation such as those presented by the migrant 
laborer. 
(2) A democratic society deplores exploitation 
of the weak and uninformed. 
(3) A democratic society does not accept the 
concept of inequality by birth; and, therefore, will 
not permit economic hardship, educational 
disadvantages, and health disabilities, to be passed 
on from parent to child. It surely follows that we 
must find effective means to prevent the children of 
migrant laborers from inheriting the extremely 
unfortunate economic circumstances of their 
parents." 
"U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Migratory Labor. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, Part 1, 
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The Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor led a 
growing initiative in Congress to increase federal 
assistance and protection for migrant farmworkers. 
During the Eisenhower period the strongest push for 
change within government had come from Secretary of Labor 
James P. Mitchell, whose personal political strength 
allowed him to successfully challenge the power of 
agricultural interests in Congress and the 
administration. With the advent of liberal Democratic 
strength in Congress just preceding the Kennedy years, 
however, advocates for migrant labor in Congress began to 
take the lead in recommending new federal approaches to 
the problem. 
The Subcommittee pursued two years of study and 
proposed legislation to deal with the problems of a 
minimum wage, child labor, registration of crew leaders, 
education, and housing. None of those bills had reached 
the Senate floor by the end of 1960, but the Subcommittee 
renewed its legislative advocacy for migrant farmworkers 
in the reform climate of 1961. In that year members of 
the Subcommittee considered a more comprehensive series 
of laws aimed at improvement of conditions for migrants 
and their families. Encompassed in eleven bills, the 
p. 1. 
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proposals offered minimum wage and child labor protection 
for agricultural workers; registration of labor 
contractors; collective bargaining; housing assistance 
for farmers and workers; employment stabilization; 
improved health, education, and welfare benefits for 
migrant adults and children; and a National Citizens' 
Council on Migratory Labor 
The Subcommittee settled on six of these bills to be 
the focus of hearings in April 1961. Those six bills 
outlawed migrant child labor, offered federal assistance 
to states for educating migrant children and adults, 
provided for registration of farm labor contractors, 
established a grant program to fund health clinics for 
migrant farmworkers and their families, and instituted a 
National Advisory Council on Migratory Labor. The 
Subcommittee reported all six to the full Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare following hearings 
in April 1961; the full Committee in turn recommended all 
six bills to the Senate for consideration.^' 
Two members of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, John G. Tower and Barry Goldwater, expressed 
i^Wiiiiams, p. 631. 
^^Diaest of Public General Bills and Resolutions. 
87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 1962), pp. A-64, A-65. 
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dissenting opinions on the bills to fund education for 
migrant children and adults and to establish a national 
advisory council. Viewed as among the most conservative 
Republicans of the Senate, Tower, a new senator from 
Texas in 1961, and Goldwater, a veteran senator from 
Arizona, both represented states that were heavy users of 
migrant seasonal farm labor. Texas growers, in 
particular, had a reputation for low wages and poor 
treatment of workers, so much so that the government of 
Mexico had refused to allow bracero contracts with Texas 
growers during the early years of that program. Tower 
and Goldwater objected to the national citizens advisory 
council because it duplicated the purposes and 
responsibilities of the President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor, still in existence under the Kennedy 
administration. They also believed the planned 
membership of the council favored the interests of 
farmworkers, since twelve of the fifteen members would 
represent migrant farmworkers or agencies and individuals 
knowledgeable about migrant farmworker problems. The 
remaining three members would represent farmers; none of 
the members would be appointed because of their knowledge 
of farmers' problems. Their opposition to the bill to 
provide federal funding to assist in educating migrants 
stemmed from their fundamental objection to federal 
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interference in state and local educational systems/"* 
General farm organizations like the American Farm 
Bureau Federation and specialized grower associations 
like the Virginia Horticulture Society, the United Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetable Association, the National Potato 
Council, and the Vegetable Growers Association of America 
expressed similar views on these migrant farmworker 
questions at the hearings in April 1961. Long the most 
powerful of the interest groups involved in farm labor 
issues, these groups did not like the idea of a national 
advisory committee for the same reasons expressed by 
Senators Tower and Goldwater in their minority views on 
the bill. Similarly, the Farm Bureau representative. 
Matt Triggs, objected on principle to any increased 
federal involvement in education, as had Tower and 
Goldwater. The farm employer organizations also objected 
to regulation of child labor and crew leader 
registration. The growers' objections to child labor 
focused on the value of farm work for young boys. These 
objections ignored suggestions that the poverty and 
'®U.S., Congress, Senate, National Advisorv Council 
on Miaratorv Labor. S. Rept. 697, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 
pp. 9-10; U.S., Congress, Senate, Programs for Improving 
Educational Opportunities for Migratorv Farmworkers and 
Their Children. S. Rept. 698, 87th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 
13-14; "Tower, John G(oodwin)," Current Biographv 1962 
(New York: H. W. Wilson, 1962), p. 426. 
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transiency of migrant families made exploitation of 
migrant children more likely than for family farm 
children helping out on neighboring farms. They opposed 
registration of crew leaders out of concern for the 
effects of such regulation on hard-working migrants who 
earned extra money by leading crews. Such leaders were 
usually poorly educated and would be unable to maintain 
the required records for federal licensing."* 
Much of the testimony at the hearings on these 
bills, however, supported the proposed comprehensive 
legislation. Representatives of such religious, social 
welfare, professional, and labor organizations as the 
Catholic Rural Life Conference, the Migrant Ministry, the 
National Child L,abor Committee, the National Advisory 
Committee on Farm Labor, the National Education 
Association, and the AFL-CIO spoke in favor of one or 
more of the six bills, often supporting them all. Most 
of these voluntary advocacy groups had begun their 
support of federal legislation for domestic migrant 
farmworkers in the preceding decade, if not earlier, and 
by 1961 occupied a well-established position within the 
^'u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Migratory Labor, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Migratorv Labor of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, Vol. 1, 
pp. 49, 61, 67, 79, 125. 
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debate on migrant labor issues. Their testimony 
expressed the consensus of the liberal activist community 
that impoverished and powerless groups like the migrant 
farmworkers required federal assistance and protection. 
The opposing beliefs of the farmworker advocate 
groups and the farm employers' organizations, however, 
added no new directions to the ongoing debate over 
government responsibility towards migrant labor issues. 
These two positions simply continued the polarized 
discussion of the 1950s. The critical change occurred in 
the distribution of political power, which, as noted 
above, had begun to alter in favor of social reform and 
antipoverty causes with the 87th Congress in 1959. The 
Kennedy election enhanced liberal strength because of its 
character as a national referendum on the liberal social 
reform agenda. Despite some Democratic losses in 
Congress in 1960, particularly in the House, the new 
administration worked with Congressional liberals to try 
to effect those reforms. 
.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Migratory Labor. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, Vol. 1, 
pp. 76, 129, 132, 139, 153, 154, 205, 280, 292, 297, 312, 
324, 334. 
^Sundquist, pp. 466-470; Matusow, pp. 17-20, 28-29; 
Herbert S. Parmet, JFK; The Presidency of John F. Kennedy 
(New York: Dial Press, 1983), pp. 96-98, 203-209. 
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Consequently, Kennedy administration cabinet 
officers testified in favor of the migrant labor bills at 
the April hearings, reflecting the support of the new 
administration toward federal assistance to farmworkers 
as one of the impoverished groups in American society. 
Comments by those officers, especially Secretary of Labor 
Arthur J. Goldberg and Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare Abraham Ribicoff, indicated clearly that the 
new administration joined the Senate Subcommittee in 
accepting the need for federal solutions to the problems 
of migratory farm labor.The preceding Eisenhower 
administration, even including Secretary of Labor 
Mitchell, had urged use of federal power primarily to 
assist states in solving their farm labor problems. This 
transition in 1961 to viewing the federal government as 
having direct responsibility for providing programs for 
farmworkers served as a critical step toward 
establishment of the comprehensive federal approach 
achieved under the Johnson Administration War on Poverty. 
As part of that commitment to federal involvement in 
solving farm labor problems, the Kennedy Department of 
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Miaratorv Labor. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, Vol. 1, 
pp. 21-33, 284. 
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Labor attempted to reinvigorate the President's Committee 
on Migratory Labor. John Walsh, Executive Director of 
the President's Committee since November 1959, produced 
an evaluation of the work of the Eisenhower Committee. 
He noted such accomplishments as passage of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulations for 
transporting migrant workers, issuance of model 
transportation and housing codes, and creation of state 
migratory labor committees. But in Walsh's estimation, 
"while these accomplishments are of some value, they are 
not ... of sufficient value to justify the existence of 
a cabinet-level committee."^' 
Walsh did not recommend disbanding the Committee. He 
believed the Committee's ineffectiveness in the 1950s 
resulted from the conflict between Secretary of Labor 
Mitchell and Secretary of Agriculture Benson over the 
proper federal role in agricultural labor questions and 
President Eisenhower's lack of interest in resolving the 
dispute. These constraints on action by the Committee 
could be avoided under the new administration if the 
President took a strong position in support of the 
2'john Walsh to the Secretary of Labor, 27 January 
1961, p. 3, attached to letter, John Walsh to Frederick 
G. Button, 31 January 1961, "FG 273, President's 
Committee on Migratory Labor-Exec.," Box 203, White House 
Central Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Columbia Point, 
Massachusetts. 
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Committee's work. Walsh also suggested Kennedy appoint a 
citizens advisory committee and allow the Secretary of 
Labor to promote a comprehensive action program and forge 
close ties between the administration's Committee on 
Migratory Labor and the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory 
Labor. Walsh asserted that "with proper leadership and 
direction, the Committee could contribute a great deal to 
public understanding of the migratory labor problem, and 
become an important segment of the Administration's 
overall attack on domestic poverty. "Z* 
Although the President never issued the strong 
statement of support Walsh had advised, the Committee did 
meet on January 17, 1962, to consider what direction it 
should take under the new administration. The Committee 
members heard presentations on pending migratory labor 
legislation by Senator Williams of the Subcommittee on 
Migratory Labor and New York Congressman Herbert Zelenko, 
House sponsor of the Subcommittee bills. Walsh outlined 
the problems of migratory labor and past federal policies 
in response to those problems, then presented a proposed 
^^Walsh to the Secretary of Labor, 27 January 1961, 
pp. 4-5, White House Central Files, Kennedy Library. 
Walsh's recommendation to give the Secretary of Labor a 
stronger hand for action on behalf of the committee 
reflected his Labor Department affiliation. A staff 
member in the department since 1954, Walsh remained a 
Department of Labor employee in his position as executive 
secretary of the committee. 
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policy statement and set of recommendations for the new 
Committee.That policy, unanimously adopted by the 
members, supported the effort to accomplish "in 
agriculture what we, as a Nation, have already 
accomplished in most other sectors of our economy - the 
restoration of respect and dignity, based on good wages, 
good working conditions, steady employment, educational 
opportunities, and the extension of public health and 
welfare services to the men, women and children who labor 
for hire in American agriculture."^" 
The recommendations for accomplishing this 
ambitious policy, however, simply advocated supporting 
the Subcommittee's legislative initiative and urging 
vigorous enforcement of provisions in current laws that 
affected migrant farmworkers. In essence, the new 
President's Committee on Migratory Labor repeated 
positions already taken by the individual cabinet 
departments on pending legislation and encouraged cabinet 
departments and other government agencies to implement 
laws already passed. This was hardly the invigorated 
^®Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor, to the 
President, 17 January 1962, "I-E.4 President's Committee 
on Migratory Labor," Box 16, Records of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, RG42, National Archives 
and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
^Goldberg to the President, 17 January 1962, p. 3, 
RG42, National Archives. 
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"attack on domestic poverty" Walsh had envisioned. The 
Committee, in fact, did not meet again, dying "of its own 
inertia," as Walsh had predicted it would, early in the 
Johnson administration.^^ 
The Working Group of the Committee, however, 
continued to pursue some of its recommendations, 
particularly those aimed at adapting other antipoverty 
legislation to benefit migrants. The Kennedy 
administration had seen several important antipoverty 
measures through Congress in 1961. Among these, the 
Housing Act, the Area Redevelopment Act and related Rural 
Area Development programs, and the Manpower Development 
and Training Act held most promise for migrant 
farmworkers. The Housing Act included provisions for 
loans to farm owners to improve housing for their 
seasonal labor and to farmworkers to improve or construct 
houses in their home-base locations. The Area 
Redevelopment Act and Rural Area Development programs 
seemed to hold job-training possibilities for migrants in 
distressed areas to help them leave unskilled seasonal 
farm work for better jobs. The Manpower Development and 
Training Act offered similar services to migrants in 
^^Goldberg to the President, 17 January 1962, pp. 4-
8, RG42, National Archives; Walsh to the Secretary of 
Labor, 27 January 1961, p. 3, White House Central Files, 
Kennedy Library. 
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other parts of the country not designated as distressed 
areas eligible for Area Redevelopment or Rural Area 
Development programs.^® 
In practice, however, none of these programs offered 
substantial benefits for the migrant population. 
Administration of the housing program continued to be 
oriented toward urban renewal, as it had been under 
housing legislation passed in 1949 and 1954, and thus 
afforded little assistance to migrant farmworkers. Both 
the Area Redevelopment and Rural Area Development 
programs had been designed to stimulate economic 
development in identified geographic areas and so could 
aid migrants only where their home-bases coincided with 
an otherwise designated area. Furthermore, both of these 
programs and the Manpower Development and Training 
programs tended to track migrant and seasonal farmworkers 
who did obtain training into agricultural occupations 
like farm mechanics and tractor operation. Although 
^®Matusow, pp. 100-105; David Burner, John F. Kennedy 
and a New Generation (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 
1988), pp. 138-140; "Assistance to Agricultural Migrants 
through the Manpower Development and Training and Area 
Redevelopment Acts," "I-E.5 Area Redevelopment 
Administration," Box 16, RG42, National Archives; 
"Summary of Action Taken by the President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor," pp. 2-3, attachment to Arthur J. 
Goldberg, Secretary of Labor, to the President, 17 
January 1962, "I-E.4 President's Committee on Migratory 
Labor," Box 16, RG42, National Archives. 
125 
opportunities for employment in those areas increased in 
1961 because of provisions in the renewal of the Mexican 
farm labor program that forbid imported Mexican workers 
from holding such jobs, these occupations could not 
accommodate large numbers of retrained farmworkers. 
Furthermore, lack of basic education often precluded 
other job-training possibilities for migrants, as for 
other unemployed and underemployed people served by these 
programs, and the economic development acts could not 
address that issue. 
Meanwhile, as the Working Group pursued its efforts 
to incorporate migrant farmworkers in the programs of the 
more general antipoverty acts, the administration 
continued to support the Subcommittee on Migratory 
Labor's agenda of specific migrant assistance programs. 
Advocates in the administration who favored such 
legislation for social reform reasons found additional 
support for their position from Kennedy's political 
advisors. In these advisors' estimation, support for 
^'Matusow, pp. 100-105; Burner, pp. 138-140; 
"Assistance to Agricultural Migrants through the Manpower 
Development and Training and Area Redevelopment Acts," 
RG42, National Archives; Louis Levine to Seymour 
Wolfbein, attn: William Mirengoff, 8 February 1962, "Area 
Redevelopment Administration," Box 24, Records of the 
PCML, Eisenhower Library; John Walsh to Lou McConnell, 26 
April 1962, and John J. Walsh to William Mirengoff, n.d., 
"37 ARA & RAD Negotiations on Migrant Programs," Box 79, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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migrant labor issues could create a "favorable public 
image . . . since their need had been well exposed in our 
mass media." They also felt passage of the migrant bills 
would provide the President "a place in American history 
. . . [because] to date no legislative program has been 
enacted, even by the Liberals and past Democratic 
Administrations." At the same time, because the migrant 
labor bills paralleled other interests of the 
administration, Kennedy could not be accused of using the 
migrant issue to score easy political points. Finally, 
the President's advisors assured him the "price to be 
paid for passage of migratory bills is small; grower 
types are not against these bills," a questionable 
analysis considering the testimony by growers and their 
representatives at the Senate Subcommittee hearings in 
1961. Still, the gain was potentially great, especially 
on minority issues, since "liberal sectors would be ready 
to commend JFK for action here; especially the Negro, who 
of late is becoming somewhat dubious about racial stand 
of Administration."'" 
Perhaps for these reasons, the President personally 
assisted the effort to establish at least one federal 
'"Memorandum, Harry G. Wilkinson to Frederick R. 
Blackwell, 10 August 1962, "I-A.4 Intersubcommittee," Box 
33, RG42, National Archives. 
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program for migrant workers. He did so in a presidential 
message to Congress in 1962 focusing on the 
administration's national health program. Kennedy spoke 
directly of the needs of domestic migrant agricultural 
workers in that message.^ His particular emphasis on 
the migrant health issue coincided with, or perhaps 
recognized, the bipartisan consensus on that issue in 
Congress. Of the original six bills proposed at hearings 
by the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, all of which 
passed the Senate in 1961, only the bill to establish 
health clinics for migrant farmworkers and their families 
raised no apparent opposition.'^ 
Three reasons may explain this broad support of 
health clinics for migrant families. The arguments in 
favor of providing improved health care for migrant 
workers connected migrant health to the health of 
communities through which they traveled, making control 
'%.S., Congress, House, Message from the President 
of the United States Relative to a Health Program. H. 
Doc. 347, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 9. 
'^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Migratory Labor. Hearing before the 
Subcomittee on Migratorv Labor of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, Vol. 1, 
pp. 49, 61, 67, 79, 125; U.S., Congress, Senate, National 
Advisory Council on Migratory Labor. S. Rept. 697, 87th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 9-10; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Programs for Improving Educational Opportunities for 
Migratory Farmworkers and Their Children. S. Rept. 698, 
87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 13-14. 
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of disease among migrants a public health benefit to non-
migrants as well. Supporters also emphasized the 
benefits to growers, arguing that improved health care 
for migrants meant a better labor force for growers. The 
third reason for success lay in the funding strategy of 
the bill. Federal money would be granted to state 
governments, local governments, or local nonprofit 
agencies to administer health care facilities and 
education activities. This plan emphasized local control 
of programs and funding, thereby satisfying those opposed 
to federal intervention on principle.^' 
The Senate bill (S. 1130) prepared by the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor provided that up to 
$3,000,000 annually for five years could be spent by the 
Surgeon General through the Public Health Service. 
Grants to state and local agencies would pay part of the 
cost of special projects to provide health care services 
to migrant farmworkers and their families or to train 
personnel to provide those services. The grants could 
also be used to support studies and demonstration 
projects aimed at improving delivery of these health care 
services and to encourage inter and intrastate 
^'u.S., Congress, House, 1961, Congressional Record 
107:1707; U.S., Congress, House, Message from the 
President of the United States Relative to a Health 
Program. H. Doc. 347, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 9. 
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cooperation for improving health care and health 
conditions of migrant farm labor. The full Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare amended the bill by removing 
references to research and demonstration projects so as 
to assure that the money would be spent on services to 
migrants.^ 
The House Subcommittee on Health and Safety of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce developed 
its own migrant health bill in 1962, following the report 
of S. 1130 to the House in spring of that year. 
Committee members envisioned a program of grants through 
the Public Health Service to help pay for "visits by 
public health nurses to migrant labor camps; sanitary 
inspections of camps, worksites, and temporary rest stops 
to assure the maintenance of adequate sanitary 
facilities, including safe and adequate water supplies; 
and the exchange of information between health workers in 
different areas to assure the availability of needed 
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 25 August 1961, 
Congressional Record 107:17078; Abraham Ribicoff to Hon. 
Lister Hill, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 13 April 1961, "P.L. 87-692 Migrant 
Health, Office of General Counsel, Legislation 1961-63, 
Health," microfilm roll 2, Records of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Kennedy Library; Helen L. 
Johnston, Health for the Nation's Harvesters (Farmington 
Hills, Mich.; National Migrant Worker Council, Inc., 
1985), pp. 136-140. 
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health service and eliminate unnecessary duplication."'® 
The House bill (H.R. 12365) resembled S. 1130 very 
closely, except that it authorized the program for only • 
three years, to force a more immediate review before 
reauthorization. The Senate concurred in that change. 
The law as enacted, P.L. 87-692, authorized the 
expenditure of up to $3 million each year for a migrant 
health program within the Public Health Service until 
June 30, 1965." 
The Migrant Health Act, as it came to be known, 
initiated a program of grants to state and local 
governments and nonprofit agencies to provide clinics and 
visiting health services for migrant families. Although 
Congress appropriated less than the full amount of 
authorized funds for the initial year of 1963, the Public 
Health Service's new Migrant Health Branch approved 52 of 
the 77 applications received that spring. By the end of 
the following year, 55 programs were operating in 27 
states. State and county health departments acquired 
most of the grants (approximately 85 percent), with the 
''U.S., Congress, House, Health Clinics for Domestic 
Migratory Farmworkers. H. Kept. 2253, 87th Cong., 2d 
sess., 1962, p. 2. 
'^.S., Congress, House, 10 September 1962, 
Congressional Record 108; 18898-18904; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, 11 September 1962, Congressional Record 
108:19058-19059; Johnston, pp. 139-140. 
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remainder going to such nonprofit agencies as the 
National Council of Negro Women in Maryland, a Migrant 
Ministry program in New Mexico, a county health 
association in New York, ahd several independent local 
migrant councils. The California State Department of 
Health received $483,004, the largest grant in the first 
year, to be divided among 14 county health programs. The 
New Jersey State Department of Health received the second 
largest grant: $130,669 for eleven county projects. The 
smallest grants went to local nonprofit agencies. For 
example, the Migrant Health Branch awarded the Las Cruces 
(New Mexico) Committee on Migrant Ministry $2,070 for a 
single nurse to train volunteers to teach migrants better 
health care and ways to get professional care for 
accidents and illnesses. 
According to evaluations and progress reports at the 
end of the first year, expenses for clinic-based nursing, 
dental, and medical services, supplies, and equipment 
absorbed 70 percent of granted funds. An additional 10 
percent paid for field nursing and sanitarians. Thus the 
programs spent an average of 80 percent of their grant 
funds on actual health care services to migrant families. 
'^Johnston, pp. 145, 150-151; "Migrant Health Project 
Grant Awards Summary - July 1963," 22 July 1963, "570. 
Health - General folder #2," Box 28, RG42, National 
Archives. 
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State and local supporting contributions of funds and 
services added another 40 percent to the total project 
budgets, nearly doubling the federal financial 
investment. 
Typically, projects concentrated on preventive 
health and early diagnosis and treatment of illness and 
injury through night clinics and visiting nurse services. 
Screening and immunizations for communicable diseases, 
especially tuberculosis, occupied a high priority for 
these clinics and mobile health services, not 
surprisingly since control of such diseases had been one 
of the reasons behind Congressional support for migrant 
health care. In most areas, physicians cooperated with 
the clinics by providing supplemental care for cases 
beyond the scope of the clinics. In a few localities, 
hospitals offered care for more acute conditions without 
charge. Visiting nurses screened migrant families for 
health problems, encouraged visits to the clinic, and 
offered advice on health, nutrition, and sanitation 
problems/* 
Most projects included sanitarians on their staffs 
who surveyed and reported camp conditions and offered 
Johns ton, p. 151. 
''ibid., pp. 151-153. 
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suggestions for improvements to camp owners and migrants. 
Camp sanitation directly affected migrant health 
problems. Poor water supplies, inadequate toilets and 
waste disposal systems, overcrowding, and lack of 
refrigeration and cooking facilities made maintenance of 
good health difficult, despite improved health care 
services offered by the projects. To assist in 
overcoming the effects of camp conditions, some projects 
offered health education classes for migrants and even 
training and employment for migrants as health aides. 
Programs in California and Michigan also offered classes 
to health care workers to help them understand the 
working and living conditions of migrants that promoted 
ill health and the best ways of providing health care 
services to migrant families, including instruction in 
Spanish.^ 
Operation of Migrant Health Act grants during 1963 
encountered the perennial problems of the migrant 
condition. Late appropriations meant funding did not 
reach projects until after the migrant movement began. 
Programs found themselves providing services before staff 
and volunteers had time to complete planned training 
sessions and before arrangements for locally contributed 
^"Johnston, p. 153; "Migrant Health Project Grant 
Awards Summary," 22 July, 1963, RG42, National Archives. 
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funds and services could be settled. Moreover, a poor 
growing season in many parts of the country fostered an 
unusually mobile migrant stream, undermining many of the 
educational and public health goals of the projects. 
Health care workers, however, believed they 
accomplished some worthwhile ends in that first year. 
Some migrants became less suspicious of the health care 
effort after their initial exposure and sought out health 
clinics on their own as they traveled the next season. 
Local projects sensitized communities to the presence and 
needs of migrants and stimulated new projects sponsored 
entirely by local organizations like the Lions Clubs and 
Church Women United. Perhaps most importantly for the 
future of federal assistance programs for migrant 
workers, however, the experiences of migrant health care 
workers illuminated the interconnectedness of migrant 
problems. Although advocates had been arguing the 
complex nature of the migrant labor question for years, 
the migrant health program offered the first direct 
federal program experience of this phenomenon since the 
days of the farm labor camps during the 1930s and 1940s. 
The lessons learned by administrators, staff, and local 
cooperators of the migrant health projects would be 
Johnston, pp. 155-157. 
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transferred to other programs as they passed Congress in 
the next few years 
When President Kennedy signed the Migrant Health Act 
on September 25, 1962, the law marked the emergence of a 
new coalition of support for social programs for migrant 
farmworkers in Congress. Not only was the legislation 
the first assistance program directed specifically toward 
domestic migrant labor in thirty years; it had passed 
both houses of Congress without a dissenting vote. 
Expectations rose immediately for further progress on 
migrant issues in the next session. In opening the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor's hearings on a new 
series of migrant labor bills for the first session of 
the 88th Congress, Senator Quentin Burdick of North 
Dakota, filling in for Chairman Williams, expressed the 
feeling of enthusiasm about the upcoming session: 
In the 87th Congress the perennial hiatus 
between intent and accomplishment was broken. Last 
year marked the passage of the Migrant Health Act 
(Public Law 87-692), which provides badly needed 
medical services for migrant farm families. 
This act is the first significant legislation 
enacted since the short-lived farm security program 
of the raw 1930's. The passage of this act marks 
more than a beginning—it marks the end of the era 
^^Johnston, pp. 157-176. 
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of legislative lethargy in the field of migratory 
worker problems/' 
Such enthusiasm for the passage of a single bill 
indicates the feeling among advocates for federal 
assistance to migrant farmworkers that their program 
inevitably would be adopted, despite persistent 
opposition. Of six bills introduced in the Senate in 
1961, only one had become law. Yet Senator Williams 
resubmitted the failed bills of the 87th Congress in 1963 
and added two new initiatives, one to authorize federal 
assistance for migrant day care facilities and another to 
establish a fund to help growers improve sanitation in 
their fields and migrant camps. Again, all of these 
bills passed the Senate, over the same objections from 
conservative, farm state Senators as expressed by 
Senators Tower and Goldwater in 1961. Although the House 
did not have the opportunity to vote on these particular 
bills, the expectation of inevitability among migrant 
program advocates proved true; the programs in the 
individual bills became part of the successful anti-
poverty legislation introduced by the Johnson 
^'u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Migratory Labor Bills. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare. 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 2. 
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administration in 1964 following Kennedy's 
assassination. '*'* 
State legislatures joined the federal Congress in 
considering new programs and protections for migrant 
farmworkers during the early 1960s as well. By mid-1961, 
twenty-four states had considered a total of 120 bills 
dealing with migrant farm labor questions. Of those, 
fifteen bills became law that year, reflecting successful 
promotion of migrant needs in the states of California, 
Colorado, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
and Oregon. Some of these laws simply funded continued 
study or authorized special migrant labor committees, but 
others created new regulations and programs for safe 
transportation, health care, education, crew leader 
registration, payroll protections, and labor standards 
for women and children. By 1963, Colorado, Oklahoma, and 
Rhode Island added labor camp regulations to their state 
statutes, Pennsylvania added a wage collection law, 
Wisconsin required workmen's compensation for larger farm 
^^Diaest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1963), 
pp. A-24, A-25, VII; U.S., Congress, Senate, The 
Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United States. S. 
Rept. 167, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 5, 81-83; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, 1 May 1963, Congressional Record 
109:7587-7588. 
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employers, and California increased its minimum wage for 
women and children in certain agricultural occupations/® 
The final, and to many the most important, 
legislative triumph of the Kennedy years in the field of 
farm labor occurred on the question of extending P.L. 78, 
the Mexican farm labor importation program. Congress had 
extended the labor importation, or bracero, program for 
only six months in 1960 as a compromise between the two 
opposing views, both of which hoped to persuade a 
majority of congressmen to their perspective, given a 
little more time to prepare their cases. As a result, 
reauthorization of P.L. 78 came up early in the first 
session of the 87th Congress, initiated by Representative 
E. C. Gathings of Arkansas, chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the House 
Committee on Agriculture, which held jurisdiction on farm 
labor issues in the House. Gathings' bill, H.R. 2010, 
called for a four-year extension of the program without 
^'"Migratory Labor Legislative Activity - 1961," 
"Status of Agricultural Workers under State and Federal 
Labor Laws, February 1962," and "Status of Agricultural 
Workers under State and Federal Labor Laws, January 
1963," Box 21, RG42, National Archives. 
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change, a position guaranteed to provoke debate between 
the opposing forces on the question/^ 
The Kennedy administration presented a united 
position in favor of amendments prepared by the 
Department of Labor. These amendments authorized the 
Secretary of Labor to restrict the number of braceros an 
individual grower could receive, require that domestic 
farmworkers be offered the same employment conditions as 
imported workers, prohibit use of imported workers in 
nonseasonal and skilled jobs, and require payment of an 
average hourly rate. Despite this united front, however, 
the House Committee on Agriculture rejected all four 
amendments and reported the Gathings bill in tact. 
Attempts by Representative Merwin Coad of Iowa to 
introduce similar amendments on the floor failed 
overwhelmingly. Proposals by New York Representative 
Alfred Santangelo and California Representative Jeffrey 
Cohelan to deny braceros to farmers producing surplus 
crops and to phase out the importation program over 
several years met the same fate. The House passed the 
bill to extend P.L. 78 without alteration by a margin of 
^Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program; Interest 
Groups and Foreign Policv (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1971), p. 163. 
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231 to 157. Only a reduction of the extension period 
from four to two years survived House debate. 
That majority copied exactly the one which had 
passed the original Mexican labor importation program in 
1951. In the only instance of change within that vote, 
unanimity among Republican representatives from states 
using the farm labor program (up from 92 percent in 1951) 
balanced the slightly larger number of Democrats opposing 
the program (4 percent) from states outside that region. 
Besides indicating the continuing strength of farm 
organizations in the House, this breakdown also 
foreshadowed an increasing party polarization on the 
issue of farm labor that would bear fruit by the end of 
thé Johnson administration.^® 
^^Craig, pp. 164-167; Memorandum for Mr. Myer 
Feldman, 10 March 1961, "LE/LA5 Legislation - Migratory 
Labor, Executive," Box 487, White House Central Files, 
Kennedy Library; Memorandum for the President, 16 March 
1961, p. 1, "LA5 Migratory Labor, Executive," Box 461, 
White House Central Files, Kennedy Library; Congress and 
the Nation. 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 765. 
^®Ibid. Analysis of this vote was performed using 
the SPSSX statistical package. The database of 
Congressional roll call votes was provided by the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 
University of Michigan. Neither the original collectors 
of the data nor the consortium bear any responsibility 
for the analysis or interpretation. I wish to thank Dr. 
Don F. Hadwiger and Dr. James M. McCormick of the Iowa 
State University Political Science Department for their 
assistance in this analysis. 
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As suggested by the vote the preceding year on 
restricting the Secretary of Labor's authority over the 
bracero program, the Senate reflected a growing 
transformation in its members positions since the 1951 
vote. The Senate Agriculture Committee proved less 
hostile to administration proposals for change in the 
importation program. The Committee report recommended 
amendments that required employers to offer domestic 
farmworkers comparable employment conditions before 
braceros could be provided and pay prevailing wages to 
both domestic and Mexican labor. The report also 
prohibited Mexican workers in skilled or year-round farm 
work. Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota proposed an 
additional amendment on the floor that required employers 
to pay Mexican farmworkers 90 percent of the average 
state or national wage for agricultural labor, rather 
than a local prevailing wage. That amendment passed by a 
margin of one vote. With such fundamental differences 
between the House and Senate versions of the Mexican 
labor bill, the potential for compromise appeared slim.^' 
The conference committee produced a bill that 
extended the bracero program for two years, as the House 
had wanted, but included amendments requiring comparable 
^^Conaress and the Nation. 1945-1964. pp. 765-766; 
Craig, pp. 167-169. 
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conditions be offered domestic farmworkers before 
Mexicans could be contracted and prohibited use of 
Mexican labor in nonseasonal and skilled farm jobs, as 
the Senate had supported. The compromise sparked heated 
debate in the House between Congressmen George Mahon of 
Texas and Merwin Coad of Iowa. Mahon claimed his 
constituents would prefer no bracero program at all to 
one so restrictive. Coad considered the compromise a 
complete defeat for those in Congress who wished to 
improve conditions for domestic farmworkers. Despite 
such different perspectives between the strongest 
advocates on both sides, the House, rather surprisingly, 
passed the conference version easily. 
The conference compromise produced a similar debate 
in the Senate. Senators holding extreme positions on 
both sides of the issue opposed the bill. Bracero 
program supporters preferred no program to one with 
increased restrictions and statutory authority for 
federal officials to monitor employment practices in 
agriculture. Bracero program opponents refused to 
support a bill without the McCarthy amendment guarantee 
of wage levels. The final vote showed a sharply divided 
chamber, with 41 supporting the compromise, 31 opposing 
^"congress and the Nation. 1945-1964. p. 766; Craig, 
p. 170. 
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it, and 28 not voting at all. Democrats evidenced the 
deepest division, with 25 supporting and 24 opposing the 
bill, reflecting the party's transition toward a more 
reform position. Among Republicans, not unexpectedly, a 
strong majority of 16 to 7 voted in favor of 
acceptance.^ 
Kennedy signed the extension of the program on the 
advice of the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, State, 
and the Bureau of the Budget, despite congressional 
refusal to include all the administration's amendments, 
especially the crucial minimum wage provision. The 
President's signing statement, recommended by both the 
Department of Labor and the Budget Bureau, reflected the 
two primary reasons cited by administration officials 
against a veto of the bill. Kennedy noted the importance 
of the bracero program to farm employers and Mexico and 
his belief that adverse effects of the program on 
domestic labor could be avoided through administrative 
action by the Secretary of Labor. He also made clear 
that he intended the Secretary of Labor to use his 
authority vigorously to "prescribe the standards and to 
make the determinations essential for the protection of 
^Congress and the Nation. 1945-1964. p. 766; Craig, 
pp. 170-172. 
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wages and working conditions of domestic agricultural 
workers. 
The extension of P.L. 78 in 1961 renewed the bracero 
program through 1963 and the Department of Labor followed 
through on its mandate from the President to enforce the 
new provisions. During the next two years, changes in 
the use of braceros that had begun in the late 1950s 
accelerated. Eisenhower's Secretary of Labor James 
Mitchell had started a process of employer withdrawal 
from the bracero program by his decision in 1959 to 
enforce long-ignored sections of P.L. 78. Using these 
sections, he set prevailing wage rates and refused 
braceros to employers who did not attempt to recruit 
domestic workers in good faith or who were involved in 
labor disputes. Cotton growers, particularly, turned to 
newly available mechanization to avoid the restrictions 
on importing foreign farm labor. As a result, the number 
of braceros used by American growers declined from 
437,543 in 1959.to 291,420 in 1961. The amendments to 
the law in 1961 provided detailed, statutory authority to 
the Secretary of Labor for the administrative regulations 
instituted by Mitchell and added additional regulations 
®^Craig, pp. 173-174; Memorandum for the President, 
28 September 1961, "P.L. 87-345, 10/3/61," Box 12, BOB 
Bill Reports, Kennedy Library. 
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in the law prohibiting the use of Mexican contract 
workers in year-round and skilled occupations. Together 
these changes led to further reduction in bracero use; 
only 194,978 Mexican contract laborers entered the United 
States in 1962, 116,000 of them to be used in 
California's fruit and vegetable fields." 
Increasing restrictions and more vigorous 
enforcement of Department of Labor regulations 
discouraged some of the previously pro-bracero interest 
groups, as well. During congressional consideration of 
the 1961 extension, the National Grange had withdrawn its 
support for the bracero program. Grange leaders believed 
that increased governmental involvement in the farm labor 
question had developed from administration of the foreign 
farm labor problem. Without administrative 
responsibility for such a program, the Department of 
Labor would have no authority to set wage rates and 
working conditions in agriculture. Withdrawal of the 
Grange from support for P.L. 78 left the Farm Bureau 
alone among general farm organizations in favor of 
"craig, pp. 177-182; Linda c. Majka and Theo J. 
Majka, Farm Workers. Agribusiness, and the State 
(Philadelphia; Temple Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 160-164, 
166; Ellis W. Hawley, "The Politics of the Mexican Labor 
Issue, 1950-1965," Agricultural History 40(3)(1966): 173-
174; Employment Service Program Letter No. 1196, 20 July 
1961, "ESPL No. 1196 - Preference for Domestics, etc.," 
Box 68, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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continuing the program. The number of grower 
associations and commodity groups supporting the program 
also declined, as bracero use became concentrated among 
less than two percent of American farm employers. Those 
growers and organizations who continued to favor P.L. 78 
were increasingly burdened with the negative publicity 
becoming current in the national media, an image with 
which many farm groups hesitated to associate themselves 
when their members had so little need for imported 
labor.^ 
The political power of bracero users, so 
overwhelming during the 1950s, also rapidly evaporated 
amid the reform climate of the Kennedy years and the 
concomitant loss of interest among important farm groups. 
As labor, religious, welfare, and liberal reform leaders 
cultivated moral outrage among the public, urban 
congressmen withdrew from old arrangements to trade 
support of the bracero program for rural congressional 
support of issues important to urban constituencies. 
Similarly, farm leaders in Congress feared loss of 
support for other farm programs more important to their 
constituents if they insisted on continuation of an 
unpopular farm labor program. With the Department of 
^^Craig, p. 176; Majka and Majka, pp. 165-166; 
Hawley, p. 176. 
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Agriculture firmly behind the administration position 
opposing the unrestricted continuation of P.L. 78, the 
former sources of political power available to bracero 
supporters had disappeared.®® 
Still, congress gave P.L. 78 one final reprieve in 
1963, although not without extenuating circumstances. 
Three positions developed during congressional debate. 
The Department of Labor recommended a one-year extension 
when hearings began in 1963, but insisted that it must 
include an amendment requiring comparable conditions of 
employment be offered domestic farmworkers before foreign 
workers could be certified. The administration supported 
the short-term extension in order to allow an orderly end 
to the program. Some forces still maintained the long-
term need of American farmers for foreign labor, however, 
and offered an alternate proposal that would extend the 
program for two years and remove the restrictions that 
had been added to the law in 1961. Committed anti-
bracero program opponents, on the other hand, called for 
immediate termination of the program.®' 
"Hawley, pp. 174, 176. 
®^.S., Congress, House, 29 May, 31 October 1963, 
Congressional Record 109:9803-9806, 20691-20732; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, 15 August, 4 December 1963, 
Congressional Record 109:15183-15204, 23217-23223; Craig, 
pp. 182-183. 
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The House Agriculture Committee again recommended a 
two-year, unamended extension. Although rejecting the 
reactionary amendments offered by the pro-bracero group, 
the Committee also rejected the administration proposal 
and specifically criticized the Secretary of Labor's use 
of P.L. 78 to set a de facto minimum wage for 
agriculture. The Senate, under pressure from the Mexican 
government not to end the program without some adjustment 
period, recommended a one-year extension. The Senate 
Agriculture Committee also rejected the administration 
amendment to equalize conditions for domestic 
farmworkers, but Senator McCarthy introduced a floor 
amendment to reinstate those protections. During 
extended debate, pro-bracero senators emphasized the 
desire of Mexico for a continuation of the program and 
American obligations to assist poor Mexicans in need of 
work. Anti-bracero senators repeated descriptions of the 
miserable conditions of domestic farmworkers and 
countered pro-bracero arguments with calls for tax-
supported foreign aid, rather than foreign aid drawn from 
the poverty of American workers. The final vote of 62-25 
in favor of a one-year extension which included the 
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McCarthy amendment attested to the growing strength of 
the liberal anti-bracero coalition in the Senate. 
Debate of a new House bill calling for a one-year 
extension but without the McCarthy amendment became the 
final battle ground for P.L. 78. Pro- and anti-bracero 
congressmen urgently argued the diplomatic, moral, and 
economic implications of the importation of Mexican 
farmworkers, aided by heavy lobbying efforts by interest 
groups on both sides of the issue. In the end, the one-
year, unamended extension passed both the House and the 
Senate, in both cases with a majority of Democrats 
opposed, but only as a final extension intended to serve 
growers and Mexican workers as an adjustment period to 
avoid a chaotic end to the program.'® 
Farmworker advocates had long considered termination 
of the bracero program critical to further progress in 
improving conditions for domestic farmworkers. 
Availability of government-sponsored foreign workers 
allowed farm employers to resist the rise in wages and 
®^U.S., Congress, Senate, 15 August 1963, 
Congressional Record 109:15183-15204; Congress and the 
Nation. 1945-1964. p. 766; Craig, pp. 188-192. 
®®U.S., Congress, House, 31 October 1963, 
Congressional Record 109:20691-20732; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, 4 December 1963, Congressional Record 109:23217-
23223; Congress and the Nation. 1945-1964. p. 766; Craig, 
pp. 192-195; Majka and Majka, p. 164; Hawley, p.174. 
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improvement of working conditions that competition for 
domestic labor would have required. Thus the assurance 
that the extension passed in 1963 would be the last 
promised much hope for additional legislative success on 
migrant labor issues. 
The success of the anti-bracero reform efforts 
during the early 1960s and the passage of the Migrant 
Health Act in 1962 depended on the changes in political 
and public attitude that had occurred in the period. 
Media attention to farmworker issues and a resurgence of 
liberal interest in government-sponsored social reform 
together had created a constituency for federal 
involvement in solving the problems of migrant labor. 
The election of a more liberal, activist Congress and a 
united administration committed to reform had neutralized 
the political power of the conservative farm bloc that 
had successfully obstructed federal interference in 
agricultural labor questions in previous years. 
Moreover, these developments in the political climate 
were as important as the legislative accomplishments to 
the future of federal assistance for farmworkers. Just 
as the new Congress and Kennedy administration had built 
on the beginnings of reform that emerged in the last two 
years of the Eisenhower presidency, the Kennedy era 
political successes provided the groundwork on which the 
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comprehensive migrant programs of the Johnson 
administration would rest. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADVENT OF A NEW ERA: MIGRANTS IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 
The War on Poverty, inaugurated by President Lyndon 
Johnson in his first State of the Union speech, January 
8, 1964, has been termed by one scholar "the apex of the 
liberal reform efforts of the 1960s."' That phrase aptly 
describes the poverty initiative's meaning for migrant 
assistance programs. Inclusion of special programs for 
migrants in the general antipoverty bills of the 88th and 
89th congresses rewarded the years of preparation by 
administration, congressional, and private proponents of 
such programs. The new programs offered funding for 
improvements in housing, sanitation, day care, job 
training, health services, and education. At the same 
time, the expiration,of the bracero program, legislation 
to require registration of crew leaders, and limited 
minimum wage and child labor amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in 1966 added some protective labor 
standards to the services of the poverty programs. Thus, 
by the end of the Johnson presidency the basic outlines 
^David Zarefsky, President Johnson's War on Povertv: 
Rhetoric and History (University, Ala.; Univ. of Alabama 
Press, 1986), p. 20. 
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of federal programs and protections for migrant 
farmworkers were in place. 
The federal antipoverty initiative originated in 
attempts by the Kennedy administration in 1963 "to go 
beyond" the antipoverty efforts of the administration's 
first two years. The unconnected programs had begun to 
appear inadequate to the task of reducing the deep 
poverty witnessed by Kennedy during campaign stops in 
West Virginia in 1960 and described by Michael Harrington 
in The Other America in 1962. The President charged his 
staff with developing a new, comprehensive approach to 
poverty. The initial plans concentrated on community 
development, job training, and basic education, which had 
come to be considered the most effective means of 
destroying "the culture of poverty" that seemed to trap 
families for generations. Based on juvenile delinquency, 
urban renewal, welfare reform, and job-training programs 
of the 1950s and early 1960s, Kennedy's planners proposed 
to bring together the experiences gained by 
administrators and social work professionals through 
these programs into a united attack on the basic causes 
of poverty.2 
Zjames L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The 
Eisenhower. Kennedv. and Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.; 
The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 112-134; Allen J. 
Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of 
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The assassination of President Kennedy on November 
23, 1963, subsequently placed the burden of opportunity 
for creating a new approach to poverty on the shoulders 
of the new President, Lyndon Johnson. Johnson proved 
enthusiastic and reassured the continuing Kennedy staff 
that he intended to carry through with the Kennedy plans 
for a comprehensive poverty program. In fact, as his 
1964 State of the Union address suggested, he intended to 
make the war on poverty a centerpiece of his 
administration. Making the most of a public mood 
favoring immediate action in support of the Kennedy 
agenda, Johnson presented the plans for his antipoverty 
programs to Congress within two months of his January 
declaration. Only five months later, the war on poverty 
was effectively launched with the passage of the Economic 
Opportunity Act in August of 1964.' 
Johnson intended the Economic Opportunity Act to be 
the basic antipoverty effort of his administration. The 
bill, prepared by a special task force, included job 
training and education programs for youth, employment and 
Liberalism in the 1960s (New York; Harper & Row, 1984), 
pp. 119-122; Zarefsky, p. 30; Paul K. Conkin, Big Daddy 
from the Pedernales; Lvndon Baines Johnson (Boston: 
Twayne, 1986), p. 219. 
'Sundquist, pp. 137-145; Matusow, pp. 123-126; 
Conkin, pp. 220-221. 
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investment incentives to bring jobs to economically 
depressed urban and rural areas, adult basic education 
programs, funding for a domestic volunteer service corps' 
(VISTA), and a plan for community involvement and control 
of poverty programs called "Community Action." It 
reflected a philosophy of poverty which required 
responses on three fronts; economic development, to make 
more jobs available to the poor; education and training, 
to make the poor more employable, supported by social 
services to help the poor maintain good health and living 
standards as they established productive roles in 
society; and restructuring of social institutions, to 
allow the poor more access to political power and thereby 
increased influence over their own circumstances.* 
Much of the theory behind the Johnson antipoverty 
programs rested on a concept called "the culture of 
poverty." That concept posited a cyclical problem, in 
which poor parents lacking skills to achieve adequate 
incomes lived in economically depressed areas which 
^Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," in On 
Fighting Povertv; Perspectives from Experience, ed. James 
L. Sundguist (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 37-46; 
Robert H. Haveman, "Introduction; Poverty and Social 
Policy in the 1960s and 1970s—An Overview and Some 
Speculations," in A Decade of Federal Antipovertv 
Programs; Achievements. Failures, and Lessons, ed. Robert 
H. Haveman (New York; Academic Press, 1977), pp. 1-19; 
Sundquist, pp. 137-145. 
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provided few services and poor education, thereby 
breeding the same lack of employment skills among 
children of these parents. Breaking that cycle required 
poverty efforts aimed at several points. The Economic 
Opportunity Act offered job training to improve the 
parents' earning power; economic development, social 
services, and community organization to improve 
conditions in the ghettoes and rural poverty areas where 
the poor lived; and education to help the children into a 
better future. In effect, to avoid the discredited 
methods of fighting poverty by welfare payments that 
encouraged dependence and continuation of the poverty 
lifestyle, the new approach to poverty offered to empower 
the poor to improve their own lives and neighborhoods.® 
The planning task force for the Economic Opportunity 
Act did not originally contemplate a special program for 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers. Officials of the 
Department of Agriculture involved in the planning task 
®The concept of a "culture of poverty" first became 
popularized in 1962 through Michael Harrington's The 
Other America. By 1964, federal antipoverty program 
planners had adopted the idea and incorporated it in a 
chapter of the Economic Report of the President for that 
year ("The Problem of Poverty in America," p. 55). For a 
detailed account of the origins of the concept and its 
effects on American antipoverty efforts see James T. 
Patterson, America's Struggle Against Poverty. 1900-1985 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981; rev. ed., 
1986), pp. 115-125. 
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force, particularly Under Secretary James L. Sundquist, 
recommended a title in the legislation to respond to 
rural poverty, but their suggestions included only loan 
and grant programs to assist small family farmers and 
rural businessmen, not farm labor. The impetus for 
inclusion of migrant and seasonal farmworkers in the war 
on poverty came from members of Congress.* 
Senator Harrison A. Williams, chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, had attempted to combine 
the issues of migrant poverty and the larger antipoverty 
program as early as December 1963. At that time, he 
offered the services of his subcommittee staff to assist 
President Johnson in designing his broad antipoverty 
initiative, citing the experience of the Subcommittee on 
Migratory Labor in preparing successful legislation on 
poverty issues. Williams, in fact, had hoped that his 
subcommittee might be designated a special subcommittee 
on poverty to assist in developing the administration 
antipoverty plans and seeing them through Congress. The 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare instead 
created a Select Subcommittee on Poverty, under the 
'sundquist, p. 144; Ronald L. Goldfarb, Migrant Farm 
Workers: A Caste of Despair (Ames: Iowa State Univ. 
Press, 1981), pp. 52-53; National Farmworker Policy 
Project, CETA Farmworker Programs: A Legislative History 
(Sacramento, Calif.: National Farmworker Policy Project, 
1981), pp. 7-14. 
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chairmanship of Pat McNamara of Michigan. But McNamara 
had been a longtime supporter of migrant labor 
legislation and other members of the Subcommittee on 
Migratory Labor favorable to federal assistance for 
migrants, including Williams, Democrat Edward M. Kennedy 
of Massachusetts, and Republican Jacob Javits of New 
York, also held seats on the Select Committee.^ 
The initiative to place programs from pending 
migrant legislation into the Economic Opportunity Act did 
not come from the Senate Select Committee on Poverty, 
however. Representative James Roosevelt, Democrat of 
California, made the suggestion that migrant farmworkers 
should be covered within Title III, the rural poverty 
program. Roosevelt, the eldest son of former President 
Franklin Roosevelt, consistently supported liberal 
legislation in Congress and as a California congressman 
maintained a particular interest in migrant farmworker 
issues. He had been promoting House versions of migrant 
assistance legislation introduced by Senator Harrison 
Williams and the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor 
since their efforts began in 1960. When the poverty bill 
^Harrison A. Williams, Jr. to The President, 20 
December 1963, and "Memorandum for the President," n.d., 
"64. Poverty - General," Box 3, Records of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, RG42, National Archives 
and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; National 
Farmworker Policy Project, pp. 13-14. 
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came before the House Subcommittee on the War on Poverty, 
Roosevelt pressed for the addition of a section in Title 
III providing for funding of public and private agencies 
to offer assistance in the areas of housing, sanitation, 
education, and day care for migrants and their families.® 
Roosevelt based his recommendation for funding in 
these areas on four bills proposed by the Senate 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor. Three of the bills, 
covering sanitation, education, and day care had passed 
the Senate in 1963; a housing bill for migrant 
farmworkers was still pending in early 1964. Because 
similar bills had failed in the House two years earlier, 
Democratic Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, chairman of 
the House subcommittee considering the poverty bill, and 
Phil Landrum of Georgia, an influential southern member 
of that subcommittee, expressed concern that adding the 
migrant provisions could jeopardize support of the 
poverty bill among southerners. Congressman Roosevelt 
approached this potential problem by engaging the help of 
southern senators who had voted for the bills to persuade 
their House delegations of the merits of the.programs. 
The tactic apparently succeeded. On April 22, 1964, only 
a few days after the administration had expressed its 
®Sundquist, p. 144; Goldfarb, p. 53; National 
Farmworker Policy Project, pp. 14-16. 
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reservations about the response of southern congressmen, 
Roosevelt suggested to the House the idea of including 
migrant provisions in the poverty legislation then being 
written. Staff members of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Migratory Labor prepared a final version of Title III-B. 
Authorizing "programs of assistance to migrant 
agricultural employees and their families which programs 
shall be limited to housing, sanitation, education, and 
day care of children," it appeared in the Economic 
Opportunity Act as passed by Congress in August of that 
year.* 
The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the 
independent agency created to administer the new anti-
poverty program, included migrant and seasonal farmworker 
'"Migrant Action on House Side," Frederick R. 
Blackwell, 13 April 1964, "Chronological File - April 
1964," Box 1, 2d accession, RG42, National Archives; 
"Memorandum Re Plan to Add Senate Passed Migrant Bills to 
Poverty Bill," 20 April 1964, "64. Poverty - General," 
Box 3, RG42, National Archives; "Migrant Action on House 
Side," Frederick R. Blackwell, 21 April 196[4], 
"Interoffice Memo - Staff," Box 16, 2d accession, RG42, 
National Archives; U.S., Congress, House, 22 April 1964, 
Congressional Record 110:8820-8821; Anne to FRB, 15 June 
1964, Frederick R. Blackwell to Don Baker, 7 July 1964, 
and "Legislative History," "64. Poverty - General," Box 
3, RG42, National Archives; National Farmworker Policy 
Project, pp. 7, 14-16; Goldfarb, p. 53. 
It is not possible to determine which individuals 
supported the migrant provisions of Title III-B in 
particular, since no floor discussion took place and 
neither the House nor the Senate voted on that section 
separately from the full Economic Opportunity Act. 
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assistance programs within an Office of Special Field 
Programs. This office provided national rather than 
regional control of funding and approval for projects. 
Two other divisions joined the Migrant Division in this 
special administrative arrangement: the Indian Division 
and the Commonwealth and Territories Division. The 
reason behind such an arrangement focused on the fact 
that none of the poverty groups covered under these 
offices could be considered the responsibility of any 
individual state or region. Regional OEO directors often 
tried to bring migrant programs under their purview, 
arguing that seasonal farm labor and even many migrants 
worked within one region or state and could be better 
served through administrative agencies more familiar with 
local conditions. OEO director Sargent Shriver insisted, 
however, that the interstate character of migration 
required national administration of the migrant 
assistance programs. Shriver and migrant program 
administrators feared that regional control of funding 
would simply perpetuate the tendency of agricultural 
states to ignore the needs of farm labor. 
Advocates also used the arguments against regional 
administration to protect migrant programs from the power 
"National Farmworker Policy Project, pp. 22-24. 
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of governors to prohibit OEO-funded programs from 
operating in their states. That tool for obstructing 
federal antipoverty activity proved popular, particularly 
in California and Alabama under conservative governors 
Ronald Reagan and George Wallace, since a large number 
of migrant programs operated in California and the deep 
South states, areas that had historically disregarded the 
needs of farm labor, such a veto power for governors 
might well have precluded the existence of programs for a 
majority of poor farmworkers.^^ 
As soon as the OEO staff had completed 
administrative arrangements for programs authorized in 
the Economic Opportunity Act, distribution of information 
regarding types of poverty assistance available for 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers began. The organized 
constituency for migrant farmworker assistance programs 
consisted primarily of the few church and social welfare 
organizations and state governments who had been offering 
services on their own for years. The staff of the OEO 
Migrant Division sought out these and other appropriate 
^National Farmworker Policy Project, pp. 26-34; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Emplovment 
Manpower and Povertv of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare. 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 2993; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, 12 October 1967, Congressional Record 
113:27850-27860. 
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grantee agencies who would offer the kinds of innovative 
programs in housing, sanitation, child care, and 
education envisioned by the authors of Title III-B. They 
avoided old-line state agencies and farm employer 
associations who showed interest in using the money for 
such projects as building new migrant housing on private 
land and offering education programs without attempting 
new approaches to solve the deficiencies of the past. 
Projects encouraged by the Migrant Division under Title 
III-B included rest camps on migrant routes; experimental 
migrant camp designs and field sanitation facilities; 
self-help housing; and day care and summer schools for 
children and adults with programs ranging from preschool 
adjustment to adult basic literacy, job training and job-
search methods, and personal and community relations 
In addition to the Title III-B authorization, 
projects to assist migrant and seasonal farmworkers could 
be funded under Title II-A community action programs. 
Communities in California, Texas, and Florida, for 
example, where large numbers of migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers maintained their "permanent" homes, could 
create community action programs that concentrated on 
^^Goldfarb, pp. 53-54; National Farmworker Policy 
Project, pp. 25-26; Office of Economic Opportunity, The 
Migrant and the Economic Qpportunitv Act. February 1965, 
p. 1. 
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offering new leadership opportunities for farmworkers in 
their home communities. At the same time, community 
action programs could offer similar social and 
educational services to those available through Title 
III-B grants. Encouragement of this use of the community 
action program expanded the funds that could be offered 
to farmworkers through OEO grants." 
In 1965, the first year in which grant funds were 
available, 48 grants in 26 states supported programs in 
the full range of eligible categories. The smallest 
grant, of $2,858, supported special summer library 
services for migrants in a single Wisconsin county. The 
largest grant, of $3,485,623, funded the construction of 
1,000 mobile housing units on state land, a program 
administered by the California Office of Economic 
Opportunity. Three-fourths of the grants went to private 
nonprofit agencies; state agencies, some newly created to 
receive OEO grants, made up the remaining one-fourth of 
grantees. Housing projects dominated the grants to 
California agencies, but outside that state most programs 
concentrated on day care, summer school for children, and 
adult basic education and vocational training. In fact, 
"office of Economic Opportunity, The Migrant and the 
Economic Opportunitv Act, p. 2. 
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over 75 percent of grant funds supported education 
programs of one kind or another. 
The Office of Special Field Programs, which 
administered the Title III-B migrant programs, fell under 
the control of the Community Action Program within the 
Office of Economic Opportunity. Because of this 
administrative connection, the migrant programs were 
required to adhere to the concept of "maximum feasible 
participation" in which members of the clientele 
population—in this case, the migrants—served on policy­
making boards and worked as aides in whatever programs 
operated in their areas. Although a central concept in 
the community action program from the initiation of the 
war on poverty in 1964, the requirement achieved a formal 
status in the 1966 amendments to the Economic Opportunity 
Act.^ 
^^International Research Associates, Inc., OEO Grants 
to Assist Migratory Labor and Other Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers. Report prepared for the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, 15 April 1966, pp. 1-8; "Progress Report -
January 1, 1965 to May 31, 1965," "Interoffice Memos-
Staff," Box 16, 2d accession, RG42, National Archives; 
Office of Economic Opportunity, A Nation Aroused; 1st 
Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965), pp. 57-58. 
^The literature analyzing the Community Action 
Program and the concept of "maximum feasible 
participation" is extensive. A critical, but well-known, 
analysis is Daniel Patrick Moynihan's Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty 
(New York: Free Press, 1969). An important contemporary 
collection of essays on the subject is James L. 
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Beginning in that year, agencies had to appoint 
migrants, or at least former migrants, to one-third of 
the seats on their boards of directors to comply with 
this directive. In addition, the new amendments mandated 
that migrant aides, often mothers of children involved in 
day care and summer school programs, were to make up as 
much as possible of the nonprofessional staff at local 
Sundquist, ed., On Fighting Poverty; Perspectives from 
Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1969). Written by 
such participants in developing and administering 
community action as Sundquist, Adam Yarmolinsky, Sanford 
Kravitz, John G. Wofford, and Robert A. Levine, the 
essays offer both local and national perspectives on the 
problems and successes of the program. Other studies, 
many also contemporary, that analyze community action and 
the concept of participation by the poor include Brian 
Henry Smith, "The Role of the Poor in the Poverty 
Program: The Origin and Development of Maximum Feasible 
Participation," (M.S. thesis, Columbia Univ., 1966); 
Lillian B. Rubin, "Maximum Feasible Participation: The 
Origins, Implications, and Present Status," The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
385(Sept. 1969); 14-29; Ralph M. Kramer, Participation of 
the Poor: Comparative Community Case Studies in the War 
on Poverty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); 
Joseph A. Kershaw, Government Against Poverty 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970); Paul 
E. Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of 
the Poor in the Community Action Program," American 
Political Science Review 64(June 1970); 491-507 ; Neil 
Gilbert, Clients or Constituents; Community Action in the 
War Poverty (San Francisco; Jossey-Bass, 1970) ; David M. 
Austin, "Resident Participation: Political Mobilization 
or Organizational Cooptation?," Public Administration 
Review 32(September 1972);409-420; Joseph Helfgot, 
"Professional Reform Organizations and the Symbolic 
Representation of the Poor," American Sociological Review 
39(August 1974):475-491; and Robert H. Haveman, ed. A 
Decade of Federal Antipovertv Programs: Achievements. 
Failures, and Lessons (New York: Academic Press, 1977). 
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programs. In most cases, program directors managed to 
appoint the requisite number of migrants to board 
positions and hire migrants as support staff, and most 
reports concluded that migrant representatives 
participated in making policy decisions. Some 
evaluators, however, especially during the first year of 
Title III-B grants, expressed some doubt about the 
ability of many programs to fully implement the idea of 
maximum feasible participation, since such an 
implementation required local program sponsors to 
reconsider their own plans for the migrants and to accept 
a much slower, and less efficient, process of program 
development.^ 
Even professionals at the Office of Economic 
Opportunity did not always seem ready to ignore their own 
assessments of migrant needs in the face of evidence that 
'^"Progress Report - January 1, 1965 to May 31, 1965, 
Submitted by the Office of Economic Opportunity to the 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare," p. 2, 
"Interoffice Memos-Starr," Box 16, 2d accession, RG42, 
National Archives; "Proceedings of the First Office of 
Economic Opportunity Conference on Antipoverty Programs 
for Migrant and Seasonal Farm Workers," 18-20 January 
1966, pp. 11-13, Box 750, Series 41., Records of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity, RG381, National Archives; 
International Research Associates, pp. 135-137, 148-150; 
Comptroller General of the United States, Effectiveness 
and Administration of the Migrant and Seasonal 
Farmworkers Program under Title III-B of the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964: Phoenix. Arizona (Washington, 
D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1969), pp. 20-22. 
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their evaluation differed from that of their clients. 
The Migrant Division employed social scientists and 
educators as "migrant specialists" to evaluate program 
proposals and provide technical assistance to grantees. 
These specialists emphasized day care and education 
programs on the dual premise that adult education would 
expand the limited employment opportunities available to 
parents and help them move their families out of poverty 
while educating migrant children would break the "cycle 
of poverty" and allow the next generation to move beyond 
the restrictions their parents faced. 
According to a survey commissioned by OEO in 1965, 
however, migrants rated free medical and legal services 
highest among services they considered "most important." 
Adult vocational education and better housing followed 
medical and legal services in third and fourth places. 
Free day care shared fifth place with better ways to find 
work; adult basic literacy and improved toilet facilities 
rated a close sixth and seventh. Remedial education for 
children rated next to last in a list of ten services, 
ahead only of camp recreation centers. Health care and 
legal services did become increasingly available to 
migrants in subsequent years through reauthorizations of 
^International Research Associates, pp. 12-15. 
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the Migrant Health Act and the addition of legal services 
to Title III-B in the 1967 reauthorization of the 
Economic Opportunity Act. But despite the migrants' 
rating of housing and sanitation as equally important 
with adult educational opportunities and more important 
than remedial education for their children, in the 
following grant year, day care and education programs 
continued to receive 70 percent of available Title-III 
funds. 
During 1966, funding expanded from $24 to $35 
million, serving migrants through 96 projects in 35 
states. Most programs resembled those of the first year, 
often simply continuing and expanding work begun in 1965. 
Some new types of programs appeared in the second year, 
however. Among these, self-help housing grants and 
stipend-supported vocational education received most 
attention. Self-help housing offered migrants both the 
opportunity to own homes and to learn new occupational 
skills involved in home construction. Stipend-supported 
job training allowed farmworkers who could not afford to 
lose their income the chance to expand their job skills 
while still earning a minimal salary. The Migrant 
^international Research Associates, pp. 12-15, 46-
49, Appendix D, Tables 3 and 4; Office of Economic 
Opportunity, The Quiet Revolution; 2d Annual Report 
(Washington, D.C: GPO, 1966), p. 54. 
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Division applied the same principle to youth education in 
the Migrant Compensatory Education Program, offering 
stipends to encourage teens and young adults to forego 
field work, remain in school, and pursue vocational 
training for nonagricultural occupations.^' 
Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act in 1967 
expanded the migrant programs further by increasing the 
flexibility in types of programs that could be funded. 
Although the amount of funding did not increase. Congress 
authorized the director to make grants in three general 
areas: to meet the immediate needs, including day care, 
education, health services, housing, and sanitation, of 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families; to 
promote increased community acceptance of migrants; and 
to provide education and training to improve the job 
skills of farmworkers and their families and to assist 
them in finding employment. In some cases. Title III-B 
grants funded the actual services offered to migrants. 
In other cases. Title III-B grantees employed their 
staffs in coordinating access to other funds available to 
migrants through federal educational, job-training, 
employment, health, and housing programs. With these new 
^^The Quiet Revolution, pp. 53-55; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United 
States, s. Rept. 1006, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, pp. 
23-24. 
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amendments, GEO Title III-B migrant programs could begin 
to approach the comprehensive ideal for providing migrant 
services that supporters had often advocated. 
Title III-B of the Economic Opportunity Act thus 
became the basic federal assistance*program for migrant 
farmworkers during the Johnson administration. Congress 
supported an important supplement to the OEO migrant 
offerings in 1966, however, in an amendment to Title I of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) passed 
in 1965. Title I of ESEA provided federal funds for 
educational programs directed toward improving the school 
performance of disadvantaged children. Migrant children 
did not receive special mention in the 1965 act, but 
public and private migrant education advocates in state 
and federal government and in private agencies insisted 
that because of their migratory lifestyle, migrant 
children could not be served by traditional programs 
operated through the local school districts. They needed 
interstate coordinated projects, summer classes, 
bilingual instruction, and mobile services, to name only 
^National Farmworker Policy Project, pp. 35-41; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, The Miaratorv Farrt Labor Problem 
in the United States. S. Kept. 91-83, 91st Cong., 1st 
sess., 1969, pp. 40-46. 
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a few of the special offerings recommended for the 
amended Title 
The migrant programs authorized in 1966 followed the 
same granting pattern as that of the original ESEA Title 
I programs. The Office of Education in the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare allocated funds to state 
departments of education based on the number of migrants 
potentially served by the state's education system. As 
with other programs funded by Title I, the state retained 
full control over what programs would be supported with 
allocated federal money, although the Office of Education 
prepared guidelines, especially recommending coordination 
with other poverty programs in the state and cooperation 
with local migrants, growers, churches, and social 
service agencies in designing programs. The 1966 
amendment limited participation in migrant education 
programs to children who had moved from one school 
district to another with a parent or guardian in search 
of agricultural employment. Congress made the 
eligibility limits less restrictive in 1967, allowing 
children of migratory farmworkers who had not migrated 
^'Matusow, pp. 221-226; Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, "Administrative History," Vol. l, 
Part 4: Office of Education, Part 2, Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, Chapter 11, Migrant Program, p. 
433, Box 3, Administrative Histories: HEW, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. 
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for up to five years to continue to receive services 
through the program. 
Following passage of the ESEA amendments in 1966, 
the Office of Education allocated funds to migrant 
education programs in 44 states. Thirty of them used the 
funds to initiate the first migrant education projects 
ever operated in their states; the remaining fourteen 
used the funds to expand projects already in place. In 
its first year, the migrant education program served 
about 80,000 migrant children with a budget of just under 
$10 million. Eligible expenditures included construction 
of facilities, hiring of teachers, purchase of textbooks, 
and operation of summer school programs. Most programs 
emphasized such areas of special need as English and 
bilingual instruction, development and testing of 
culturally appropriate teaching materials and techniques, 
interstate teacher exchanges, and a records transfer 
system to enable migrant children to move from one school 
to another with minimal disruption of their education." 
In the second year, in addition to broadening 
^^Matusow, p. 222; Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, "Administrative History," pp. 434-435, 438, 
Administrative Histories: HEW, Johnson Library. 
^bepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
"Administrative History," pp. 433-436, Administrative 
Histories; HEW, Johnson Library. 
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eligibility, Congress increased the program's 
appropriation to $42 million. The increase allowed the 
state grantees to add full-time migrant education program 
personnel to their education departments. Many states 
also used their increased allocations to improve training 
for teachers working with migrant children and to hire 
additional Spanish-speaking aides from among the migrants 
to relieve shortages of bilingual teachers. Mobile 
classrooms, food and health programs, and extended 
surveys of the migrant population and its educational 
needs accounted for the remainder of newly funded 
programs in 1968. Of the $42 million appropriation, 
however, nearly 55 percent paid for instructional 
services and supplies similar to those supported in the 
first year of the program. 
Migrant education projects attempted to equalize 
access to education for migrant children as a 
specifically identified "educationally deprived" group. 
Access to health care had emerged three years earlier as 
another area of social opportunity with respect to which 
migrants had been identified as a disadvantaged group. 
Under the Migrant Health Act of 1962, migrant farmworkers 
^Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
"Administrative History," pp. 438-439, Administrative 
Histories: HEW, Johnson Library. 
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became eligible for special public health service clinics 
and mobile family health services for a period of three 
years. Congressional consideration of that program for 
possible reauthorization began in early 1965. The 
Migrant Health Branch had requested an external review by 
the American Public Health Association (APHA), in 
addition to the internal review required by law. That 
review formed the basis for congressional discussion 
regarding extension of the migrant health program. The 
reviewers found that the program had been carefully 
administered and had made a measurable impact on the 
health care of migrant farmworkers. The APHA recommended 
the addition of some kind of hospital care provisions 
among the funded services, as well as improvement in 
continuity of health care along the migrant streams, 
addition of family planning to migrant health services, 
and studies of special farmworker health problems. They 
also suggested training of health care professionals in 
intercultural understanding, inclusion of nonmigratory 
seasonal farmworkers under the Migrant Health Act, 
cooperation between the Migrant Health Branch and the OEO 
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Migrant Division programs, and larger appropriations to 
support all of these new programs. 
With full administration support, Congress 
incorporated the suggestions for inclusion of hospital 
care and larger appropriations in the bill extending the 
Migrant Health Act to 1968. "Necessary hospital care" 
became one of the health care expenses eligible for 
funding under the extended act, and annual appropriations 
increased from $3 million a year under the original act 
to $7, $8, and $9 million in each of the years covered by 
the extension. Following the extension of the migrant 
health program in 1965, the Migrant Health Branch 
responded to other APHA recommendations on its own, 
particularly those related to improved continuity of care 
and intercultural understanding. Conferences and staff 
working groups increased communication among projects 
within a single migrant stream that helped especially 
with referrals from one project to another as migrants 
traveled during the season. Hiring of health care aides 
from among the migrant population proved the most 
effective method of promoting intercultural 
^^Helen L. Johnston, Health for the Nation's 
Harvesters (Farmington Hills, Mich.: National Migrant 
Worker Council, 1985), pp. 158-160; "Summary of American 
Public Health Association Report Evaluating Migrant 
Health Act," "1965 Chronological File - January," Box 2, 
2d accession, RG42, National Archives. 
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understanding. Aides helped professional staff and 
migrants communicate better and often reduced potential 
misunderstanding by serving as the initial contact for 
migrants at clinics and on mobile units. 
Congress and the President had often expressed as a 
purpose for the "war" approach to antipoverty that it 
could provide for comprehensive, integrated services to 
attack all of the causes of poverty for a given group at 
one time. The OEO Title III-B, ESEA Title I, and Migrant 
Health programs together represented such a comprehensive 
attack, offering a range of services to improve the 
living conditions and opportunities of migrant 
farmworkers and their families. In some areas a single 
agency administered grants under all three programs. 
More often, grantee agencies for each of these programs 
worked together in one area to provide their services in 
an integrated manner, so that migrant clients might not 
even be aware of the administrative diversity. Despite 
the perennial inadequacy of funding and the problems of 
reaching the eligible population, advocates of federal 
assistance for migrant and seasonal farmworkers found 
many reasons to support the antipoverty migrant programs 
^Johnston, pp. 161-164; Phillip S. Hughes to the 
President, 3 August 1965, "P.L. 89-109/S. 510, 8/5/65," 
PL89-109/S510, Enrolled Legislation, Johnson Library. 
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as a first step in alleviating the worst effects of the 
migrant lifestyle. 
But the antipoverty approach offered only one kind 
of solution to the problems of migrant farmworkers. In 
addition to such assistance as health care, education, 
housing, and sanitation, migrant advocates and every 
reviewer of the adequacy of migrant antipoverty programs 
insisted that migrants needed the protection of labor 
laws in order to improve their own lives. The maximum 
feasible participation requirement and adult education 
programs to teach political and leadership skills 
empowered some migrants to take more control of their 
circumstances, but without the economic protections 
afforded other categories of labor in the United States, 
migrants simply did not have enough secure income to 
maintain an adequate standard of living. 
Labor protection legislation for agricultural 
workers had first become an issue during the New Deal, 
when Congress passed child labor, wage and hour, 
collective bargaining, and social security legislation to 
cover workers in other industries. Repeated attempts to 
extend those guarantees to agricultural labor failed 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and agricultural labor 
laws remained an unresolved issue in the 1960s. As 
health and education assistance programs for migrants 
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began to gain support in Congress, the question of 
whether social services alone could solve the problems of 
migrant labor achieved increasing significance. In April 
I960, Varden Fuller, Professor of Agricultural Economics 
at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former 
member of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor 
during the Truman administration, offered a particularly 
clear exegesis of the dual approach needed in solving the 
problems of migrant labor. Although his presentation, 
made at the Western Interstate Conference on Migratory 
Labor sponsored by the President's Committee on Migratory 
Labor, effected no change in federal legislation, his 
explanation of the alternative concepts behind the social 
service and labor law approaches offers much insight into 
some of the shortcomings of the migrant antipoverty 
programs that did appear in the 1960s. 
Fuller's dichotomy asked the question: "Are people 
poor because they are migrants, or are they migrants 
because they are poor?" These two alternative 
constructions reflected two understandings of the nature 
of poverty and of agricultural employment. If one 
^^Varden Fuller, "Immediate Needs and Ultimate Goals 
in Migratory Labor Policies," Presented at the Western 
Interstate Conference on Migratory Labor, Phoenix, 12 
April 1960, "Hon. E. L. Bartlette," Box 24, RG42, 
National Archives. 
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believed people became poor because they were migrant 
farmworkers, then one would seek solutions to migrant 
poverty in the structure of farm employment. Remedial 
measures would include establishment of a minimum wage, 
employment stabilization, better planning of crops, and 
other methods for assuring adequate income to seasonal 
farmworkers. If, however, one believed people became 
migrants because they were poor, then solutions would be 
aimed toward altering the condition of the individual 
migrants so that they could choose other occupations. 
Measures to accomplish that end would include education, 
health care, and other social welfare programs to raise 
migrants from poverty and provide them with abilities to 
enter more productive employment. Fuller advocated a 
combination of approaches, believing that the causes of 
migrant poverty arose from both personal and cultural 
disabilities and structural deficiencies in farm 
employment patterns.^® 
But legislation offering agricultural labor the same 
benefits guaranteed industrial labor came much more 
slowly than legislation providing social services to the 
poor. During the five years of Johnson's administration, 
when the integrated approach to relieving the personal 
'^Fuller, "Migratory Labor Policies," 12 April 1960, 
pp. 1-4, RG42, National Archives. 
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and cultural disabilities that sustained migrant poverty 
became reality, very little structural change in farm 
employment was accomplished. Only legislation requiring 
crew leader registration, offering limited guarantees of 
a minimum wage, and placing equally limited restrictions 
on child labor succeeded in Congress. Crew leader 
registration regulated the labor contractors who acted as 
middlemen between the farmworkers and farm employers. 
They hired crews of workers and accepted employment for 
them as a group from farmers who wished to avoid the 
complications of employing individual farmworkers on 
their own. Crew leaders retained responsibility for 
paying their crew members, allowing them to determine 
when and how much individual farmworkers received, 
regardless of the rates paid by farmers for the work. 
The Department of Labor documented enough abuses in the 
system to convince Congress by 1964 that these labor 
contractors required regulation.^' 
The minimum wage guarantees and restrictions on 
child labor passed as amendments in 1966 to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. Although these amendments might 
^'Phillip S. Hughes to the President, 3 September 
1964, "P.L. 88-582/S. 524, 9/7/64," P.L. 88-592/S. 524, 
Enrolled Legislation, Johnson Library; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United 
States. S. Rept. 155, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, pp. 
15-17. 
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have signaled a significant breakthrough in labor law 
coverage for farmworkers, their narrowness limited their 
influence. Among the remaining recommended priorities in 
protective legislation for migrants, collective 
bargaining, unemployment and workmen's compensation, and 
social security legislation for agricultural labor 
repeatedly failed to receive enough support for passage. 
Consequently, the Johnson era approach to solving migrant 
farmworker poverty remained incomplete, even though it 
accomplished more than any previous period in provision 
of needed social services. 
The Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor continued 
to work actively, however, for the passage of both social 
service and labor protection legislation throughout the 
years of the Johnson presidency. The subcommittee's 
preeminence in Congress as the source of ideas for 
solving migrant problems suffered some with the 
absorption of key migrant programs under the Economic 
Opportunity Act. Chairman Harrison Williams, however, 
assured an oversight role for the subcommittee by 
insisting the OEO Migrant Division make regular reports 
to the subcommittee and appear in person to answer the 
'"U.S., Congress, Senate, The Miaratorv Farm Labor 
Problem in the United States. S. Rept. 71, 90th Cong., 
1st sess., 1967, pp. 6-15; Goldfarb, pp. 147-148. 
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members' questions regarding funded projects and the 
direction and progress of the Title III-B programs. The 
subcommittee also continued to issue annual reports on 
the condition of migratory farmworkers, implementation of 
recently instituted federal programs, and progress of 
additional needed legislation. Although for the most 
part these reports repeated the already familiar 
recommendations of the subcommittee, beginning in 1966 
they also included in detail the dissenting views of 
Senator George Murphy of California, with the occasional 
concurrence of Senator Paul J. Fannin of Arizona.^ 
Both newly elected in 1964', Murphy was a former 
actor and Fannin a former governor of Arizona and a 
partner in an agricultural chemicals marketing firm. 
These two Republican senators represented the minority 
position on the subcommittee. Senators Murphy and Fannin 
^Harrison A. Williams, Jr., to Edward Kennedy, 9 
June 1965, "C-Subcommittee Members," Box 16, 2d 
accession, RG42, National Archives; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United 
States. S. Rept. 934, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, ; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the 
United States. S. Rept. 155, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 
1965,; U.S., Congress, Senate, The Migratory Farm Labor 
Problem in the United States. S. Rept. 1549, 89th Cong., 
2d sess., 1966,; U.S., Congress, Senate, The Migratory 
Farm Labor Problem in the United States. S. Rept. 71, 
90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967,; U.S., Congress, Senate, The 
Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United States. S. 
Rept. 1006, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968,; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United 
States. S. Rept. 91-83, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969. 
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generally agreed with the majority view on social service 
issues and even on such labor protection issues as child 
labor restrictions, unemployment and workmen's 
compensation, and social security extensions. On the 
questions of federal legislation to increase the 
agricultural minimum wage, protect collective bargaining 
for farmworkers, and end importation of Mexican farm 
labor, however, the minority senators voiced their 
opposition repeatedly. With regard to the agricultural 
minimum wage. Murphy and Fannin recommended against 
increasing the coverage of the agricultural minimum wage 
beyond that of the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act without careful study of the effects of the 
initial law. They warned of increasing unemployment, 
especially in the South, where the minimum wage had 
encouraged mechanization on many farms. The senators 
also feared the minimum wage would undermine the 
incentives of the piece-rate system by paying poor 
workers,as well as efficient ones. In the end, fewer 
workers would have jobs, since increased labor costs 
induced farm employers to mechanize or hire only the most 
productive workers. As a consequence, rural-to-urban 
migration would tend to increase, adding to the urban 
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unemployment problems already claimed as pressing by the 
Democratic administration.'^ 
Senators Murphy and Fannin objected to collective 
bargaining legislation primarily because provisions of 
the existing National Labor Relations Act that covered 
collective bargaining for industrial workers did not take 
into account the special circumstances of agricultural 
labor and employers. For example, agricultural employers 
depended for their entire year's income on the work of a 
few weeks or months of seasonal farm labor, particularly 
during harvest time. Strikes by an agricultural union 
could ruin a farm employer in a very short time, in 
contrast to an industrial employer who would have the 
remainder of the year's production to help him recover 
the losses incurred in a strike. Furthermore, the 
senators pointed out, farm employers were often 
themselves unorganized individuals who could easily be 
overpowered in negotiations with an organized group of 
union farmworkers. Finally, because of the seasonal 
variations in the number of employees needed on farms, 
'^"Murphy, George (Lloyd)," Current Biography 1965 
(New York: H. W. Wilson, 1964), pp. 296-298; 
Congressional Dlrectorv (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965), p. 
8; U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1549, p. 159; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 71, p. 69; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, S. Rept. 1006, pp. 97-98; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
S. Rept. 91-83, p. 149. 
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questions would arise about when elections for union 
representation should appropriately be held and which 
workers should be eligible to vote.'' 
On the issues of collective bargaining and the 
agricultural minimum wage, the minority views of Senators 
Murphy and Fannin persuaded the majority of members of 
Congress. Despite the ardent pleading of such liberal 
Democratic senators as Harrison Williams, Walter Mondale, 
and Edward and Robert Kennedy, and the strong support of 
such citizen organizations as the National Council of 
Churches, the American Friends Service Committee, and the 
National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, neither an 
extension of the federal minimum wage for farmworkers nor 
provisions for collective bargaining in agriculture 
achieved enough support for passage.'^ Conservative 
''U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1549, pp. 160-163; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 71, pp. 91-97; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1006, pp. 69-73; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 91-83, p. 143-149. 
'^U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 934, pp. 43-48; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 155, pp. 25-26, 34; 
U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1549, pp. 33-36; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 71, pp. 6-10, 30-33; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1006, pp. 25-31, 38-43; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 91-83, pp. 19-24, 51-61; Kay 
Longcope, "The Changing Role of the Migrant Ministry," 
Presbyterian Life. 15 November 1967, pp. 14, 16; National 
Council of Churches meeting, 18 March 1964, transcript by 
Anne von der Lieth, Associate Counsel, Senate 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, "181. National Council 
of Churches," Box 5, RG42, National Archives; "Statement 
by Bard McAllister, Farm Labor Secretary, American 
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attempts to reinstate the bracero program, on the other 
hand, experienced a different fate. 
In 1964, Congress had refused to extend the farm 
labor importation program under P.L. 78 beyond its 
termination date of December 31, 1964. Another legal 
possibility for importing farm labor existed, however, 
under the provisions of P.L. 414 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. As had been the case under P.L. 78, the 
Secretary of Labor had the authority to certify a farm 
employer's need for additional harvest labor beyond that 
available domestically. Under such conditions, farm 
labor could be imported from Mexico or other supplier 
nations for the required period. Many growers who had 
received Mexican labor under the provisions of P.L. 78 
for years hoped to continue their use of foreign farm 
labor without interruption through P.L. 414.^" 
Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, however, 
refused to utilize the provisions of P.L. 414 to continue 
a program that had so clearly been rejected by the 
Friends Service Committee before the National Advisory 
Committee on Farm Labor, May 18-19, 1964," pp. 4-8, "195. 
Misc. National Supporting Organizations," Box 5, RG42, 
National Archives; National Advisory Committee on Farm 
Labor, Poverty on the Land in a Land of Plentv (New York: 
National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, May 1965), pp. 
7-15, 20. 
''U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1549, pp. 2-3. 
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majority in Congress. He issued regulations for 
receiving P.L. 414 farm labor in mid-December 1964, just 
before the scheduled termination of the P.L. 78 
importation program. These regulations made clear his 
aim of enforcing the intent of Congress to require the 
use of domestic farmworkers except under extraordinary 
circumstances. Retaining some of the same wording as had 
been used in regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Labor for implementing P.L. 78, Wirtz refused to certify 
need in areas where domestic farmworkers could not find 
employment at specified minimum wage levels and required 
farm employers to offer paid transportation and adequate 
housing to farmworkers, as had been required under the 
bracero program.^" 
Not unexpectedly, employers accustomed to using 
imported foreign labor to harvest their crops objected to 
Wirtz' pre-certification requirements. Growers turned to 
their traditional sources of influence in government for 
help. In a move reminiscent of the attempt in 1960 to 
remove the Secretary of Labor from involvement with farm 
labor importation, the Senate Agriculture Committee 
included a provision in the 1965 farm bill that would 
'^Ibid., pp. 2-3, 61-63; Ellis W. Hawley, "The 
Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 1950-1965," 
Agricultural History 40(3)(1966): 175. 
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have removed the Secretary of Labor's authority under 
P.L. 414 and reassigned it to the Secretary of 
Agriculture. The tactic failed, as it had five years 
earlier, through the adoption of an amendment on the 
floor of the Senate removing the restrictive provision. 
Despite the loss, the closeness of that vote (Vice 
President Humphrey broke a 45-45 tie) indicates how much 
power farm interests still held on the issue of farm 
labor in 1965, notwithstanding the termination of the 
bracero program, and how consistent political and 
regional sympathies remained. Republicans still voted 
strongly, 28 to 2, in favor of the growers' interests. 
Democrats continued strongly opposed to farm organization 
wishes, voting 43 to 17 to leave the Secretary of Labor 
in charge of P.L. 414 certifications. Democrats in the 
region making most use of Mexican farm labor, however, 
still supported farm interests in opposition to the 
majority of their party, in this case by a vote of 4 to 
2.» 
3^U.S., Congress, Senate, 13 September 1965, 
Congressional Record 111:23504-23530; Hawley, p. 175. 
^^u.S., Congress, Senate, 13 September 1965, 
Congressional Record 111:23530; Congress and the Nation. 
Vol. 2: 1965-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1969), pp. 595-596. 
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Applying another.strategy, the chairman of the House 
Agriculture Committee, Representative Harold D. Cooley of 
North Carolina, approached the President with a plan to 
"relieve" the Secretary of Labor of direct responsibility 
for making certification decisions for each individual 
employer who applied. Chairman Cooley recommended the 
establishment of a system of regional certification 
boards that would hear evidence and make recommendations 
regarding the need for foreign workers on a particular 
farm. Although no national system of regional 
certification boards appeared. Secretary Wirtz did set up 
a special panel in California to evaluate applications 
for foreign workers. The panel, however, found Secretary 
Wirtz' assessment of need appropriate and made no changes 
in policy.'' 
The Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor included 
a review of the effects on American farmers of 
terminating the bracero program in its annual report for 
1966. According to their information, derived primarily 
from Department of Labor reports, the harvest in 1965 had 
^'"Memorandum of conversation with: Secretary of 
Labor Willard Wirtz, et al.," 6 April 1965, pp. 1, 4-5, 
"C-Labor Department," Box 16, 2d accession, RG42, 
National Archives; Lee C. White, Special Counsel to the 
President, to Willard Wirtz, Secretary, Department of 
Labor, 9 April 1965, with attachments, "LA5, 4/7/65-
4/30/65," Box 18, Series LA5, White House Central Files, 
Johnson Library. 
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been among the largest since 1952 and had shown an 
increase in net farm income of 21 percent. Moreover, 
this large harvest had been accomplished with nearly 75 
percent fewer foreign farmworkers. The minority views 
expressed by Senator Murphy, however, challenged the 
subcommittee majority's figures with information provided 
by grower associations and the California Board of 
Agriculture. These sources documented losses from labor 
shortages in most fruit and vegetable crops that formerly 
depended on braceros, as well as serious crop damage 
resulting from inexperienced labor recruited to take the 
place of foreign workers.*" 
Since both sets of figures came from interested 
parties, it is difficult to determine which, if either, 
were the accurate measure of the 1965 harvest. The 
majority figures depended on more highly aggregated data, 
showing overall harvest figures and labor usage for the 
nation. Their interpretation might, therefore, have 
glossed over real shortfalls in the crops and regions 
subject to loss of Mexican labor. The figures presented 
by the minority broke the harvest data down into 
individual crops and growing regions, suggesting that 
their interpretation might portray the harvest conditions 
*°U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rept. 1549, pp. 3-5, 61-
159. 
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in the affected crops and regions more accurately. 
Growers, however, had often been accused of 
misrepresenting their harvest figures and labor needs in 
past discussions about imported labor. They were just as 
likely as the members of the majority to present the data 
in ways advantageous to their interests. 
The Department of Labor retained responsibility 
under P.L. 414 for determining the number of foreign 
workers needed by farm employers, however, and so its 
interpretation of labor availability and reasons for crop 
losses prevailed. Secretary Wirtz insisted on strict 
implementation of pre-certification requirements and the 
use of imported foreign farm labor continued to 
d e c l i n e . B u t  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  c o n s i d e r e d  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
employment opportunities for domestic migrant farmworkers 
only a "transition" for those workers. Writing in a 
report on seasonal farm labor in 1965, Wirtz remarked: 
The turning of work previously performed by braceros 
over to domestic workers was in itself no great 
gain. Its real significance is that it was a 
necessary step toward cleansing the whole "migrant 
worker" sore on the American body politic. There 
still lies ahead the establishment for migrant farm 
labor of the standards of both decency and 
^"Administrative History of the Department of 
Labor," Vol. II, Part I, "Programs of the Department of 
Labor," Section 8, "Farmworker Programs," p. 297, Box 
"Vol. II, Part I," Administrative Histories: Department 
of Labor, Johnson Library. 
193 
efficiency which are characteristic of other 
employment in this country/^ 
Among the priorities for carrying out the necessary 
"establishment of standards," Wirtz hoped to see 
legislation to guarantee minimum wages, better housing, 
and improved recruitment. A former law professor and 
labor lawyer, Wirtz had special interests and experience 
in the areas of wage stabilization and labor arbitration. 
He worked closely with the Senate Subcommittee on 
Migratory Labor, advising the chairman and his staff 
about what programs he believed the administration could 
support and implement effectively. In the face of strong 
grower resistance to increased farm labor regulation by 
the Department of Labor, he urged "a broad offensive 
tackling the overall problem rather than the fragmentary 
approach he and the Senator [Williams] had adopted in the 
past. "43 
Secretary Wirtz championed the cause of improving 
social and economic conditions for migrant and seasonal 
^^W. Willard Wirtz to Bill Moyers, 21 January 1966, 
with attached report, pp. 2-3, "LA5 Migratory-Seasonal 
Labor 6/3/65-1/21/66," Box 17, Series LA5, White House 
Central Files, Johnson Library. 
^'"Memorandum of conversation with Secretary of Labor 
Willard Wirtz, et al.," 6 April 1965, pp. 2, 4, "C-Labor 
Department," Box 16, 2d accession, RG42, National 
Archives; "Wirtz, William Willard," current Bioaraphv 
1963 (New York; H. W. Wilson, 1963), pp. 474-476. 
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farmworkers, much as Eisenhower's Secretary of Labor 
James Mitchell had a decade earlier. He did so without 
the formal interagency cooperation so important to 
Mitchell, however, preferring instead to coordinate 
programs and strategies from within the Department of 
Labor. Just two days before President Kennedy's death in 
November 1963, Wirtz had submitted a request for approval 
to disband the interdepartmental President's Committee. 
President Johnson supplied the required assent within a 
few weeks of taking office, eliminating the decade-old 
committee that had served as the symbolic centerpiece for 
action on migrant labor issues for both the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy administrations.^ 
Formal interagency cooperation did not disappear 
with the dissolution of the President's Committee, 
however. President Johnson favored the task force 
approach to developing administrative strategies. During 
his tenure he appointed more than 90 interagency task 
forces to develop legislative programs directed toward 
narrowly identified problems. More than one of these 
task forces addressed the problems of migrant and 
seasonal farmworkers. The Task Force on Labor and 
^W. Willard Wirtz to the President, 21 November 
1963, "FG273," BOX 399, White House Central Files, 
Subject File, Johnson Library. 
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Related Legislation of 1965, the Health Task Force of 
1966, and the Rural Poverty Task Force of 1967 all 
included recommendations for legislation to assist 
farmworkers. The need for a concentrated look at 
legislative issues aimed at migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers, however, brought the establishment in 1966 
of a Task Force on Migratory and Other Farm Workers, 
chaired by Secretary of Labor Wirtz/' 
The Task Force on Migratory and Other Farm Workers 
operated much like the old President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor in that its members represented the 
federal agencies most involved with programs for migrant 
farmworkers—the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, and 
Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Office of 
Economic Opportunity. Representatives from the Council 
of Economic Advisors, the Bureau of the Budget, and the 
White House completed the membership, serving in their 
capacities as overseers of administration programs. 
Meeting occasionally for a period of just over two 
months, from October 4 to December 14, 1966, the task 
^'Conkin, pp. 209-210; 1965 Task Force on Labor and 
Related Legislation, Box 10, 1966 Task Force on Migratory 
and Other Farm Workers, Box 17, and 1967 Task Force on 
Health, Box 22, Task Force Reports, Johnson Library; 1966 
Rural Poverty Task Force Report, "Task Force on Migratory 
and Other Farm Workers, File 1," Reel 31, Federal 
Records: Department of Labor, Johnson Library. 
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force members produced a report containing four 
recommendations for legislative action.^ 
Despite the expectation that this task force would 
develop innovative approaches to the problems of migrant 
labor, its recommendations resembled those advanced by 
nearly every public and private study since the 1930s. 
The task force called first for an expanded research 
program to determine the character of the farm labor 
force and the effects of technological change in 
agriculture on that labor force. It further recommended 
coverage of farm labor under federal collective 
bargaining, social security, and unemployment insurance 
laws; continued funding of education, health, housing, 
and other social services for migrants; development of a 
more comprehensive system of service delivery to 
migrants; and improved efficiency in the recruitment and 
employment of interstate migrants. Moreover, the report 
generated no new legislative initiative from the 
administration, suggesting it served President Johnson in 
the same way the President's Committee on Migratory Labor 
had served presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy—as a symbol 
46"Task Force on Migratory and Other Farm Workers, 
File 1," Reel 31, Federal Records: Department of Labor, 
Johnson Library. 
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of administration interest in the problems of migrant 
farmworkers.^ 
The most creative of the recommendations, supported 
particularly by Secretary of Labor Wirtz, envisioned a 
Migrant Manpower Corporation that would both stabilize 
the farm labor force for employers and offer farm workers 
employment security, protection from exploitation, and 
educational services to help them eventually leave the 
migrant stream. A truly comprehensive, if paternalistic, 
employment service approach, the Migrant Manpower 
Corporation would have represented workers in bargaining 
with employers over wages and working conditions and have 
served as a party to any contract between employers and 
farmworkers. At the same time, it would have provided 
housing, transportation, insurance, and job-training to 
migrants choosing to accept the Corporation's services. 
The Department of Labor developed the idea into a 
legislative proposal in early 1967, but failed to 
persuade the administration to introduce it in Congress. 
Secretary Wirtz, together with Secretary of Agriculture 
Orville Freeman, presented the proposal again in November 
as a demonstration project in response to Johnson's 1967 
^^1966 Task Force on Migratory and Other Farm 
Workers, pp. 1-5, Box 17, Task Force Reports, Johnson 
Library. 
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Manpower Report calling for new solutions to the problems 
of rural workers. Again, the recommendation failed to 
gain administration support/® 
The Migrant Manpower Corporation proposal very 
likely failed because it managed to raise opposition from 
both the liberal and the conservative camps on the farm 
labor question. Thomas Karter, director of the OEO 
migrant programs, found the bill proposed in early 1967 
"unsatisfactory. It provides little more than a means of 
assuring cheap labor for growers and does not attempt to 
provide needed education and other services.On the 
other hand, in proposing the Migrant Manpower Corporation 
demonstration project the following November, Wirtz 
clearly reflected an awareness of opposition from 
growers. He recommended "that no publicity be given this 
effort or credit taken for it at this time in order that 
its chances of acceptance and success . . . not be 
jeopardized by backlash from . . . resistance-prone 
employers."®® Secretary Wirtz favored the program, 
*®1966 Task Force on Migratory and Other Farm 
Workers, p. 4, Task Force Reports, Johnson Library. 
^'Don Wortman to John Bell, 3 February 1967, 
"Migrants," Box 28, Office of Planning, Research, and 
Evaluation, 1967, RG381, National Archives. 
^Memorandum for the President from Willard Wirtz, 
Secretary of Labor, 28 November 1967, with attached 
report, p. 3, "Migrant Manpower Corporation," Reel R-51, 
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though, because he did not believe legislation providing 
the protection and assistance required by migrant 
farmworkers to improve their position in the workplace 
would be forthcoming in the near future. He did not 
prefer paternalistic government protection of 
farmworkers, but endorsed it because of the inability of 
farmworkers to bargain effectively against highly 
organized employers intent on maintaining their control 
of the farm labor market.^ 
The bargaining position of farmworkers had indeed 
become a volatile issue by the mid-1960s with the rise of 
a successful organizing effort in California under the 
leadership of Cesar Chavez. Chavez, a Mexican-American 
and son of a migrant farmworker, began organizing among 
farm laborers in California in opposition to the bracero 
program in 1958. He worked at that time in civil-rights 
organizing among Mexican-Americans for the Community 
Service Organization, an affiliate of Saul Alinsky's 
urban community organizing effort, the Industrial Areas 
Foundation. Chavez finally left that organization in 
1962 after they repeatedly refused to support a full-
fledged labor organizing drive among farmworkers, but he 
Federal Records: Department of Labor, Johnson Library. 
®'lbid., p. 2; Wirtz to Moyers, 21 January 1966, pp. 
27-28. 
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continued that group's emphasis on community-based 
political empowerment in his work with agricultural 
labor." 
Labor organizers had attempted to unionize 
farmworkers in California periodically throughout the 
twentieth century, but generally without much success. 
California growers maintained powerful associations 
dedicated to resisting organizing efforts by farmworkers 
and almost always found willing support- from state 
authorities in enforcing their control over the labor 
supply. When state authority proved insufficient to 
suppress successful strikes, California growers turned to 
vigilantism and effectively neutralized organizers 
through violence and fear. Strikes led by the socialist 
Industrial Workers of the World in 1913 and the 
Communist-led United Cannery and Packinghouse Workers of 
the 1930s ended in the face of such tactics. Further 
sporadic strike efforts under the leadership of the 
National Agricultural Workers Union in the 1940s and 
'^The literature on Cesar Chavez and the United Farm 
Workers union is abundant, much of it for popular 
audiences and published during and immediately after the 
successful grape boycotts of 1965-1966 and 1967-1970. 
Among more scholarly studies, Linda C. Majka and Theo J. 
Majka, Farm Workers. Agribusiness, and the State 
(Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1982) and J. Craig 
Jenkins, The Politics of Insuroencv; The Farm Worker 
Movement in the 1960s (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 
1985) are particularly good. 
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1950s met the same resolute response from growers and 
government. Cesar Chavez, however, developed a new 
organizing strategy for the United Farm Workers, one 
tailored to the political climate of the 1960s that 
seemed to hold great promise for achieving lasting 
success." 
That strategy consisted of allying the community 
organizations that fostered solidarity and cooperation 
among the farmworkers with "a new feature in American 
social and political activity—the movement for civil 
rights, the movement of the youth and the movement of the 
poor.Chavez thereby connected the struggle for 
farmworker unionization to the movements for empowerment 
of the poor and minorities that were rising out of the 
civil rights movement and antipoverty initiatives. 
Chavez built on the publicity surrounding the poverty of 
American farmworkers that politicians and journalists had 
been cultivating since the end of the 1950s. Such 
"Histories of the early years of farm labor 
organizing may be found in Majka and Majka; Jenkins; 
Cletus E. Daniel, Bitter Harvest; A Historv of California 
Farmworkers. 1870-1914 (Ithaca; Cornell Univ. Press, 
1981); Ernesto Galarza, Farm Workers and Aari-business in 
California. 1947-1960 (Notre Dame, Ind.; Univ. of Notre 
Dame Press, 1977); and Clarke A. Chambers, California 
Farm Organizations; A Historical Studv of the Grange, the 
Farm Bureau and the Associated Farmers. 1929-1941 
(Berkeley; Univ. of California Press, 1952). 
^^Majka and Majka, pp. 171-172. 
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publicity had evoked compassion among liberals and a 
commitment to ending poverty among farmworkers. At the 
same time, the civil rights movement in the South had 
attuned American liberals to the need for direct action 
and mass demonstrations to gain political power for 
traditionally powerless groups. Thus/ when the 
Farmworkers Association began strike activity against 
grape growers in 1965, the movement could rely both on 
sympathy for the justice of their cause and acceptance of 
nonviolent, mass demonstration tactics to mobilize 
liberal support for farm labor unionization. 
Chavez made full use of these methods in gathering 
such support. He adopted Martin Luther King, Jr.*s 
strategy of nonviolent confrontation, refusing to allow 
pickets to react violently when harassed by local growers 
and sympathetic law enforcement officials. He organized 
a mass march from Delano, the center of strike action, to 
Sacramento, the California state capital, to draw media 
attention to the cause and force action by the California 
state government. Finally, he used the tactic of public 
fasting to reenergize a faltering strike effort by 
bringing national attention to the injustice of grower 
efforts to crush the farmworker movement. All three 
tactics brought the expected media coverage, as well as 
the endorsement of powerful politicians, particularly 
203 
potential Democratic presidential candidate Robert 
Kennedy. Such public attention brought financial 
assistance and worked to pressure some of the larger 
corporate agricultural Interests Into recognizing the 
union and signing collective bargaining contracts to 
avoid adverse publicity. It also brought manpower In the 
form of students and churchworkers already experienced In 
the work of the free speech and civil rights movements. 
Scarce commodities during the 1940s and 1950s, political 
recognition, money, and organizers allowed the United 
Farmworkers to sustain its efforts against determined 
grower resistance.^" 
Perhaps the most effective use of the external 
connections cultivated by Chavez came in the mobilization 
of the liberal public behind the grape boycotts of the 
late 1960s. The farmworkers first employed the boycott 
strategy successfully during the 1965 strikes against the 
Schenley and OlGlorgio corporations. Farmworker 
Association organizers and their cooperators contacted 
other unions and leafleted and picketed stores in 
thirteen large cities, portraying Schenley and DlGlorgio 
as antiunion and heartless oppressors of poor 
farmworkers. The boycotts, and the grape harvest strikes 
"Majka and Majka, pp. 172-179, 189-190; Jenkins, pp. 
140-144, 150-151, 154-156, 165-166. 
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they were meant to support, had little financial effect 
on the companies, but they brought national attention to 
these large corporations with recognizable brand names 
and threatened more harm to their images and sales in the 
long term than could be balanced by the gains from 
fighting the farmworkers union. The corporations decided 
not to risk the loss and recognized the union. 
The success of the first boycott campaign in 1965-
1966 led to the adoption of a much broader boycott in 
1967. Again a response to a failing strike effort, the 
union's attempt to run a boycott of table grapes produced 
by a single grower, Giumarra vineyards, derailed when the 
grower adopted the strategy of using labels borrowed from 
other growers to disguise his shipments. The farmworkers 
union decided that it needed a boycott of much larger 
proportions and that such a boycott would be more 
effective in forcing recognition of the union than 
strikes that could be so easily defeated by growers 
^^ajka and Majka, pp. 174-179; Jenkins, pp. 151-156. 
In fact the process of recognition by the DiGiorgio 
company was not nearly as smooth as is portrayed here. 
Although it did succeed eventually, a violent 
jurisdictional dispute broke out with the Teamsters Union 
and in the process of winning recognition for the 
Farmworkers Association, its leadership accepted 
affiliation with the AFL-CIO, thereby sacrificing some of 
its autonomy and grassroots character. See Majka and 
Majka, pp. 179-186, and Jenkins, pp. 157-160. 
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through violence, sympathetic injunctions restricting 
picketing, and an endless supply of willing labor. 
Throwing most of the union's resources into the 
boycott, organizers established "boycott houses" in New 
York, Boston, and Philadelphia. From these centers, 
boycott staff directed an intensive campaign, eventually 
active in fifty cities and hundreds of smaller 
communities, to disrupt grape sales at several critical 
points. They called on the support of other unionized 
workers to refuse to handle shipments of California table 
grapes, they appealed to grocery store owners to refuse 
to stock the grapes, and they asked consumers to refuse 
to either buy California grapes or shop in stores that 
continued to sell those grapes. Through the efforts of 
Chavez' effective coalition of labor unions, students, 
and urban liberals, thé strategy brought success. In 
little more than a year, the effects of plummeting grape 
sales brought California grape growers into negotiations 
with the farmworkers and resulted in contracts for grape 
workers that recognized the union, established union 
hiring and grievance procedures, limited pesticide use, 
^^Majka and Majka, pp. 186-187; Jenkins, pp. 162-163. 
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forced rehiring of strikers and contributions to a union 
health fund, and instituted a 25-cent-per-hour raise. 
The successes of the farmworkers' unionization 
effort decisively affected the development of federal 
programs for migrant farmworkers through its radicalizing 
effect on both private and public supporters of their 
efforts. Chief among the private supporters were the 
church-related organizations, especially the National 
Council of Churches' Migrant Ministry. Migrant Ministry 
work on behalf of farmworkers had begun in the 1920s and 
had offered religious, recreation, and welfare services 
to migrants since that time. The organization became 
more activist, however, during the late 1950s as it 
joined other migrant advocacy organizations in opposing 
the bracero program and supporting increased federal 
assistance to alleviate the poor working and living 
conditions of farmworkers. In the 1960s, the interest of 
professionals within the Migrant Ministry began to move 
more toward community organizing and fostering of self-
help and political effectiveness among farmworkers. By 
1967, the Migrant Ministry supported unionization 
activity in Texas, Wisconsin, Michigan, Florida, and 
California. Particularly in California, where the number 
®®Majka and Majka, pp. 187-197; Jenkins, pp. 163-172. 
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of farmworkers far outstripped the numbers in other 
states and where the state Council of Churches had 
adopted a liberal stance, the Migrant Ministry staff 
threw its whole effort behind the grassroots organizing 
of farmworkers under the leadership of Chavez. By 1969, 
the California Migrant Ministry had renamed itself the 
National Farm Worker Ministry and considered itself "the 
servant of the farm worker movement."®' 
Individual denominations, including the American 
Baptist Convention, the Disciples of Christ, the 
Methodist Church, the United Church of Christ, and the 
United Presbyterian Church, endorsed the right of 
farmworkers to organize for collective bargaining, as 
well, and many allowed ordained ministers to join union 
picket lines and grape boycott efforts. The Roman 
Catholic church also offered support, both moral and 
financial, although it restricted the organizing 
activities of its clerical members more carefully. Such 
changes in the mission to migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers within many churches created a polarization 
between radicalized liberal members who favored 
supporting the United Farmworkers and more conservative 
members who felt the churches had betrayed their role as 
"Jenkins, pp. 137-140; Longcope, pp. 12-38. 
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mediator of disputes and supporter of understanding and 
reconcil iation. 
Such a polarization of the issue of collective 
bargaining rights for agricultural labor also appeared in 
the political arena. As mentioned above, collective 
bargaining, along with the minimum wage and termination 
of the bracero program, had already divided the members 
of the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor along 
partisan and ideological lines. Liberal Democrats 
supported federal legislation to protect the right of 
farmworkers to organize; moderate and conservative 
Republicans opposed such legislation because of 
agriculture's special vulnerability to strike action and 
the complications of union elections in a seasonal 
industry with a casual labor supply. The success of 
Cesar Chavez' farmworker organizing, especially as the 
grape boycotts took hold, further intensified feelings on 
the issue, radicalizing some politicians as it had the 
staffs of private advocacy organizations. 
Senator Williams recognized the change in attitude 
among farmworkers following their organizing successes, 
having held hearings of the Subcommittee on Migratory 
Labor in the Delano area to investigate the 1965-1966 
'°Longcope, pp. 14-38. 
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grape strike. In response to the testimony at those 
hearings, he recommended active administration support 
for the passage of minimum wage and collective bargaining 
legislation to preclude the development of even more 
threatening labor unrest in the future. Although much of 
the testimony implied that the strike resulted from 
frustration among farmworkers over denial of federal 
labor law coverage to agricultural workers, in a letter 
to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Williams hinted that 
the farm labor issue was making connections with Mexican-
American civil rights questions. Williams paraphrased 
farmworker testimony saying, "They will not accept 
special welfare programs and government subsidies in lieu 
of their rightful claim to equality with other 
citizens."^ 
The changes which these farmworkers considered 
necessary for equality offer evidence of the broad nature 
of their grievances. Again according to Senator 
Williams, "they equate equality with collective 
bargaining, minimum wage, unemployment compensation, 
reform and abolition of the Farm Placement Service, 
freedom from discrimination by governmental authorities, 
^Memorandum to Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey 
from Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., 24 March 1966, p. 
2, "Full Committee & Chairman," Box 16, 2d accession, 
RG42, National Archives. 
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particularly local law enforcement, etc.Farmworkers, 
at least in the California movement, had developed a 
voice and a consciousness of their rights and potential -
power in a way similar to that in which the civil rights 
movement for blacks had led to increasingly assertive 
demands for social and economic change. 
This new attitude on the part of mobilized 
farmworkers, coupled with unapologe^Ac liberal support of 
the United Farmworkers grape boycott, brought angry 
reactions from conservative congressmen, particularly 
those representing states heavily dependent on migrant 
and seasonal farm labor. Congressmen J. Herbert Burke of 
Florida and Burt L. Talcott of California spoke 
derisively of two unnamed New York congressmen who had 
returned a gift of grapes from California representative 
Robert Mathias, a member of the House Agriculture 
Committee. Burke and Talcott accused the New York 
congressmen of playing to the media and misleading the 
public regarding the farm labor dispute in California. 
Talcott insisted that no farmworkers were striking table 
grape growers in California and that the union had 
instigated the grape boycott in desperation when they 
^^Memorandum to Humphrey from Williams, 24 March 
1966, p. 2, RG42, National Archives. 
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failed to persuade grape workers to join their 
organization.^ 
Senator Williams issued a rebuttal of grower attacks 
on the farmworker movement a few days later, as well as 
statistics showing the success of the grape boycott. He 
insisted that the farmworkers had begun the boycott not 
out of desperation, but because growers had destroyed the 
possibility of an effective strike through use of court 
injunctions and strikebreakers. The boycott, he noted, 
had the support of politicians, church leaders, and 
organized labor, as well as ordinary citizens. Such wide 
support, not the use of illegal methods, explained the 
boycott's success. In the same vein, Williams and 
Senator Fannin of Arizona had argued heatedly a few 
months earlier over an attempt by Williams to add a 
collective bargaining amendment to the 1968 farm bill. 
Each man accused the other of unfair parliamentary 
tactics to thwart the will of Congress. Dispassionate 
discussion of the issues deteriorated into thinly veiled 
antagonism that clearly demonstrated the degree to which 
views on this issue had become polarized.^ 
^%.S., Congress, House, 26 September 1968, 
Congressional Record 114:28508, 28527-28528. 
^U.S., Congress, Senate, 20 July, 11 October 1968, 
Congressional Record 114:22453-22455, 30919, 30932-30934. 
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In the face of such heightened tension, compromise 
for the purpose of passing new legislation to solve 
migrant problems became impossible. For this impasse, 
however, the farmworker movement itself must take some 
responsibility. Chavez had discovered the effectiveness 
of the. secondary boycott in placing pressure on grape 
growers to deal with the farmworkers union. The National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the basic federal law 
protecting collective bargaining rights for workers, 
outlawed the use of secondary boycotts by unions in labor 
disputes. If farmworkers achieved coverage under this 
act, they could not use their most successful organizing 
and pressure tactic. As a result, Chavez informed the 
congressional coalition fighting for expansion of NLRA 
coverage to agricultural workers that the farmworker 
movement no longer wished to be covered by the same 
collective bargaining legislation as industrial 
workers. ** 
With this change of position on the part of 
farmworker leaders, liberal advocates of farmworker 
rights faced a dilemma. They had to decide whether to 
respect the wishes of the grassroots farmworker movement 
or follow their own beliefs and continue to work for 
^'Jenkins, pp. 166-167. 
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passage of a collective bargaining law for farmworkers. 
Again, as with the transformation of the civil rights 
movement into the black power movement, the emergence of 
indigenous leaders among the farmworkers led to a 
divergence between traditional liberal solutions to their 
problems and the solutions the poor demanded on their 
own. Some liberals, like the professional staffs of the 
Migrant Ministry described above, chose to follow the 
lead of the indigenous movement. Others pulled back from 
the new demands, unsure of what their position should be 
and of where the new direction would lead. 
J. Craig Jenkins has analyzed these consequences of 
the success of the farmworker union movement in his 
recent book The Politics of Insurgency, calling them 
"paradoxical." As the farmworkers gained success in 
organizing and forced acceptance of their demands, they 
threatened the traditional powers in agriculture who then 
increased their efforts to crush them. At the same time, 
success brought increasingly radical demands and 
alienated many of the former allies who had provided the 
external support necessary to the movement's successes. 
Weakened by the loss of its widespread public support 
through apparent radicalization, the movement became more 
vulnerable to conservative counter-pressure which 
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eventually forced the farmworkers to retrench in an 
effort to protect earlier victories.* 
Jenkins' description of the dynamics of the 
farmworker movement parallels descriptions by other 
scholars of the dynamics of liberalism itself in the 
1960s. Alonzo Hamby has described the liberal expansion 
in the 1960s as a "politics of excess," in which the 
political popularity of reform encouraged national 
leaders to move beyond the acceptable confines of social 
change, thereby provoking a public reaction that forced a 
return to more moderate approaches. Allen Matusow has 
suggested that the steady resurgence of conservatism 
after 1968 resulted from a loss of faith in liberalism 
among the general public, brought on by rising violence 
and threats to traditional community power structures, as 
well as disillusionment with the potential for liberal 
solutions to reduce poverty and discrimination.^^ 
The movement to improve living and working 
conditions for migrant and seasonal farmworkers, then, 
followed the same pattern as other antipoverty and civil 
rights initiatives of the 1960s. Beginning with 
^Jenkins, pp. 221-222. 
^^Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers; 
F.D.R. to Reaaan (New York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), 
pp. 5-6; Matusow, pp. 438-439. 
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relatively modest efforts by liberal advocates to achieve 
passage of government assistance programs, the initial 
successes encouraged further demands and provided the 
support for indigenous organization. Although self-
determination among the poor and disenfranchised was 
among the original goals of liberal advocates, such self-
determination threatened the traditional social and 
economic power structure and brought a strong enough 
conservative reaction to preclude further progress toward 
improving the position of the disadvantaged group within 
society. 
The Johnson administration antipoverty initiatives 
for migrant and seasonal farmworkers truly fit their 
description as "the apex of liberal reform efforts." 
During the period 1964-1968 those efforts achieved their 
fullest possible potential, then were followed by a 
period of reaction and retrenchment for the next two 
decades. Yet despite conservative reaction to the war on 
poverty, most programs, including those for migrant and 
seasonal farmworkers, continued to operate in slightly 
reorganized form under subsequent administrations. The 
increasingly radical demands of the late 1960s had 
rendered the original programs of the war on poverty much 
less threatening. Providing child care, health, housing, 
and educational services to farmworkers became an 
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accepted part of the federal social agenda, fulfilling 
over thirty years of effort by more than one generation 
of activists. Although success was far from complete, 
the work of migrant advocates had increased the 
availability of social services and educational 
opportunities for migrants, if not the power of 
farmworkers in relations with their employers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FIGHTING THE WAR IN IOWA: MIGRANT ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL 
The federal assistance programs authorized during 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations depended for 
implementation on state and local agencies willing to 
accept federal funding and direction to provide services 
to migrant and seasonal farmworkers. Since provision of 
social services had traditionally been state and local 
government responsibilities in the United States, 
adoption of grant programs for new services by the 
federal government sometimes required establishment of 
new offices and agencies within state and local 
government. Moreover, the federal migrant assistance 
programs allowed for grants to private agencies that 
offered direct federal support for programs complying 
with federal goals, bypassing entirely the state and 
local government systems. For both government and 
private agencies, the federal funds provided a 
substantial new source of income. But also for both, 
federal funding brought with it new experiences of 
federal involvement in local activities. 
In order to explore the effects of federal funding 
on state and local solutions to migrant problems, this 
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chapter examines the development and implementation of 
service delivery for migrant farmworkers in a single 
state. Although analysis of the experience of one state 
cannot provide the basis for any broad conclusions, it 
can provide an example of the ways in which state and 
local agencies translated federal legislation into 
programs that affected the lives of individual people, 
and how these agencies worked with available federal 
funding to create the kinds of programs they wanted to 
offer. 
The state of Iowa may serve as a useful example for 
two reasons. First, the state's migrant population was 
relatively small in the 1960s compared to other 
agricultural states. A comprehensive statewide analysis 
of migrant programs is therefore less complicated than it 
would be for such large migrant-user states as 
California, Texas, or Florida. Second, two different 
nonprofit agencies provided service programs for migrants 
using federal funding. These two programs operated from 
different philosophies, which led ultimately to different 
relationships with funding agencies and different kinds 
of program development. Thus, there is the opportunity 
to make some comparative observations about the effects 
of relationships with state and federal funding agencies 
on programs offered to migrants. 
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Although Iowa is most often portrayed as a state of 
small farmers using family labor to run their operations, 
migrant labor has played an essential role in the state's 
agricultural economy. Annual estimates of the number of 
migrants working in Iowa during the 1960s hover around 
1500. They worked primarily in five counties: Cerro 
Gordo in north-central Iowa, where the American Crystal 
Sugar Company contracted with local growers for sugar 
beets, and Cedar, Scott, Louisa, and Muscatine in the 
southeast, where the H. J. Heinz Company contracted with 
tomato and cucumber growers. Small growers hired 
scattered groups of workers in Kossuth, Winnebago, 
Hancock, Worth, Mitchell, Floyd, Franklin, and Grundy 
counties in the north-central part of the state, and in 
Fremont, Page, and Monona counties in the southwest (see 
Figure 1). These growers used migrant labor crews to 
cultivate and harvest seed corn, soybeans, onions, 
asparagus, potatoes, cucumbers, and melons; and to work 
in the tree nurseries, orchards, and seasonal food-
processing industries. Migrants arrived as early as late 
March for nursery work and stayed as late as the end of 
October for vegetable and orchard harvesting. Most of 
those who worked in Iowa traveled north from Texas along 
the mid-continent migrant stream at the beginning of the 
season, passing through Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas, 
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15-Fremont 
16-Monona 
Figure 1. Counties in Iowa where Migrant 
Worked during the 1960s 
Farm Labor 
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Missouri/ Illinois, and Nebraska on their way to Iowa 
(see Figure 2). Some remained in Iowa throughout the 
season; others traveled north into Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
and Michigan after spring cultivation, then returned 
through Iowa in the fall.^ 
Most of the migrants who came to Iowa traveled in 
small crews, often related by family ties, although 
growers in the Muscatine area brought from 100 to 200 
braceros each year until 1965 to harvest tomatoes and 
cucumbers under contract with the H. J. Heinz Company 
cannery in Muscatine. These migrants, primarily Mexican-
Americans, generally lived in housing provided on 
growers' farms, isolated from nearby communities. Thus, 
their problems, including poor housing and sanitation, 
frequent unemployment and underemployment because of poor 
weather, and limited access to educational and health 
care services, remained hidden from most residents of the 
^Migrant Action Program, Annual Report 1966 (Mason 
City, la.,; Migrant Action Program, 1966), n.p.; 
Muscatine Migrant Committee, Annual Progress Report 1966 
(Muscatine, la.: Muscatine Migrant Committee, 1966), p. 
1; Janet M. Jorgenson, David E. Williams, and John H. 
Burma, Mlaratorv Agricultural Workers in the United 
States (Grinnell, la.: Grinnell College, 1961), pp. 41-
43; U.S. Department of Health Education, and Welfare, 
Domestic Agricultural Migrants in the United States. 
Public Health Service Publication No. 540, revised 1966. 
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Source: Iowa Governor's Spanish Speaking Task Force, 
Concerne en Iowa; The Official Report of the 
Governor's Spanish Speaking Task Force (Des 
Moines: The Task Force, 1979), p. 36. 
Figure 2. Iowa in Relation to the National Migratory 
Patterns 
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state; even state officials were unaware of their 
presence.2 
To combat such ignorance, the President's Committee 
on Migratory Labor appointed by Eisenhower in 1954 
included among its objectives the fostering of efforts on 
the state level to solve the problems of migrant farm 
labor. Members of working subcommittees contacted state 
governors, labor and health departments, and special 
commissions and committees to gather information on the 
experiences of migrants in individual states and to 
encourage programs and new laws and regulations to 
protect these migrants and improve their living and 
working conditions. In November 1954, Mildred Dougherty, 
field consultant for the Department of Labor's Bureau of 
Labor Standards, visited Iowa to discuss migrant problems 
with representatives of the Department of Health and the 
Employment Security Commission. Paul Mauser, Director of 
Zjorgenson et al., p. 42; George W. Moore, Chief, 
Employment Service Division, to Robert C. Goodwin, 
Director, Bureau of Employment Security, 21 January 1960, 
"592. USDL Crew Leader Survey folder #2," Box 9, Records 
of the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, RG42, 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, 
D.C.; William T. Bailey, Acting Regional Director, Kansas 
City, to Don Larin, Chief, Farm Placement Service, 27 
July 1955, "Subcommittee on Development of Migrant 
Housing, Smelker (3)," and "Farm Labor Camps," Region 
Vll-Iowa, p. 13, "Subcommittee on Development of Migrant 
Housing, Merlin Smelker (1)," Box 16, Records of the 
President's Committee on Migratory Labor, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 
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Public Health Engineering, and Dr. Zimmerer, State Health 
Commissioner, both expressed surprise, and even 
disbelief, that any Iowa growers hired migrant 
farmworkers. To convince them, Dougherty had to show 
them a map of migrant labor use around the state prepared 
by the Iowa Employment Service.' 
Some officials, however, knew of the state's migrant 
problems from personal experience. Dr. Madeline 
Donnelly, Director of Maternal and Child Health, had 
delivered a number of children in migrant homes under 
distressing conditions while in private practice in the 
Mason City area in the 1940s, although she no longer 
encountered migrant workers after she joined the State 
Department of Health. Esther Immer, Executive Secretary 
of the Iowa Commission on Children and Youth, had 
traveled around the state inspecting the health and 
housing problems of migrant families in Iowa. Immer 
worked closely with Dougherty during her field visits to 
Iowa in 1954 and again in 1956 and both Donnelly and 
Immer represented the state at the Mid-American 
Conference on Migratory Labor cosponsored by the Council 
'Mildred Dougherty to George Moore, Director, 
Employment Service, 18 November 1954, "Iowa," Box 2, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Mildred 
Dougherty to Miss McConnell, 23 December 1954, 
"Subcommittee on Housing Standards, Clara M. Beyer (2)," 
Box 16, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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Of State Governments and the President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor in 1959.* 
Despite the efforts of Donnelly and Immer, however, 
the state government did not follow through on the 
information about migrants in Iowa by initiating any new 
regulations or laws or by sponsoring any special programs 
to help farmworkers and their families. They and others 
concerned about migrants in Iowa turned to private 
interests in hopes of establishing programs to assist 
migrant farmworkers. In the summer of 1958, the Iowa 
Commission on Children and Youth helped to sponsor a 
study of the need for a migrant assistance program in the 
Muscatine area. The Iowa Council of Churches, through 
"Skip" Andrews, a Des Moines college student and 
president of Christian Young Men of Iowa, approached the 
Social Action Department of the Muscatine Ministerial 
Association and the H. J. Heinz Company to organize a 
^Esther L. Immer, Executive Secretary, Iowa 
Commission on Children and Youth, to Miss Dougherty, 12 
November 1954, and Mildred Dougherty to Esther L. Immer, 
19 September 1957, "Iowa," Box 2, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library, Mildred Dougherty to Miss McConnell, 
23 December 1954, "Subcommittee on Housing Standards, 
Clara M. Beyer (2)," Box 16, Records of the PCML, 
Eisenhower Library; Newspaper clipping, "Migrant Workers 
in Iowa," 5 September 1957, "Iowa (No rep.)," Box 28, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Beatrice 
McConnell to Esther L. Immer, 8 September 1960, 
"Migratory Labor-2, Publications-Bulletin 215," Box 101, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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short exploratory program for that summer. A four-member 
group, called "The Harvester Team," composed of Andrews, 
Marvin Budd of the National Council of Churches summer 
staff, and two women students of area colleges operated a 
mobile program to offer informational and recreational 
services to migrants at their camps. As a result of the 
acceptance of this pilot project among migrants, and an 
assessment of extensive need for services by the 
Harvester Team, the Ministerial Association formed the 
Muscatine Migrant Council to provide education, health, 
and "Christian social welfare" services.® 
The Council planned a full-summer program for 1959 
to be supported by the Iowa Council of Churches, the 
Heinz Company, and the national Migrant Ministry. They 
established another Harvester Team to provide expanded 
services at the camps and to spread information about the 
other facets of the Council's program. The Iowa 
Department of Social Welfare contributed $3,000 toward 
the operation of a day care facility to offer supervision 
and education for migrant children too young to work in 
^Muscatine Migrant Committee, Annual Progress Report 
1966. p. 1; Esther L. Immer to the President's Committee 
on Migratory Labor, 9 October 1958, attached to F. A. 
Potter to Esther L. Immer, 14 October 1958, "Iowa," Box 
5, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Richard 
DeVere Horton, "Spanish-Speaking Migratory Agricultural 
Workers in the Area of Muscatine, Iowa" (M.A. thesis, 
Univ. of Iowa, 19^3), pp. 69-71. 
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the fields. The State Health Department, through the 
influence of Dr. Donnelly, provided the services of a 
Public Health Nurse to serve the child care facility and 
the camps. Local churches and individuals, as well as a 
thrift sale, contributed the remainder of the Council's 
summer budget of $6,035. The Harvester Team estimated it 
had served about 500 migrants and family members during 
its visits to 16 individual farms and the Heinz migrant 
camp. A total of 46 children attended the child care 
center over six weeks, although none attended every day 
and about half attended for five or fewer days. The 
Public Health nurse provided care to nearly 350 children 
and adults, through both the child care program and home 
visits.* 
Despite organizational problems and a tight budget, 
the Council and summer staff considered the program 
successful. They also believed a much larger population 
could be served by the child care center with better 
planning and increased funds. Consequently, the Council 
operated a program again in the summer of 1960. The 
Public Health nursing service remained essentially the 
same, concentrating on examinations at the child care 
Muscatine Migrant Council, "Migrant Work in 
Muscatine, Iowa, 1959," "Iowa," Box 56, Records of the 
PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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center and home visits, and the Harvester Team again 
served about 500 migrants at 16 different locations. The 
child care center, however, enrolled 163 children in 
three age divisions, each with a teacher and assistant, 
in contrast to the single teacher and assistant with 46 
children of varying ages in 1959. The child care staff 
evaluated the new program enthusiastically, but with 
further suggestions for increasing the staff and number 
of children served. They estimated up to 250 migrant 
children might attend the center in 1961.^ 
But salary and staff increases and expenses for 
serving so many additional children had stretched the 
Council's budget beyond its limits. Although the local 
contribution rose from around $600 to over $2,000, 
including contributions from the Heinz Company, the State 
Department of Social Welfare had reduced its contribution 
from $3,000 to $2,000 in anticipation of this local 
increase. With an income of $5,440 and expenses of 
$7,556, the Council faced a shortfall of funds by 
September that forced a réévaluation of the purposes and 
goals of the Muscatine Migrant Council. Estimates of 
potential local contributions went as high as $3,000, but 
^Muscatine Migrant Council, "Migrant Ministry 
Report," Summer 1960, pp. 6-10, 23, 26, "Iowa," Box 56, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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the Executive Secretary, Jean Green, calculated the 
budget needs for 1961 at $15,000. The Council believed 
its programs offered a necessary service to both the 
migrants and the local community, but without increased 
government support for their work they could not 
continue. Robert Hinshaw, chairman of the Council, 
suggested federal support was warranted, since the 
services provided to migrants in Iowa benefited other 
states as well by handling health and educational 
problems that reduced their need when they traveled to 
their next destination.® 
Although the Migrant Council could not directly 
request federal funding before grant programs passed 
Congress, they maintained some contact with the federal 
government through the President's Committee on Migratory 
Labor in the early 1960s. They sent a copy of the their 
first year's report to President Eisenhower, with the 
comment that "the migrant people are very much in need of 
help and any support that can be given to the Councils 
that are trying to do this is well worth while."' The 
White House referred the letter and report to the 
^Muscatine Migrant Council, "Migrant Ministry 
Report," Summer 1960, pp. 1-3, 31-33; Morton, pp. 75-76. 
'Rev. Robert B. Goebel to President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 17 February 1960, "Iowa - General," Box 72, 
Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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President's Committee on Migratory Labor, whose Assistant 
Executive Director responded with a request for further 
reports to keep the Committee up to date on activities 
for migrants in the various states. Mildred Dougherty 
also continued to gather information on the Iowa 
situation, noting in 1962 the success of the Muscatine 
program in gaining support from the state departments of 
Health and Weifare 
Dougherty did not believe such support would 
necessarily lead to any statewide efforts, however, since 
the two departments disagreed on the value of expanding 
migrant work beyond localized programs. In fact, because 
of legislative cutbacks in the budget, the Department of 
Social Welfare eliminated contributions to the Muscatine 
Migrant Council in 1962. At about the same time, federal 
grants for the public health component of the Muscatine 
program replaced the state health department support for 
the Council. Thus, instead of increased state support 
for migrant assistance programs in Iowa during the early 
1960s, direct state government funding for migrant 
^''Mrs. Howard H. Green, Executive Secretary, 
Muscatine Migrant Council, to John F. Heathershaw, 
Assistant Executive Director, President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor, 21 September 1960, "Iowa - General," Box 
72, Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Mildred 
Dougherty to Miss Geach, 6 April 1962, "Migratory Labor-
2, Community Projects, 1962-," Box 100, Records of the 
PCML, Eisenhower Library. 
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programs came to an end after 1962. It did not resume 
until the passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act amendments of 1966 provided federal funding 
to state departments of education to support special 
programs for migrant children 
Nevertheless, the Muscatine Migrant Council 
continued its program throughout the early 1960s, 
expanding the child care center enrollment annually, 
until, by the mid-1960s, between 200 and 250 children 
attended each summer.'^ Although the Council suspended 
the public health service project for 1962 when a 
qualified nurse could not be located, health service 
resumed under federal Migrant Health Act funds in 1963.^^ 
The Muscatine program remained the only agency providing 
special services to migrant farmworkers until 1964. In 
that year, however, the Mason City Council of Churches 
decided to begin a project to assist migrant farmworkers 
"Horton, pp. 76-77. 
^^Unfortunately, I could not locate any reports of 
the Council's activities for the period 1963-1964 and so 
cannot discover the source of funds to continue the child 
care center operations following the withdrawal of state 
support. According to Morton, p. 78, the Council had 
applied to be included among the United Fund donees, 
requesting an annual share of $2,000. The Fund denied 
their application for 1963, but was expected to 
reconsider in 1964. 
"Horton, p. 73. 
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in north-central Iowa. They had heard of the program in 
Muscatine and thought a similar need for services to 
migrants might exist in their area.^ 
The area Council of Churches asked the United Church 
Women, an affiliate of the Council, to accept leadership 
of the project. The president of that volunteer 
organization, Betty Jean Clark, agreed to take on the 
responsibility and formed a committee to study the 
problem. The committee included representatives of the 
Council of Churches, United Church Women, the Mason City 
Deanery of the Catholic Church, and the American Crystal 
Sugar Company, the area's largest employer of migrant 
farmworkers. Together they decided to fund a study of 
the needs in their own area before launching a program 
based on the Muscatine plan, to be sure that such 
services as those offered by the Muscatine Migrant 
Council fit the requirements of the north-central Iowa 
migrant families. Clark indicated that the committee 
considered itself "only an activating group." They 
planned to direct a study during the summer of 1964, 
propose a list of needed services, and then interest 
^"Extend hand to migrants," Mason City Globe 
Gazette. 6 June 1964. 
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"individual churches and individual agencies which can 
best meet the needs" in providing the services.^ 
To conduct the summer study, the committee requested 
an experienced person trained in migrant ministry from 
the National Council of Churches. Working with a local 
budget of $530, the committee hired Enrique Perez, a 
Methodist ministerial student from Mexico who had worked 
with a migrant ministry in Michigan during the previous 
two summers. Perez established a program of camp 
visitations to offer "social, recreational, educational, 
and religious" services with the help of local 
volunteers. Planned activities for children and adults 
included bringing toys and games, movies, reading 
material, religious services, and local information to 
th^ migrants at home in the evenings. Perez oriented 
local volunteers to migrant culture and appropriate ways 
to offer services and offered advice to the program 
committee regarding the need for expanded services and 
attention to the general situation of migrants in the 
area, not just individual problems. 
^"Extend hand to migrants," Mason City Globe 
Gazette. 6 June 1964; Interview with Betty Jean Clark, 
Des Moines, Iowa, 12 April 1990. 
I6"study of migrants' needs starts," Mason City 
Globe-Gazette. 15 June 1964, p. 15; "Reaching migrants," 
Mason City Globe-Gazette. 4 July 1964, p. 4; "Local fold 
in visits to migrants," Mason City Globe-Gazette. 6 July 
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One of the local volunteers who assisted Perez was 
Shirley M. Bandage. A former president of the Mason City 
United Church Women, Sandage had become interested in 
working with migrants in 1963 following a state 
convention of the Disciples of Christ at which delegates 
discussed the needs of migrant farmworkers and their 
families. Sandage urged Betty Jean Clark to involve the 
United Church Women in a migrant ministry and to get the 
area Council of Churches' support for a project in 1964. 
Following her volunteer experiences during the initial 
summer project, Sandage recognized the wider needs of 
migrants in the Mason City area and began work with 
similarly inspired volunteers to formalize and expand the 
efforts of the initial planning committee into an ongoing 
program. In March 1965, these interested volunteers 
organized the Mason City Area Committee on Migrant 
Relations. Unlike the Muscatine Migrant Council, the 
committee did not retain a formal connection to the local 
council of churches, although church members and clergy 
remained much involved with the committee's activities. 
The group prepared a purpose statement to guide its work 
that called for the new committee to direct a church and 
community program for migrants in the areas of "day care 
1964, p. 17. 
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and remedial education, health and sanitation, and camp 
visitation for purposes of fellowship, recreation and 
training." The committee was also expected to "secure 
adequate interest and financial support," provide public 
relations for the program in the community, and 
coordinate its services with programs directed by the 
Iowa Council of Churches, Archdiocese of Dubuque, and 
"concerned governmental agencies. 
Sandage became secretary of the new committee. The 
committee hired a local woman, Carolyn Pitts, who was 
about to graduate from college with a degree in 
elementary education and who spoke fluent Spanish, to 
coordinate the program and continue camp visitations in 
the summer of 1965. But Sandage also had hopes of a 
full-fledged education program for migrant children that 
summer and volunteered to write a grant for funds from 
the newly established Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) in Washington. The decision of the committee to 
take that step beyond the limits of local volunteer 
efforts to a federally funded program of much broader 
scope precipitated dissension among the church groups and 
community supporters who had worked together during the 
^Shirley M. Sandage, "Something of Substance," 
unpublished manuscript, copyright 1988, pp. 54-55; "Hire 
co-ordinator for area summer migrant program," Mason City 
Globe-Gazette. 13 March 1965. 
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first summer. The Committee on Migrant Relations 
supported Sandage, however, and when the OEO approved the 
grant for a summer remedial education program in the 
Mason City area, Sandage became its director J® 
Funded from an Economic Opportunity Act Title III-B 
grant of $23,817, the summer school program, serving 
about 75 children, operated at three locations—Manly, 
Sheffield, and Clear Lake—for the convenience of 
migrants, most of whom lived in camps clustered around 
these three towns (see Figure 3). Sandage secured the 
use of regular school classrooms for all three programs 
and hired local teachers to work with the children at 
each school. In addition to the remedial education 
program, the grant provided for a public health nurse to 
work in the schools and with families at the camps and a 
iSiiHire co-ordinator for area summer migrant 
program," Mason City Globe-Gazette. 13 March 1965; 
Interview with Betty Jean Clark; Sandage, "Something of 
Substance," pp. 55, 58. 
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sanitary engineer to work with migrants and growers on 
improving housing and field sanitation.^' 
GEO required state approval in order to qualify for, 
a grant, and so Sandage secured official support for the 
Mason City program from the state departments of Social 
Welfare, Employment Security, and Public Instruction, 
apparently without difficulty.Local support, despite 
division over the wisdom of launching an expanded, 
federally funded program, also continued. The local 
newspaper, in fact, ran an editorial recommending the 
success of the program as a model for other local 
agencies interested in securing OEO grants. Granting 
"the antipoverty program ... is not above criticism," 
the newspaper insisted "there is some need for 
antipoverty money in North Iowa and the migrant workers 
project afforded a worthy springboard." In conclusion, 
the newspaper advised "there will be more and larger 
antipoverty allocations in future years. Other groups 
''Telegram, Sargent Shriver to Mrs. Richard Sandage, 
3 July 1965, photocopy provided to author by Sandage; 
Office of Economic Opportunity press release, 2 July 
1965, "Program Development-Iowa," Reel 26, Federal 
Records:OEO, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, 
Texas; "Expect federal aid to provide schooling, health 
training for migrant workers," Mason City Globe-Gazette. 
23 June 1965, p. 21; "School set for children of 
migrants," Mason City Globe-Gazette. 26 June 1965, p. 8; 
Sandage, "Something of Substance," pp. 56-59, 64-65. 
^"sandage, "Something of Substance," p. 57. 
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would be well advised to follow the footsteps of the 
migrant workers committee and lay their plans now. 
A federal evaluation praised the Mason City summer 
school program as well and recommended expansion in 1966. 
Margaret Garrity, Midwest project director for the OEO 
Migrant Division, hoped to see a full-day summer school 
for children and the institution of evening and weekend 
adult education classes in future years. Responding to 
Garrity's suggestions, Sandage, now officially project 
director for the Mason City Area Committee on Migrant 
Relations, submitted a proposal for the summer of 1966 
that included day care for preschoolers at four centers, 
remedial education for elementary children 6-10 years 
old, industrial arts and home economics classes for 
children over 10, and classes in literacy, citizenship, 
and health for adults. OEO accepted the proposal and 
funded the Mason City program, renamed the Migrant Action 
Program, with a grant of $45,269. 
The Migrant Action Program (MAP) faced public 
relations problems in 1966, however, despite increased 
Federal funds fight poverty," Mason City Globe-
Gazette. 6 July 1965. 
^^"Migrant workers program, U.S. consultant: 'Good 
job,'" Mason City Globe-Gazette. 7 August 1965; Office of 
Economic Opportunity press release, 20 April 1966, 
"Program Development-Iowa," Reel 26, Federal Records:OEO, 
Johnson Library. 
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federal support. The sanitarian's report for 1965, made 
public in March 1966, had pointed out the inadequacy of 
some area migrant housing, antagonizing growers whose 
camps had been singled out for criticism. In addition, 
the extension of the school program from half to full 
days threatened the use of children's labor in the 
fields. Adult education programs intensified the threat 
to adequate labor and grower control of the work force, 
since part of the purpose of such programs was to teach 
farmworkers new skills for better employment 
opportunities, as well as better understanding of their 
rights as American citizens. As a result, some of the 
original program staff from 1965 chose not to return in 
1966 and the schools in Clear Lake, Sheffield, and Manly 
refused the use of their buildings. 
MAP, led by the determined and not easily defeated 
Sandage, secured facilities in the nearby towns of 
Rockwell, Hanlontown, and Thompson (see Figure 3) and 
raised local funds to buy a bus to transport children 
from the camps to the new school locations. In addition, 
a new school facility opened in Reinbeck (see Figure 3) 
as a result of a decision by the Reinbeck Area Council of 
^'"Growers' concern asked. Migrant's housing varies," 
Mason City Globe-Gazette. 3 March 1966, p. 14; Sandage, 
"Something of Substance," pp. 69, 71-72, 73-77. 
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Churches to begin work with migrants. Although they had 
planned to create their own program, Garrity recommended 
they invite MAP to expand into their area, since OEO 
could not justify funding of similar programs in such 
close proximity. The local asparagus canning company, 
for whom the migrants in Reinbeck worked, opposed the 
school program, but the local community supported it 
through donations of clothing and equipment and 
preparation of meals for the children. 
Education of migrant children remained among the 
highest priorities for the Migrant Action Program and its 
OEO sponsors throughout the 1960s. Sandage, 
particularly, envisioned MAP'S adult education program as 
a means of improving opportunities for the children. 
Besides increasing the parents' ability to provide 
support and approval of their children's schooling, basic 
literacy and vocational training could help migrant 
parents find permanent work in Iowa communities, thereby 
insuring their children's attendance during the regular 
school year. Three families "settled out" in this way 
during 1966. Although enrollment in most adult classes 
2^"rcs Board Votes To Adopt Migrant Educational 
Program," Reinbeck Courier. 17 March 1966; "Migrant 
Worker Program Well Received," Grundy Register. 14 July 
1966; Sandage, "Something of Substance," pp. 69, 71-72, 
73-77. 
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remained low that year (the total for all classes reached 
only 39), MAP found, through a survey of migrants not 
attending, that classes in a greater variety of 
occupational specialties might increase involvement.^® 
Sandage also administered a Migrant Health grant 
during 1966 that allowed MAP to operate clinics for 
migrant families in six locations around north-central 
w 
Iowa, including Reinbeck, Latimer, Buffalo Center, Manly, 
Clear Lake, and Northwood (see Figure 3). The grant 
allowed the clinic to operate for a total of 128 hours, 
divided in whatever manner best suited the needs of the 
migrant population. The grant also supported school and 
camp visits by a staff of three nurses, reimbursed local 
dentists for a systematic screening through the summer 
school program, and paid the full-time salary for a 
sanitarian to continue efforts to survey housing and 
recommend improvements to growers.^' 
During 1965 and 1966, the OEO Migrant Division and 
the U.S. Public Health Service also funded the program of 
the Muscatine Migrant Committee, formerly the Muscatine 
z^Sandage, "Something of Substance," p. 78-79; 
"Migrants get practical help," Mason City Globe-Gazette. 
27 July 1966; Migrant Action Program, Annual Report 1966. 
n.p. 
z^Sandage, "Something of Substance," p. 68; Migrant 
Action Program, Annual Report 1966. n.p. 
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Migrant Council. An OEO grant of $24,587 in 1965 had 
relieved their chronic financial problems, allowing the 
Committee to continue the day care and summer school 
services operated since 1959. In 1966, OEO increased the 
Committee's funding to $51,279, enabling them to add more 
instructors for each level and buy new materials and 
equipment to replace outdated and worn supplies donated 
in previous years. The day care program for 2- to 5-
year-olds enrolled 118 children over the nine weeks of 
operation and the remedial elementary program served 110 
students during the same period. Because the Muscatine 
Community School District offered the use of one of its 
school buildings to house both the day care and 
elementary school programs, migrant parents could send 
all of the their children aged 2-12 years to a single 
location. That situation encouraged the parents to allow 
their preschoolers to travel by bus from the outlying 
camps to the school in Muscatine. 
The Muscatine Migrant Committee continued to hire 
two public health nurses with the assistance of a Migrant 
Health grant from the Public Health Service and the Iowa 
2'office of Economic Opportunity press release, 2 
July 1965, "Program Development-Iowa," Reel 26, Federal 
Records:OEO, Johnson Library; Muscatine Migrant 
Committee, Progress Report 1966. pp. 4-8, 11, 15, 18, 21-
23. 
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State Department of Health, each paying the salary and 
expenses of a single nurse. The Council hired a school 
nurse in 1966 to supply the health screening and first 
aid formerly offered by one of the public health nurses. 
Unlike the Migrant Action Program's health grant, 
however, the Muscatine program did not operate a family 
health clinic, offer hospitalization assistance, or 
provide dental screening. The nurses made regular visits 
to the 49 farms housing migrant workers in the four 
counties—Louisa, Scott, Cedar, and Muscatine—served by 
the Committee (see Figure 3). They provided emergency 
treatment of illnesses and injuries, immunizations, 
referrals to doctors and family planning agencies, and 
health education programs for the migrants and growers. 
The Committee recognized the limitations of its program, 
particularly the lack of a central health clinic and 
funds to assist with hospitalization costs, and planned 
to request increased funding from both OEO and the Public 
Health Service for an expanded program in 1967.^® 
The Muscatine program seemed to maintain friendly 
relations with the local school district and area 
growers, avoiding some of the problems encountered by the 
Migrant Action Program with growers in their area. 
^®Muscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966. 
pp. 25-27, 31. 
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Offering of adult education had caused some of the 
friction in the north-central region, but did not have 
the same effect in the Muscatine area. Adult vocational 
education, sponsored by the neighboring Illinois Migrant 
Council, assisted 65 migrant families to settle in the 
Muscatine area in 1966. The work of the project 
sanitarian also did not seem to create the same animosity 
among Muscatine area growers as it did in north-central 
Iowa. An explanation for that may lie in the attitude 
reflected by the Committee's insistence that poor 
conditions in the camps required not only grower 
improvements and but also "an educational program to 
teach these impoverished people to learn how to help 
themselves more in seeking improved living and working 
conditions. 
The Iowa Department of Social Welfare assisted the 
Muscatine Migrant Committee program by paying the 
salaries and expenses of four student social workers in 
1966, an increase from only two social workers in 1965. 
These students visited migrant families as they arrived 
to assess their needs and offer information about migrant 
services available in the area. They served as links 
between the migrants and migrant service programs, 
^'Muscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966. 
p. 2, 35-39. Quotation from p. 38. 
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carrying information about educational, health, and 
recreational programs to the migrants and bringing 
information and insight about individual migrant 
families' needs to the service providers. In addition, 
the state Department of Social Welfare reimbursed the 
county welfare department for the cost of family day care 
for migrant children under 2 years old, since state law 
prohibited children under 2 years old from group care. 
Parents of fourteen infants accepted such care for their 
children.^® 
Finally, the Muscatine Migrant Commitcee offered 
social and religious programs, as well as space for the 
Illinois Migrant Council adult education classes, at a 
permanent migrant center in downtown Muscatine. The 
center replaced the services that had been provided by 
the mobile Harvester teams during the early years of the 
Committee's work and operated entirely on local funds 
received from churches, businesses and foundations, and 
the center's thrift shop sales. During the peak periods 
of the migrant season as many as 500 migrants used the 
center on weekends, and 100 to 200 visited on the 
weekdays. Saturday night dances brought the largest 
crowds. Despite such heavy use, the Committee believed 
'"Muscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966. 
pp. 49-55. 
247 
the mobile Harvester teams formerly supported by the 
state and national Council of Churches had reached 
greater numbers by bringing services to isolated camps 
and they hoped to reinstitute that program. Priorities 
had changed by the mid-1960s in the National Council of 
Churches Migrant Ministry, however, reducing the 
availability of funding for primarily recreational 
programs. 
Both the Muscatine Migrant Committee and the Migrant 
Action Program attempted to ascertain what services the 
migrants themselves most wanted in order to make their 
programs as useful as possible to migrants working in 
their area. During the initial summer of programming in 
Muscatine the staff surveyed the migrants at the camps in 
the area asking them which of the services they received 
during the 1959 season benefited them most and what other 
services they might like to see added to the program. 
The Muscatine Migrant Council used the responses to that 
survey in planning the program for the following year. A 
similar process occurred in Mason City, where volunteers 
became aware of unmet needs among migrants in the north-
central Iowa area during their initial summer program in 
^Muscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966. 
pp. 41-47; Kay Longcope, "The Changing Role of the 
Migrant Ministry," Presbyterian Life. 15 November 1967. 
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1964 and incorporated what they learned in preparing 
their program for 1965.'^ 
Such attention to the migrants' perceptions of theic 
own needs became formalized when the programs began to 
receive funding from OEO. Following a directive 
developed from amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act 
in 1965, OEO required Community Action Program grantees 
to practice "maximum feasible participation" of clients 
in the planning and operation of antipoverty programs. 
This directive applied to migrant programs funded under 
Title III-B of the Economic Opportunity Act, since the 
Migrant Division fell under the administrative control of 
the Community Action Program. The OEO expected at least 
one-third of the members of their grantees' boards of 
directors to be from among their client group and also 
recommended the hiring of as many staff members as 
possible from that group. 
The Muscatine Migrant Committee complied with the 
requirement for migrant representation by establishing a 
twelve-member migrant advisory board elected from among 
the migrant population. The Committee expressed a dual 
^^Ann Hillyer, "Report on the Child Care Center for 
Migrant Children in Muscatine, Iowa," in Muscatine 
Migrant Committee, "Migrant Work in Muscatine Iowa, 
1959," Records of the PCML, Eisenhower Library; Interview 
with Betty Jean Clark; "Extend hand to migrants," Mason 
City Globe-Gazette. 6 June 1964. 
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goal for^the advisory board; the elected migrants would 
pass along the migrant community's evaluation of services 
provided by the Muscatine program and their suggestions 
for additional services, and the members of the advisory 
board would gain leadership experience and enhance their 
ability to represent their community's needs. Since it 
took time to arrange for elections among the migrants, 
the advisory committee could only participate in 
evaluation of an already planned program in 1966. The 
Committee hoped to constitute the board much earlier in 
the season in 1967, however, in order to involve the 
migrant members in planning and operating the program 
throughout the summer. The Committee also employed 
migrants as aides in the day care and elementary school 
programs and at the migrant center in Muscatine, in 
compliance with the OEO recommendations.^' 
The Migrant Action Program increased its board of 
directors from six to eighteen members, five of whom came 
from among the migrant, workers served by the program. 
Migrants from four central locations elected 
representatives to the board and a fifth served as an 
officer of the board, representing all of the migrants as 
a group. Program director Sandage remembered that the 
'^Muscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966. 
pp. 3, 39, 41. 
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experience of serving on the MAP board of directors often 
provided the incentive needed for a family to settle in 
the Mason City area permanently. She developed close 
personal friendships with several migrants through this 
process. Migrants also served as teacher and cook aides 
in the day care and summer school programs and as aides 
and interpreters at the family health clinics.^ 
By 1966 two fairly comprehensive programs served the 
migrant farmworkers who traveled through Iowa during the 
growing season. Both offered day care, remedial summer 
school, adult education, sanitation, and health services 
in two distinct areas of Iowa using an appreciable number 
of migrant laborers in cultivating and harvesting a 
variety of crops. Both had their origins in church 
initiatives to help the migrant farmworkers overcome the 
disadvantages of their poverty and feel more welcomed by 
the communities where they worked. Both expanded into 
programs offering not only church-supported community 
acceptance and recreation, but also state-certified and 
federally funded day care, health, and educational 
programs for all ages to assist the migrants in improving 
their condition. A difference in the philosophies of the 
'^"H. 0. Clark heads migrant committee," Mason City 
Globe-Gazette, undated clipping supplied to the author by 
Shirley M. Sandage; Sandage, "Something of Substance," 
p. 70; Migrant Action Program, Annual Report 1966. n.p. 
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programs had begun to surface in 1965 and 1966, however, 
evident in the amount of friction each program generated 
in the local communities they served. By the end of the 
1966 program year that difference began to affect their 
relationship with the OEO Migrant Division, the federal 
agency on whom both depended most for financial support. 
The Migrant Action Program adopted a broad critique 
of the condition experienced by migrants, similar to that 
proposed in repeated federal studies of the migrant 
condition in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Such a 
critique required comprehensive structural solutions that 
involved not only provision of educational and health 
services to individual migrants, but also empowerment of 
migrants in their relations with their employers and with 
the governments to whom they turned for services and 
protections. Such a philosophy brought strong support 
from the OEO, where programs had always been based on 
such a structural "culture of poverty" approach to 
migrant problems. But it also threatened established 
local community relations and centers of power and 
longtime patterns of state and county assistance to needy 
families, leading to strained relations with these local 
252 
communities and county and state social service 
agencies.^ 
The Muscatine Migrant Committee, on the other hand, 
maintained a good working relationship with traditional 
state service agencies, including the Department of 
Health, Department of Social Welfare, and Department of 
Public Instruction. They seemed to accept a more 
conservative philosophy of charitable assistance for 
individual betterment in improving the lives of the poor, 
rather than the more radical stance that called for 
"changing the system." Their advisory board included 
such members as Republican state senator David Stanley, 
who had a reputation for opposing liberal antipoverty and 
labor bills in the state legislature and who worked with 
grower representatives against a bill to prohibit child 
labor in agriculture in Iowa. The Muscatine Migrant 
Committee supported the prohibition on child labor, but 
its relationship with Stanley and growers who served on 
the Committee board of directors undoubtedly worked to 
''interviews with Shirley M. Sandage, Arlington, 
Virginia, 8 October 1988, and Washington, D.C., 7 
November 1989. 
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keep its programming from moving along the lines of 
structural change.^' 
Margaret Garrity, who oversaw both programs for the 
OEO Migrant Division, developed a close working 
relationship with Shirley Sandage and the Migrant Action 
Program. She had encouraged Sandage during the first 
grant application process in 1965, providing guidance 
about the necessary steps to a successful grant when 
Sandage refused to withdraw the request and wait a year 
to develop plans more fully. Garrity publicly expressed 
her pleasure with the program offered by MAP in 1965 and 
encouraged expansion of the summer school into a full-day 
program and the addition of an adult education component. 
She discussed personally with Sandage the problems of 
migrant child labor in Iowa and the need to help migrant 
families find permanent jobs and settle into 
communities/^ 
In contrast, Garrity found the Muscatine Migrant 
Committee program unsatisfactory. She reported misuse of 
^^uscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966; 
Muscatine Migrant Committee, Annual Progress Report 1967 
(Muscatine, la.: Muscatine Migrant Committee, 1967); 
"Fellow Republican Assails Stanley on Migrant Bill," Des 
Moines Register. 17 June 1967; Interview with Betty Jean 
Clark; Interviews with Shirley Sandage. 
'^Sandage, "Something of Substance," pp. 56-57, 63-
65; "Migrant workers program, U.S. consultant: 'Good 
job,*" Mason City Globe-Gazette. 7 August 1965. 
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funds and discriminatory treatment of migrant children to 
the OEO Migrant Division and recommended ending support 
for the day care program. Mary Seaton, a Headstart 
preschool program consultant working out of Cedar Rapids, 
Iowa, inspected the situation and concurred with 
Garrity's assessment of the program's inadequacy. Seaton 
found the physical facilities too small, poorly arranged, 
and unsanitary, and the equipment in terrible condition. 
Teachers adopted a patronizing attitude toward the 
children and used questionable methods of discipline. 
Some of the parents of enrolled children had complained 
about the conditions and about the unwillingness of the 
center staff to involve parents in planning and 
evaluating the program. Moreover, funds allocated for 
the migrant preschool also supported programs for 
resident children.'® 
The Muscatine Migrant Committee contested the 
charges. They explained that the facility visited by 
Garrity and Seaton had been a temporary location used 
only for the final three weeks of the center's operation; 
^Sandage, "Something of Substance," p. 72; Telephone 
interview with Mary Seaton, San Diego, California, 31 
March 1989; Margaret Garrity to Judy Carlisle, 28 
February [1967], "Muscatine Migrant Committee 
(discontinued)," Box 757, Series 42, Records of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity, RG381, National Archives 
and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
255 
the school district needed to prepare the school building 
used for the earlier part of the summer for the upcoming 
regular school session. The day care staff recognized 
the inadequacy of the site and planned to find a better 
alternative in the future. The Iowa Department of Social 
Welfare had licensed the center and a supervisor made a 
number of inspections during the twelve-week session. In 
addition, a day care consultant spent nearly one day each 
week with the program and found it warm and supportive. 
She did recommend an improved educational plan and the 
use of fully trained teachers, rather than college 
students, as well as a permanent location for the program 
to avoid the problems of moving and operating in an 
inadequate physical environment. But she praised the 
integration of migrant children with local children, 
finding the interaction valuable despite language 
barriers.^' 
Disagreements over the number of children served and 
unauthorized expenditures increased the friction between 
the Muscatine program and OEO. Despite efforts by the 
Rev. Philip Auffrey, president of the Muscatine Migrant 
^'Muscatine Migrant Committee, Progress Report 1966. 
pp. 4-8; H. Philip Auffrey, President, Muscatine Migrant 
Committee, to Noel H. Klores, Director, Office of Special 
Field Programs, OEO, 31 January 1967, "Muscatine Migrant 
Committee (discontinued)," Box 757, Series 42, RG381, 
National Archives. 
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Committee in 1967, to explain and defend the program's 
efforts and to account for the fiscal questions, OEO 
refused to fund the Muscatine Migrant Committee after 
1966. Auffrey had expressed concern that such a loss of 
funds would harm the migrants of the Muscatine area, but 
Noel Klores, director of the Office of Special Programs 
under which the Migrant Division operated, assured 
Auffrey that funds would be available for preschool and 
elementary school education programs through other 
sources.^ 
The Muscatine program did not fear a complete end to 
their offerings without OEO funds. The Committee could 
continue the adult education classes provided in 
cooperation with the Illinois Migrant Council, the 
medical program funded by the Public Health Service, the 
social services provided by the state Department of 
Social Welfare, and the migrant center supported by local 
funds. Their concern stemmed from the dependence of 
their day care and summer school programs on OEO funding. 
Based on encouragement from this federal agency, the 
^"Auffrey to Klores, 31 January 1967, RG381, National 
Archives; Noel H. Klores to H. Philip Auffrey, 27 
February 1967, "Muscatine Migrant Committee 
(discontinued)," Box 757, Series 42, RG381, National 
Archives; "Growing Season, Not Waste Ruled Migrant 
School's Size," Muscatine Journal. 21 February 1967, 
p. 2. 
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Muscatine Migrant Committee had expanded its programs for 
children beyond what could be supported by local funds. 
Without a day care and school program, parents would 
either leave children unattended in camps or take them to 
play and work in the fields.^ 
Klores explained to Auffrey that although OEO would 
no longer fund the Muscatine Migrant Committee, the 
Migrant Division had made arrangements to fund all the 
costs of the education program offered by the Migrant 
Action Program, thereby releasing newly available 
education funds from Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act amendments of 1966. The federal 
Office of Education disbursed those funds to the states 
on the basis of the previous year's migrant population. 
State education departments then allocated the money to 
school districts according to the number of migrant 
children those districts could serve. Because OEO 
offered to pay the full costs of migrant children's 
summer education for the Migrant Action Program, the 
State Department of Public Instruction could allocate the 
full amount of Iowa's Title I funds to the Muscatine 
Community School District. Klores also noted that the 
Iowa State Office of Economic Opportunity, which 
^Auffrey to Klores, 31 January 1967, RG381, National 
Archives. 
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administered community action program grants throughout 
the state, could be called on to assist in providing a 
preschool Headstart program for migrant children in the 
Muscatine area/^ 
In fact, the Muscatine program continued under just 
such an arrangement. Because of the Muscatine Migrant 
Committee's good relations with the local community and 
state officials, disapproval of its program by the 
Migrant Division in Washington, D.C., could not force the 
agency to change. The State Department of Public 
Instruction dedicated its entire allotment of $9,800 to 
summer migrant education in Muscatine, since "the funds 
were not needed elsewhere in the state.In addition, 
the adjoining Nichols Independent School District donated 
$17,544 in unused ESEA Title I funds from the 1966-1967 
school year to Muscatine for their summer migrant 
program. Officially the Muscatine Community School 
District operated the migrant summer elementary school, 
but the Muscatine Migrant Committee program continued in 
^^Klores to Auffrey, 27 February 1967, RG381, 
National Archives. 
^'"State Allocates Muscatine $9,800 for Migrant 
School," Muscatine Journal. 2 March 1967. 
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essentially the same form it had for the previous two 
years 
The preschool Headstart program continued through a 
grant of $24,528 from the Iowa East-Central TRAIN 
Community Action Agency. In addition to directly funded 
migrant programs, OEO operated in Iowa through the state 
Office of Economic Opportunity, which in turn made grants 
to locally organized community action agencies. These 
agencies accepted grant proposals and funded local 
programs based on decisions taken by their own local 
citizen boards. The decision not to refund the Muscatine 
Migrant Committee program at the national level, 
therefore, did not necessarily preclude its funding 
through the local agency. Again, the Muscatine Community 
School District acted as the official delegate agency for 
the program, but they simply contracted with the 
Muscatine Migrant Committee to operate a day care center 
in 1967 in the same manner it had operated in previous 
years. 
The Muscatine Migrant Committee added a few new 
services to its program for 1967 as well. The Public 
Growing Season, Not Waste Ruled Migrant School's 
Size," Muscatine Journal. 21 February 1967, p. 2; "School 
for Migrant Children to Open July 3," Muscatine Journal. 
27 June 1967, p. 2. 
^^ibid. 
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Health Service provided funding for weekly family health 
clinics through a private physician in Muscatine and 
added money for emergency hospitalization. The Iowa East 
Central TRAIN Community Action Agency sponsored adult 
basic education at the Muscatine Migrant Center in 
cooperation with the county welfare department and the 
Muscatine Community College.^" Yet although the 
Muscatine Migrant Committee replaced the GEO Title III-B 
funds and even gained funding increases for their health 
and adult education services, loss of backing by the OEO 
Migrant Division nevertheless had a discernible effect on 
the program. While Muscatine was forced to find ways in 
1967 to maintain its program at the same basic level as 
1966, the Migrant Action Program in Mason City expanded 
into new program and geographical areas. 
Even before the ESEA amendments in 1966 that 
specifically provided for migrant education programs 
under Title I, the Migrant Action Program had begun a 
program under the general provisions of Title I to offer 
remedial services to disadvantaged children. In 
cooperation with the Reinbeck and Dinsdale Consolidated 
Community school districts in Grundy County, MAP 
organized special classes for migrant elementary school 
^^uscatine Migrant Committee, Annual Progress Report 
1967. n.p. 
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students during the final month of the regular school 
year, when migrant families had already begun arriving to 
work in the asparagus fields. Two teachers worked with 
31 children in a special classroom separate from the 
nonmigrant students, but the students shared library, 
physical education, and lunch facilities. At the end of 
the school year, the teachers and students transferred to 
the summer education program run by the Migrant Action 
Program. Because MAP provided the teachers' initial 
training, the transition to the summer program worked 
smoothly for both children and staff. This program 
continued in 1967, although its funding came from GEO 
Title III-B sources when the state dedicated its ESEA 
Title I allocation to Muscatine. 
An increase in MAP' S  GEO Migrant Division grant from 
$45,269 in 1966 to $80,716 not only covered the added 
cost of the elementary education program, but also an 
expanded day care program to provide care for infants 
under 2 years old. Although a program of family day care 
for infants seemed to work well in Muscatine, the Migrant 
^^James 0. Schnur, A Handbook for Migrant Education 
in Iowa (Des Moines, la.: Iowa Department of Public 
Instruction, 1975), pp. 11-13; State of Iowa Department 
of Public Instruction, This was Title I—1966. pp. 20-22, 
"Title I ESEA, Fiscal 1966," Box 47, Records of the 
Department of Public Instruction, Iowa State Archives, 
Des Moines, Iowa. 
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Action Program had found migrant parents in the north-
central Iowa area reluctant to allow their young children 
to be placed in private homes. Shirley Sandage, still 
director of the Migrant Action Program in 1967, made 
special arrangements with the state Department of Social 
Welfare to allow group day care of infants for the 
migrant program, a practice generally prohibited by state 
regulations/® 
In other changes made possible by increased funding 
that year, the adult education component became further 
oriented toward helping migrants find permanent jobs. In 
addition to basic education, MAP offered a welding class, 
helped arrange placements with the federal Manpower 
Development and Training Act job-training program, and 
persuaded the area Employment Service offices to remain 
open on occasional evenings so migrants could apply for 
full-year jobs and training programs. In addition, the 
OEO Migrant Division provided money for Sandage to train 
^®Migrant Action Program, Annual Report—1967 (Mason 
City, la.: Migrant Action Program, 1967), n.p.; "$80,716 
for N. Iowa Migrants," Des Moines Register. 30 March 
1967, p. 4; "Area migrant plans outlined," Mason City 
Globe-Gazette. 30 March 1967, p. 17; "Migrant Children 
Start to School," Reinbeck Courier. 8 May 1967. 
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migrant program personnel in Minnesota and North Dakota, 
indicating their full support of her methods/' 
The Migrant Action Program expanded its program 
geographically, as well, in 1967. Through a cooperative 
arrangement with Migrants, Inc., of Minnesota, MAP 
offered day care and elementary education services to 
migrants in several counties in southern Minnesota 
through a school already serving north Iowa migrants in 
Buffalo Center. The Minnesota Department of Education 
provided a grant of $84,102 from the state's ESEA Title I 
funds to underwrite the education of migrant children 
living in Minnesota. In exchange, the Minnesota agency 
operated adult basic education classes in Buffalo Center 
to serve Iowa migrants in that area. The two programs 
further exchanged health and dental services, the 
Minnesota Migrant Health project treating Iowa migrants 
in their area family health clinic and the Migrant Action 
Program offering dental services to Minnesota migrant 
families. The following year Migrants, Inc. requested 
^'Migrant Action Program, Annual Report—1967 (Mason 
City, la.: Migrant Action Program, 1967), n.p.; "$80,716 
for N. Iowa Migrants," Des Moines Register. 30 March 
1967, p. 4; "Area migrant plans outlined," Mason City 
Globe-Gazette. 30 March 1967, p. 17; "Migrant HIT Welding 
Under Way," Reinbeck Courier. 8 June 1967. 
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that MAP expand into southern Minnesota with its full 
array of services. 
In connection with this expansion into Minnesota, 
Iowa Governor Harold Hughes designated MAP the "official 
state agency to channel state and other government 
resources into programs to benefit migrants" late in 
1967.51 Representatives of a number of state agencies 
interested in migrant services joined the board of 
directors. These agencies included the Governor's 
Commission on Children and Youth, the Iowa Welfare 
Association, the Governor's Commission on Children and 
Youth, the Iowa Employment Security Commission, the Iowa 
Civil Liberties Union, the Iowa Catholic Conference, and 
the Iowa Council of Churches. At the same time, MAP 
expanded into the Muscatine area in 1968, offering an 
OEO-funded adult education program.at the invitation of 
the Muscatine Migrant Program. 
50"set Up School For Migrants," Des Moines Register. 
13 June 1967; Migrant Action Program, Annual Report— 
1967. n.p. 
"Expand Migrant Program To Cover Entire State," 
Waterloo Dailv Courier. 11 January 1968, p. 13. 
""Migrant unit to extend service," Mason City Globe-
Gazette. 17 November 1967, p. 13; "Migrant program 
grows," Mason City Globe-Gazette. 11 January 1968, p. 22; 
"Expand Migrant Program To Cover Entire State," Waterloo 
Dailv Courier. 11 January 1968, p. 13; "2-State Pact on 
Education of Migrants," Des Moines Register. 11 January 
1968, p. 3; Sandage, "Something of Substance," p. 95. 
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Thus, while the Muscatine Migrant Committee 
maintained a strong but limited program during the mid-
1960s, the Migrant Action Program continued to expand 
with each year, adding new programs, territories, and 
political sponsors. The potential for conflict simmered 
b e n e a t h  t h e  s u r f a c e ;  e v e n  t h e  O E O  e v a l u a t o r  o f  M A P ' S  
grant request for 1968 recognized it, noting that "the 
Mason City director and the Muscatine Migrant Council do 
not agree on issues . . . there may be some problems as 
time goes on.But in fact those problems never 
developed, at least openly. The two agencies 
successfully continued to operate their programs side-by-
side for the next decade. Based on widely different 
philosophies of how to help migrants improve their lives, 
both found sources of political and financial support to 
maintain the kinds of programs they wished to provide. 
The Migrant Action Program expanded rapidly and 
favored new approaches and ideas. For this they received 
funding and support from the federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity Migrant Division, whose staff admired MAP's 
commitment to experimentation and change. The Muscatine 
Migrant Committee preferred to offer traditional services 
""Statement of CAP Grant, Migrant Action Program," l 
April 1968, n.p., "Migrant Action Program," Box 757, 
Series 42, RG381, National Archives. 
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in familiar ways and found support through state and 
local agencies more comfortable and undoubtedly less 
threatened by an approach that accepted and worked within 
the established social services system of state and local 
government. The federal antipoverty effort to assist 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers provided money for both 
approaches; whether one proved more effective than the 
other in the long term remains to be investigated. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The federal assistance programs for migrant and 
seasonal farmworkers of the 1960s emerged slowly over a 
period of three decades, built on the experience of the 
depression and war years and sustained through the 
inauspicious 1950s by persistent interest groups and 
sympathetic individuals within government. During those 
decades, the political strength of both opposing and 
supporting forces rose and fell with the rise and fall of 
public sympathy for the poverty of farmworkers. Yet 
throughout the period, particularly in the 1950s when, 
assistance to farmworkers foundered in the face of a 
powerful farm lobby and public indifference, determined 
individuals within government played a critical role in 
sustaining federal involvement. Such figures as Secretary 
of Labor James P. Mitchell and Senator Harrison A. 
Williams fostered a renewal of public interest and 
supported the research and planning that enabled reforms 
to take place quickly once public support reappeared. 
Depression-era efforts to provide help to migrant 
farmworkers succeeded as long as a constituency could be 
gathered that felt compelled to relieve the suffering of 
migrant workers as portrayed by liberal advocates in the 
media. When public interest in poverty dissipated with 
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the coining of World War II, so did the constituency on 
which liberals in the New Deal had depended for support. 
The wartime labor shortage and guarantees regarding 
living and working conditions for foreign workers 
together forced some minimum standards for farmworkers 
and assistance in the form of transportation and 
subsistence. But when the war program ended, the reasons 
for assisting migrants disappeared and American 
farmworkers returned to a situation in which they lived 
and worked without any government protections or support. 
Conservative reaction to the liberal "excesses" of 
the New Deal neutralized the remaining support for 
federal assistance to migrant labor in the Democratic 
administration and among the public in the immediate 
post-war period. The influence in Congress of such farm 
organizations as the American Farm Bureau Federation and 
the National Council of Farmers Cooperatives reached 
their apogee during the decade following the war. Fears 
of recurring food shortages, both immediately after World 
War II and with the outbreak of the Korean War helped 
farm employers convince legislators that they needed 
imported farm labor to fill their labor needs. 
Truman and other members of his administration placated 
migrant advocates in government and voluntary religious 
and social welfare associations by sponsoring periodic 
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studies of the needs of migrant labor. But Congress and 
the administration unfailingly ignored the 
recommendations of these studies and favored farm 
employers through the legislative establishment of a 
permanent Mexican farm labor supply program. 
Nevertheless, the operation of that farm labor 
supply program, the bracero program, held the seeds for 
its own demise. Migrant advocates could point to the 
inequity of guaranteeing minimum living and working 
conditions for foreign workers when the federal 
government offered no protections to domestic 
farmworkers. Such arguments gained ground as the latter 
part of the decade of the 1950s witnessed a return of 
liberal interest in the question of poverty in the United 
States. In sympathy with this thinking, Eisenhower's 
Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell began to enforce the 
protection of domestic farmworkers written into the 
bracero program. Although his actions outraged organized 
agriculture and its federal government allies in the 
Department of Agriculture and on the congressional 
agriculture committees, a rising tide of public interest 
in social reform sustained his efforts. 
Drawing on the studies of migrant labor needs 
commissioned by the Truman administration, and those 
conducted by the President's Committee on Migratory Labor 
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during the mid-1950s, the more liberal Senate elected in 
1958 began to consider ways in which the federal 
government might assist domestic farmworkers. An 
indication of this renewed interest, the Senate created a 
Subcommittee on Migratory Labor chaired by Senator 
Harrison A. Williams that studied and publicized 
conditions for farmworkers and regularly submitted 
legislation to correct them. The election of Kennedy as 
President consolidated liberal strength in the federal 
government and indicated a readiness for government-
sponsored social and economic reform. Public interest in 
the condition of migrants solidified following the airing 
of the television documentary Harvest of Shame just weeks 
after the election in November 1960. The first federal 
assistance program for migrant farmworkers passed during 
the Kennedy administration in 1962 and further bills 
followed in every year of Johnson's presidency. 
Although the liberalism of the 1960s witnessed the 
establishment of a series of federal social service 
assistance programs for migrant farmworkers, attempts to 
extend support of social assistance to support of 
collective bargaining failed. By 1968, union organizing 
among farmworkers in California had led to polarization 
of public opinion on the question of farmworker 
legislation. Education, health care, and job-training 
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did not threaten power relations in agriculture; 
unionization and collective bargaining did. Moreover, 
public sympathy with the plight of the poor in America 
had begun to dissipate with increasing violence in the 
civil rights and student movements and the rise of the 
antiwar movement. Divided views on the wisdom of federal 
involvement thwarted attempts at further extension of 
federal assistance to migrants by the end of the Johnson 
period. 
The political rollercoaster that marked the 
emergence of federal assistance programs for farmworkers 
mirrors the rise and fall of other liberal efforts to 
establish federal aid for the disadvantaged in American 
society, particularly the movements for the equality of 
blacks and other minorities. The Ifew Deal witnessed the 
beginning of federal interest in improving conditions. 
The priorities of war during the early 1940s diluted 
support for such improvements, but the heavy involvement 
of government in the war effort sustained what progress 
had been made. The retreat from liberalism and federal 
involvement in American society during the decade 
immediately following the war overwhelmed the power of 
activists to accomplish any advance, but by the end of 
the 1950s the return of liberalism and interest in social 
reform reignited the movements on hold since the war. 
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Although the pace of change in the early 1960s remained 
disappointingly slow for those in favor of liberal social 
change, the rapid passage of civil rights and antipoverty 
legislation after 1963 inspired increasing demands. By 
1968 a polarization had developed, ending the 
possibilities for compromise available in the mid-1960s 
and signaling the likelihood of a renewed retreat from 
social reform efforts. 
In addition to reaffirming the outlines of the rise 
and fall of liberal social reform in post-World War II 
America, this study suggests that the years from 1945 to 
1958 served as an incubation period during which a 
critique of American society's neglect of less-advantaged 
groups quietly but deliberately developed. This critique 
became the agenda available for new federal social 
policies when the political climate changed in 1960. In 
the case of migrant farmworkers, the regulatory actions 
of Secretary of Labor James Mitchell in the late 1950s 
and the legislative proposals of Senator Harrison 
Williams in the early 1960s drew directly from the 
reports of the President's Committee on Migratory Labor 
and the President's Commission on Migratory Labor, both 
prepared during the early to mid-1950s. These actions 
and proposals subsequently became part of the agenda of 
the war on poverty in the mid-1960s. Thus, the federal 
273 
assistance programs for migrant and seasonal farmworkers 
that finally emerged in the 1960s depended for their 
substance on the recommendations for improving farmworkeir 
conditions developed in the late 1940s and 1950s. 
A critical change occurred in the late 1950s in the 
way in which decisions about migrant farmworkers were 
made within government that both accompanied the rise of 
liberal leadership on farmworker issues and. helped to 
provide that leadership with the political power to 
achieve its reforms. This change supports the generally 
accepted contention of agricultural historians that 
farmers lost political power in government as an 
increasingly urban and liberal population began to view 
agricultural interests as a barrier to reform. At the 
urging of James Mitchell, Eisenhower had appointed the 
Secretary of Labor to chair the President's Committee on 
Migratory Labor in 1954. The Labor Secretary already 
held responsibility for the operations of the foreign 
farm labor supply program; with this appointment, the 
administration acknowledged the Department of Labor as 
the center of policy development for domestic migrant 
farmworkers as well. Mitchell used that position, and 
his powers under Public Law 78, to accomplish some 
limited federal assistance to domestic migrants over the 
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objections of the Department of Agriculture and the 
congressional agriculture committees. 
A newly liberal Senate accomplished a similar 
reorganization in 1959 that transferred jurisdiction over 
migrant farm labor questions from the Agriculture 
Committee to the new Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Legislative 
proposals for federal migrant assistance programs and 
minimum labor standards no longer required the approval 
of the Agriculture Committee before reaching the Senate 
floor. This reorganization greatly reduced the ability 
of farm organizations to alter or kill farm labor 
initiatives that threatened employer control of the farm 
labor supply system. Thus, by the end of the 1950s, the 
federal labor establishment, with interests in liberal 
reform of the farm labor situation, had wrested political 
control of that issue from the agriculture establishment. 
Although agricultural interests in government did not 
lose all power to influence decisions on farm labor 
questions, they did lose their ability to manage the 
terms of their discussion. Coupled with the more general 
public interest in social reform by the end of the 1950s, 
these changes severely curtailed the political power of 
farm employers. 
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The final conclusion of this study arises from 
examination of implementation of federal assistance 
programs in Iowa. Although this investigation does not 
evaluate the effectiveness of Iowa's two quite different 
programs for migrant farmworkers, it does illustrate that 
agencies which offered programs funded from federal 
sources managed to maintain substantial local control 
through creative use of overlapping federal authorities. 
Because the federal government offered grants to support 
state and local migrant assistance through more than one 
program, agencies could apply for support to whichever 
agency suited their local needs and program philosophies. 
For example, the Migrant Action Program came to 
depend for most of its funds on the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) Migrant Division. The Migrant Division 
stressed a comprehensive approach to providing needed 
services to migrant workers and their families through 
sympathetic government and private nonprofit agencies, 
thereby circumventing local power structures that had 
neglected migrants in the past. The Migrant Action 
Program (MAP) shared this philosophy. Its program 
director maintained a close relationship with the OEO 
project officer and both accepted and suggested ideas to 
expand its services across a wide area of north-central 
Iowa and into neighboring states. With its support 
276 
primarily based on a relationship with the federal 
government, the program consciously crossed local and 
state government boundaries in providing programs. As a 
result, MAP weakened its ties to local communities and 
state government and became increasingly dependent on 
federal funding for its survival. 
The Muscatine Migrant Committee, in contrast, 
offered migrant services in a clearly defined four-county 
area that did not change for the entire decade covered by 
this study. The Committee maintained strong ties to the 
community of Muscatine and continued to receive 
substantial support from local churches throughout the 
period. It supplemented its federally funded education, 
day care, and health services with recreational and 
religious offerings, unlike MAP, which had given up its 
recreational offerings and religious ties within a year 
of its organization. Although the Muscatine Migrant 
Committee received funds from the OEO Migrant Division 
for two years, its preference for a more traditional 
approach to services for migrants and its disinclination 
to challenge established authority led to a loss of those 
funds. When the Muscatine program lost its OEO funding, 
however, the state Department of Public Instruction 
replaced the money to operate its educational program 
with state-administered federal funds under Title I of 
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the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The Muscatine 
program's traditional approach to migrant services did 
not challenge established authority, making it an 
appealing agency for the state school system to fund, 
unlike the Migrant Action Program, which never received 
Title I funds from Iowa. 
Further state and local studies must be made before 
these observations of the ways in which local agencies in 
Iowa implemented migrant assistance programs can be 
considered representative. Yet on their own they offer 
some suggestive considerations about the distance that 
can develop between federal legislative intentions and 
programs on the local level. Those differences can be 
constructive or destructive, depending on one's 
perspective. In the case of migrant assistance programs, 
supporters of the recommendations for social and 
political change advanced by liberals in government and 
private advocacy organizations would be disappointed to 
see that their legislation could provide for continuation 
of traditional programs like that in Muscatine. 
Opponents of such change, on the other hand, would find 
such uses of migrant assistance funds encouraging as a 
counter to threatening programs like MAP that actually 
proposed to carry out the expansive changes supporters of 
federal migrant assistance had advocated for thirty 
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years. This flexibility in migrant assistance programs 
as they took form on the local level suggests a 
characteristic perhaps inherent in reform efforts through 
the American federal system: dispersion of power among 
many levels of government can protect local communities 
against abrupt change by moderating comprehensive reforms 
considered too radical by established authorities. 
Overall, however, the position of migrant 
agricultural workers in American society improved during 
the post-World War II period and federal assistance 
programs could claim much credit for that change. By 
1968, migrant farmworkers had access to health care, day 
care, educational opportunities from elementary school 
through the community college level, and improved 
standards for housing and sanitation. Crew leader 
registration requirements had ended some of the 
exploitation of individual migrants and transportation 
safety regulations curtailed the number of fatal 
accidents stemming from transportation of migrants to 
worksites. Failure to include most migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers in major labor standards and protection 
legislation kept seasonal farmworkers economically 
insecure, but the social programs and safety regulations 
at least offered a measure of improvement in these 
workers' daily lives. 
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Congress and subsequent presidential administrations 
have made changes in federal farmworker programs over the 
last two decades, but the approach developed in the 1950s 
and 1960s has remained the model. Such social programs 
as health care and educational opportunities garner 
support even from conservative administrations. The 
thrust remains to improve the individual and offer him or 
her a path out of the migrant stream, rather than to 
improve the working conditions and economic return for 
seasonal employment in agriculture. Individual success 
stories abound, but as the 1990 public television 
documentary New Harvest; Old Shame makes clear, for those 
who cannot escape, the poverty and insecurity of migrant 
and seasonal farm work remains little changed since 1945. 
Although we should not disregard the accomplishments of 
these programs for the individuals they have aided, we 
also must not lose sight of the fact that they have not 
altered the underlying economic and political structures 
that allow this system to persist. 
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